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DOSSIER
SELF-DECEPTION: NEW ANGLES
ANNEMEYLAN
UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH
INTRODUCTION
It is no wonder that self-deception has always sparked philosophers’ interest.
Self-deception is a very intriguing phenomenon from both the descriptive and the
normative points of view. First, self-deception raises a number of descriptive
problems. Should we model self-deception on others’ deception and hold that the
self-deceived subject intends to deceive herself? Or should we rather—granted
that some motivational state must be part of the self-deceptive process—iden-
tify self-deception’s motivational cause with a desire? Famously enough, the
classical opposition between intentionalist (e.g., Davidson, 1986) and defla-
tionist accounts (e.g., Mele, 1997, 2001; Nelkin, 2002) of self-deception revolves
around these questions. Intentionalist and deflationist accounts face different
sorts of worries and each seems to succeed where the other fails. For instance,
deflationism has been accused of not faring as well as intentionalism with
regards to the selectivity problem (Talbott, 1995). For its part, intentionalism—
mostly because it does not allow the self-deceptive process to take place
unknowingly—has been charged of raising paradoxes (the well-known “static”
and “dynamic” paradoxes; see, e.g., Mele, 2001). Furthermore, self-deception
typically involves a certain epistemic discomfort or tension (Funkhouser, 2005;
Noordhof, 2009; Van Leeuwen, 2007). Subjects do not hold self-deceptive
beliefs in the simple, wholehearted way in which they hold their other, non-self-
deceptive beliefs. Most often, doubts nag at the back of their minds and prevent
them from being completely at ease with their beliefs. Another descriptive prob-
lem is to explain this tension.
Self-deception is also normatively fascinating. Self-deception is often considered
to be an irrational cognitive phenomenon. But what makes it irrational? Is it not,
at least occasionally, acceptable to deceive oneself?According to Joseph Butler
(1726/2006) and Adam Smith (1759/2002), self-deception is always morally
reprehensible, mainly because we get used to casting a too-favourable light on
the morality of our own actions by self-deceiving ourselves about them. This
gradually corrupts our moral judgment and prevents us for correcting our moral
mistakes. Much more recently, Van Leeuwen (2009) has claimed that self-decep-
tion is not even “egoistically good” since it does not make us happy.1 In contrast,
Barnes (1997) has argued that in some sufficiently difficult or costly circum-
4
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stances, “the avoidance of a painful truth” (chapter 9, p. 165) is not always prima
facie morally bad (even though, according to Barnes, the epistemic cowardice
that goes along with self-deception is prima facie objectionable). Additionally,
several psychologists and neuroscientists (see, e.g., Sharot, 2011; Taylor, 1989)
have emphasized the positive effects that (positive) self-deceptive evaluations of
ourselves have on our mental health. These evaluations even seem able to
promote our ability “to care about others” and “to engage in productive and
creative work” (Taylor and Brown, 1988, p. 193).
While the first four papers included in this special issue address some descrip-
tive issues raised by self-deception, the last two articles deal rather with norma-
tive questions surrounding it.
Pedrini’s paper “Liberalizing Self-Deception: Replacing ‘Paradigmatic State
Accounts’ of Self-Deception with a Dynamic View of the Self-Deceptive
Process” suggests a change of paradigm. Philosophers should give up the “snap-
shot” conception of self-deception—that is, the currently prevailing assumption
that self-deception is a stative phenomenon. Pedrini suggests that we should
replace this classical conception with a dynamic and processual account.Accord-
ing to her proposal, self-deception is a process that is susceptible to including
what she describes as “a multitude of highly tensive and unstable mental states”
that are not only cognitive but also conative and affective.
The purpose of Hubbs’s contribution is also to illuminate the very nature of self-
deception. In line with Barnes’s anxiety-avoidance account, he argues that self-
deception results from the “tendency of the mind to avoid thinking unpleasant
thoughts.” An additional, and to my knowledge, innovative element of Hubbs’s
view is, however, as follows. When this tendency is satisfied—that is, when the
subject holds the self-deceptive belief— she also takes the positive feeling (or
pleasure) that comes with the self-deceptive belief to signify its warrant or its
truth while it is, in fact, not the mark of truth but rather the mark of the believer
believing what she wants to believe. In other words, the self-deceived subject
confuses “the epistemic satisfaction of believing what is warranted” with “the
thumotic satisfaction of believing what he wants to be true.” According to
Hubbs’s paper, self-deception results from a phenomenologically describable
confusion between two distinct feelings of satisfaction.
Ohlhorst’s article focuses on a specific form of self-deception, which he calls
tragic self-deception. In tragic self-deception, Ohlhorst claims, the self-deceived
subject holds a belief that is immune to all pieces of evidence, even compelling
ones. But is it possible to dismiss compelling evidence? Does this not amount
to madness or deep irrationality? Ohlhorst defends the possibility of tragic self-
deception by bringing in the Wittgensteinian notion of hinges or certainties.
Briefly, hinges are acceptances (for instance, that the earth exists) that constitute
the necessary rock-bottom of our knowledge and, most importantly, that lie
beyond evidential justification. Hinges have, according to Ohlhorst, their
analogue in the affective domain. These are iHinges, acceptances that are so
5
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crucial for our affective balance (for instance, the acceptance that your daugh-
ter is not a persistent murderer) that they also lie beyond evidential justification.
Finally, iHinges are what makes genuine cases of tragic self-deception possible.
For some time already, discussions surrounding self-deception have included
findings from empirical science. For instance, significant inspiration has been
found in the psychological studies addressing our “bounded rationality” (see,
e.g., Mele, 1999 and Scott-Kakures, 2001). Lauria’s affectivist filter view of
self-deception extends this trend but also innovates on it by introducing specific
results from neuroscience into the picture of self-deception. More precisely,
Lauria’s paper defends an account on which affective mental states (e.g.,
emotions like fears, shame, etc.) play a crucial role in the self-deceptive process
at the stage of the appraisal of the evidence. His view is supported by, among
other things, the fact that such an appraisal is accompanied by a certain neuro-
biological mechanism—mainly, dopaminergic activity that takes precedence
over neural structures, such as frontal activation and negative somatic markers.
This neuroscientifically informed account of self-deception has the advantage
furthermore—Lauria argues—of solving the problem of selectivity (Talbott,
1995) and of unifying “straight” and “twisted” self-deception (Lazar, 1997;
Mele, 1999), while other affectivist accounts do not score as well on these two
problems.
Deceiving yourself is generally considered to be irrational. But what makes self-
deception irrational? Sarzano’s paper focuses on this question. She gets part of
her inspiration from the epistemological literature on pragmatic encroachment.
“Pragmatic encroachment” refers to the cluster of views according to which the
possession of epistemic states like knowledge and justified beliefs does not
exclusively depend on truth-related factors. Pragmatic considerations—most
famously the costs and benefits of knowing/believing something (de Rose,
1992)—also seem to have an influence on whether one really knows or holds
a rational belief. For instance, in some cases, the costs of being wrong about
p are such that the right attitude to hold is, for instance, to suspend judgment
about p. Now, as Sarzano writes, not only are the costs/benefits of holding a
belief occasionaly considered (Mele, 2001) to part of the mechanism that initi-
ates self-deception, but the influence of such practical considerations on the
production of the self-deceptive belief also seems to make the latter irrational.
But, how could practical considerations be responsible for the rationality of
our doxastic attitudes (at least, according to the pragmatic Encroachers) while
explaining their irrationality in the case of self-deception? In the last part of
her article, Sarzano suggests various answers to this question. She differenti-
ates right and wrong ways in which practical considerations might influence
our doxastic attitudes.
Another important normative question is whether we are responsible for deceiv-
ing ourselves; van Loon’s paper addresses this issue. According to McHugh’s
account of doxastic responsibility (see, e.g., McHugh, 2017—which is currently
one of the most influential accounts), our being responsible for our beliefs is a
matter of these beliefs being responsive to our reasons. In her paper, van Loon
6
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shows that one implication of Mele’s account of self-deception is that self-decep-
tive beliefs are always reasons responsive. According to van Loon, self-decep-
tive beliefs “à la Mele” always fulfil the crucial necessary condition for doxastic
responsibility.
As it should now be clear, the six articles included in this special issue approach
self-deception from different angles, bringing in notions, tools, and results from
distinct research areas. The outcome, hopefully, is a collection of essays that
renews the traditional debate surrounding self-deception and that opens several
original lines of research.
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NOTES
1 See also Baron (1988) for some other charges against self-deception.
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LIBERALIZING SELF-DECEPTION: REPLACING
PARADIGMATIC-STATE ACCOUNTS OF
SELF-DECEPTIONWITH A DYNAMIC VIEW
OF THE SELF-DECEPTIVE PROCESS
PATRIZIA PEDRINI
UNIVERSITY OF FLORENCE, ITALY
ABSTRACT:
In this paper, I argue that paradigmatic-state accounts of self-deception suffer from a
problem of restrictedness that does not do justice to the complexities of the phenome-
non. In particular, I argue that the very search for a paradigmatic state of self-deception
greatly overlooks the dynamic dimension of the self-deceptive process,which allows the
inclusion of moremental states than paradigmatic-state accounts consider. I will discuss
the inadequacy of any such accounts, and I will argue that we should replace them with
a dynamic view of self-deception that ismore liberal regarding themental states inwhich
self-deceivers may find themselves.
RÉSUMÉ :
Dans cet article, je soutiens que les explications de l’auto-illusion en termes d’un état «
paradigmatique » souffrent d’un problème de limitation qui ne rend pas justice à la
complexité du phénomène. Plus précisément, j’avance que la recherche même d’un état
paradigmatique néglige tout à fait la dimension dynamique du processus d’auto-illusion,
de sorte à inclure davantage d’états mentaux que ne le font les explications en termes
d’un état paradigmatique. Après avoir démontré l’insuffisance de ces dernières, je propo-
serai que nous devrions les remplacer par une conception dynamique de l’auto-illusion qui
serait plus flexible quant aux états mentaux potentiellement vécus par des personnes
sous l’emprise de l’auto-illusion.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The problem of the mental state in which self-deceivers find themselves has a
long tradition. It can be traced back at least to Mele’s early objections (1997,
2001) to Davidson’s intentionalism (1985). Famously, Davidson’s idea that self-
deception must be intentional was criticized by Mele for leading to a couple of
paradoxes, one of which is the “static paradox,” as it is known.1 It regards the
mental state a self-deceiver is in when the self-deceptive process is successfully
accomplished. Mele’s argument is well known: if self-deception is intentional,
and self-deceivers thus intend their self-deception, at the end of the self-decep-
tive process they must retain the belief that not-p—that is, the belief about how
things really stand—while also getting to believe the self-deceptive, desired
falsity that p. If this is correct, then it seems that the final, resulting mental state
in which self-deceivers find themselves is somehow paradoxical, amounting to
both believing that p and also believing that not-p.2 Thus, Mele suggested that
we should get rid of intentionalism altogether and resort to focusing on the moti-
vational set of the subjects engaging in self-deception: since the subjects desire
that not-p, the desire in question biases their evaluation and selective search for
evidence. This opens the door to a motivationally distorted treatment of the rele-
vant data, which leads the subjects directly into believing that not-p, without
also retaining any belief that p.
However, although the solution offered by Mele may be a satisfactory way out
of the static paradox, it has the drawback of describing the state of mind of the
self-deceiver as quite peaceful: if a full-blown belief that p is successfully
reached, then there is no trace of the psychological tension that seems, instead,
to be highly typical of self-deception. For this tension is obviously due to the fact
that the motivationally distorted self-deceptive process runs counter to evidence
that is at hand or easily available that not-p.
Of course, scholars are sensitive to the interplay of motivation and evidence,
and to their opposing thrusts.And once the problem of the psychological tension
created by this contrasting interaction has been posed as crucial, scholars have
continued to investigate the nature of this resulting, final state of mind of self-
deception, and have tried to keep psychological tension in the picture. To this
end, they have advanced interesting and refined analyses of what this final state
must be, virtually all requiring that a satisfactory account of self-deception must
preserve and account for the psychological tension that is characteristic of the
self-deceiver’s final state of mind.
In this paper, I wish to raise the issue, again and afresh. I will argue that, while
most accounts currently on offer are on the right track in their search for states
of mind that can account for tension, I will also object that most of them are on
a misleading track insofar as they look, or tend to look, for a paradigmatic, final
mental state for self-deception. For virtually all accounts working with para-
digmatic states for self-deception suffer from a potential flaw that should be
carefully considered—namely, a certain restrictedness, at least in spirit. I say “at
12
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least in spirit” because, if a state is presented as paradigmatic, that need not be
necessary. Thus, there may be room for predicting other mental states in a
descriptive account of the mental state a self-deceiver is in—a less paradigmatic
one, say, and yet capable of satisfying the constraints set by the motivated self-
deceiver’s struggle with opposing evidence. This seems to be especially true for
all those accounts that offer only sufficient (and not also necessary) conditions
for self-deception, such as Mele’s.3 However, the rhetoric of most accounts
addressing the problem of the paradigmatic mental state of self-deception may
lead us to assume that, when self-deceiving, more often than not we are in a
certain highly typical state, and to focus on that state of mind at the expense of
other possibilities. My plan in this paper is to show that these other possibilities
are not only live, but also quite common and highly typical as well. They are so
common and typical that, as a matter of fact, once we have and keep this empir-
ical truth in view, any claims regarding states that can be taken as paradigmatic
become fatally weakened.
One might ask why there has been such a great focus on the problem of a para-
digmatic state. Most likely, it is created by a bias in favour of a static state, which
questionably guides the analysis toward what I will dub a “snapshot theory” of
self-deception. Unpacking the metaphor, one discovers that a snapshot theory of
self-deception seems to be designed to take a descriptive, static picture of the
mental state a self-deceiver is in. But this focus on static states may be highly
misleading and lead us to exclude other candidates for typical self-deceptive
mental states.
Starting from these premises, I will argue that self-deception is a psychological
process before it is an end state—a process set in motion by the force field
created by motivation and evidence. Accordingly, I will offer an argument in
favour of replacing what I call “paradigmatic-state accounts” of self-deception
with a dynamic view of the self-deceptive process. Once we have seen the
reasons in favour of this move, and once the move is made, we will be in a posi-
tion to see that mental states that are taken to be paradigmatic of self-deception
should be liberalized, so as to include all the variations allowed by the evolving
combinations of the two factors of motivation and evidence. I will focus fully on
motivation and evidence as the two fundamental constraints singling out the
phenomenon of self-deception. I will explain how the pull of motivation and the
thrust of reality create a force field that is dynamic, often in motion, strained by
the variations in these two components that may be triggered by various contin-
gent or noncontingent factors. If we bear it in mind that self-deception amounts
to a dynamic psychological space determined by both motivation and evidence,
then a dynamic view becomes a promising option.And this significantly changes
our approach to the attitudes that are the products of the self-deceptive process.
Such a move turns out to be liberalizing regarding the mental states that can be
instantiated in self-deception and whose possibilities should be brought fully
into the picture.
13
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Here is the plan of the paper. In section 2 I will discuss the inadequacy of the
paradigmatic-state accounts of self-deception, thus creating the premises for
moving forward toward formulating an alternative view. In section 3 I will
explore the most promising alternative—namely, a dynamic, more liberal theory
of the self-deceptive process, which amounts to my proposed positive view. I
will also address one obvious objection to my positive view, and I will conclude
by briefly indicating what my approach suggests in terms of refining and apply-
ing the conceptual mental categories that prove to be useful for capturing self-
deception.
2. THE INADEQUACY OF PARADIGMATIC-STATE ACCOUNTS OF
SELF-DECEPTION
As we have seen, the problem of including and explaining psychological tension
in a satisfactory account of self-deception has led several scholars to advance
proposals suggesting that we should adopt an “attitude adjustment approach”
(cf. Deweese-Boyd, 2017) regarding the mental state that is the product of self-
deception. Since full-blown self-deceptive belief as a final product of self-decep-
tion seems unable to explain why the self-deceiver experiences psychological
tension, we can choose to adopt alternatives. One possible alternative is to posit
some quasi-doxastic or other nondoxastic attitudes towards the self-deceptive
proposition. Candidates are hopes, suspicions, doubts, anxieties (Edwards,
2013), “besires” (Egan, 2009), pretense (Gendler, 2007), and imagination (Lazar,
1999). On this view, the subject is not required to end up believing a desired
proposition. Rather, the subject can either entertain the hope that the desired
proposition is true or suspect that the desired proposition is not true, or the
subject can have doubts about its truth value or maybe also anxiously fear the
possibility of it being false.All these attitudes seem to be able to explain why the
self-deceiver is in a highly tensive state of mind: since the evidence points to a
certain truth value of the desired proposition—that is, it suggests that it is at least
likely that it is false—the subject struggles with such evidence and tries to see
if the desired proposition can be true.
Another alternative is to alter the content of the proposition believed.We can do
so without incurring any static paradox of the kind associated with the tradi-
tional intentionalist models of self-deception. For instance, Funkhouser (2005)
suggests that self-deceivers have a second-order belief about their believing that
p, while they do not believe that p at all. Reality shows them that p cannot be true
or that p is unlikely; however, they process the evidence in a motivationally
biased way, so that they can at least believe that they believe that p.4 That creates
a tension between the false second-order belief that they believe that p, along
with the dispositions associated with having it, and the first-order belief that not-
p, along with the dispositions associated with it. Bilgrami (2006) also suggests
that the tension is due to a conflict, this time between a fully authoritative, true,
second-order belief about a completely transparent, first-order belief that p, and
another first-order belief that not-p that is, however, not transparent, and that
does not generate any second-order belief that one also has the first-order belief
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that not-p. Here the tension is created either by the conflict between the trans-
parent, first-order belief that not-p and the opaque, first-order belief that p, or by
the clash between the true, second-order belief that one has a first-order belief
that p and the first-order belief that not-p, or both, along with the complications
created by the further dispositions associated with all of these beliefs.
More recently, Lynch (2012) has claimed that “wholeheartedly believing what
one wants to be true may be rare in self-deception (p. 440), and that we should
look for a “more fine-grained way of capturing the attitudes of subjects towards
propositions than can be accomplished with the coarser apparatus of belief” (p.
438). Thus, he claims that unwarranted degrees of confidence in p are enough
to explain tension.
He also argues that we have self-deception as long as the subject puts some
different degree of confidence in p and in not-p, whereas any phenomena in
which the subject avoids altogether the question whether p are best captured as
“escapism” (Lynch, 2012, p. 446). He draws on Longeway (1990) and describes
escapism as a defence against reality. According to Lynch, “deep conflict cases”
best represent escapism: while in self-deception there is a cognitive tension due
to the different degrees of confidence placed by the subject in p and not-p, in
deep conflict cases we have a more profound tension that is behavioural. The
subjects here are taking a greater risk by acting upon their attitudes than they take
by just speaking and thinking (p. 435). Often the subjects engage in avoidance
behavior. Such actions give us reasons to think that the subjects are not simply
struggling cognitively with p and not-p, but that they are investing in p in a way
that shows that they must have found a way to avoid any vacillation as to
whether p. According to Lynch, this may not be self-deception any longer—or
at least not a paradigmatic case of it. Interestingly, however, he admits that it
may not be a necessary truth that self-deception contains tension, and allows for
the possibility that, at times, the subject may become fully convinced of the
desired proposition that p (p. 442). I will come back to this later in the paper.
In the context of distinguishing willful ignorance from self-deception, Lynch
(2016) is even more explicitly interested in singling out paradigmatic cases of
self-deception. He is aware that “philosophical analysis of a phenomenon is
challenging enough at the best of times, but it becomes all the more difficult
when there is disagreement over what the paradigmatic cases are. Such is the
situation, unfortunately, with regards to self-deception” (p. 513). However, he
thinks that “there are some features that are generally recognized to be present
in paradigmatic self-deception,” such as
(1) the subject’s encounter with evidence indicating that some true
proposition, not-p, is true; and
(2) the strong desire of the subject that p be true.
15
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
So, according to (1) and (2), in paradigmatic self-deception the subject encoun-
ters unwelcome evidence, indicating that not-p. Lynch adds that “beyond that,
disagreement persists, particularly with regard to the subject’s epistemic/doxas-
tic relation with the truth” (p. 513).
Lynch then claims that approaches regarding paradigmatic cases of self-decep-
tion can be sorted into three categories (p. 513-514):
(a) unwarranted-belief accounts, where the subject ends up self-decep-
tively believing that p (Mele, 1997, is an example of such an account);
(b) implicit-knowledge accounts (e.g., Bach, 1981), where the subject
does not believe that p, but recognizes the truth of not-p, while such
knowledge is “shunned, ignored, or kept out of mind, and the subject
acts in various ways” as if the subject believed that p, though other
behaviour may betray the knowledge that not-p (p. 514); and
(c) intermediate accounts, where the subject both believes that p and
believes that not-p (Davidson, 1985), or where what the subject believes
remains indeterminate (e.g., Funkhouser, 2009).
All these approaches agree on the discrepancy between the attitude toward p
held by the self-deceiver and the attitude the self-deceiver should have, given the
available evidence. Lynch adds that it seems to be characteristic of self-decep-
tion that the subject encounters the countervailing evidence, while this is not
typical of wishful ignorance. For in willful ignorance the subject successfully
manages to avoid evidence altogether and does this voluntarily and intentionally.
This guarantees that willful ignorance lacks the encounter with evidence that is
typical of self-deception.
However, Lynch thinks that this is no conclusive evidence that willful ignorance
is not a kind of self-deception after all. For the former could, for example, be a
nonparadigmatic case of self-deception. Lynch contemplates this possibility
because he is persuaded that, if we had an analysis that did not rely on any of the
three views listed above, we could get different results. If such an analysis were
available, maybe we could be in a position to see that willful ignorance and self-
deception are two of a kind, notwithstanding their obvious differences. I have
reasons to think that the theory I will develop could be a promising candidate for
being such a view. But before I move on to it, it is important to see why all the
paradigmatic-state accounts are inadequate.
All the approaches seen thus far lead us to think that there must be a character-
istic, paradigmatic state the self-deceiver is in. They do so by looking statically
at the final product of the self-deceptive process. Even if Lynch seems to be
more liberal in admitting that more states than are predicted by a paradigmatic-
state account could be instantiated by the self-deceiver, he ends up adopting a
rhetoric suggestive of the importance of singling out the paradigmatic state. Inso-
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far as all these views look statically at the allegedly final product of self-decep-
tion, they can be described as snapshot theories: that is, it is as if they take a
static, instantaneous picture of the mental state that a self-deceiver is in at a
certain time t, presumably taken to be representative of the central phase of self-
deception, and try to unpack its features so as to meet the constraint of tension.
By doing so, however, these views lay themselves open to a quite obvious objec-
tion: how should we deal with the empirical discovery that, with regard to the
self-deceptive process, self-deceivers are in mental states other than the para-
digmatic one?What if these other states are capable of meeting the constraint of
tension, too? Obviously, the answer will be that all those accounts suffer from a
restrictedness that puts us on the wrong track in our attempts to give a descrip-
tion of the phenomenon, which is rich enough to include other possible, often
empirically instantiated, mental products. This is exactly what I think happens
if we go beyond the biasing search for a paradigmatic state and head toward a
more accurate focus on the self-deceptive process as a whole.
The analysis I will propose in the next section is given over precisely to show-
ing how we should frame our view of self-deception, by considering the process,
its moving forces, its dynamics, and all its possible, evolving, mental products.
We will see that there is a multitude of highly tensive and unstable mental states
that can be instantiated by a self-deceiver, and which have been unjustifiably
excluded by paradigmatic-state accounts. However, as long as we persist in
trying to freeze self-deception in a certain state instantiated at a certain time t,
we lose the chance to give citizenship to all those other mental states. Insofar as
a dynamic view is interested in focusing on the process instead, it leads us to
liberalize the varieties of mental states in which a self-deceiver may be. Let me
then move on to an outline of such a dynamic, liberal view.
3. A DYNAMIC, LIBERAL VIEW OF SELF-DECEPTION
As we have seen, virtually all scholars who study self-deception agree that there
are two main forces that set the process in motion—namely, motivation that p
be true, and the thrust of evidence that points to not-p. Both factors are active
together, and most likely they create a force field that can be, and in fact often
is, highly dynamic. For obviously these factors can vary, and co-vary, depend-
ing on contingencies that can occur over time. For instance, there may be times
when self-deceived subjects feel more strongly the pull of their motivation that
p be true. Accordingly, they may engage more intensely in their biased treat-
ment of the evidence or of the hypotheses associated with what the evidence
suggests. At other times, instead, the encounter with evidence that not-pmay be
more pressing, either because further evidence is provided or because the
evidence already possessed is now seen in a less prejudiced light or else because
the motivation that p be true as such is weakened by other intervening factors
that have nothing to do with evidence (e.g., a diminished interest in p being true
on the part of the subject).
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There are also presumably noncontingent factors that can intervene in the
dynamic of the process. For instance, these may be certain quite stable features
of the subject’s psychology. For example, if a subject is well trained to treat
evidence impartially, even if motivation may have more or less momentarily
suspended, shunned, or weakened that epistemic virtue, the latter may at some
point just spontaneously strike back and correct, at least for a while, the moti-
vationally distorted treatment of evidence. This may not guarantee the subject’s
complete exit from self-deception, as it may be the case that the motivation that
p is true strikes back in turn once again. But it can certainly change the specific
mental state self-deceiver is in at least temporarily. Perhaps, before such epis-
temic virtue made its claims felt, the subject placed more confidence in p than
he or she does now. But if the drives of motivation rise forcefully again, the
subject may revert once again to a higher degree of confidence in p.
Let me now expand on the possible mental states a self-deceiver can experience
with regard to the self-deceptive process. It may not simply be the case that
degrees of confidence vary, as Lynch (2012) correctly diagnoses. It may also be
the case that a subject can at times temporarily reach even a state of full-blown
belief that p, while, owing to the variations in the factors described, the same
subject can revert to less than that, even to the antipode of believing not-p. Of
course, given the dynamics at work, none of these attitudes seems set to last. Or
else there may be times when the subject reaches a false second-order belief that
he or she has a first-order believe that p, while truly believing that not-p, as
Funkhouser (2005) requires. And there may also be moments when the subject
is in an intermediate, indeterminate state of mind, possibly even recognizing it
as such.
As we see, the dynamic force field that self-deception amounts to can easily
instantiate a vacillation between p and not-p, one that can (and often does)
include a variety of attitudes toward p and not-p. No attitudes can be excluded
in principle, and what temporal extension and qualitative intensity such vacilla-
tion may have is a totally empirical question. It all depends on the individual
subject, that subject’s specificities, and the contingent evolution of his or her
practical and epistemic interaction with evidence and reality.
This vacillation over time is best captured, I think, as an “attitude seesaw.” There
is no reason to exclude from it a priori any of the states that have been indicated
as paradigmatic by different scholars, including those that they judge nonpara-
digmatic, such as escapism. There seems to be no a priori reason why a subject
could not at times engage in escapism as well, perhaps emerging from it after a
while. Or a subject might just start with escapism and then move on to other less
extreme attempts to deal with reality. Nothing in escapism suggests that it cannot
be irreversible, nor is there anything in self-deception to suggest that escapism
cannot be one of its more-or-less temporary outcomes. The same interpretative
line may be applied to willful ignorance, I think. Willful ignorance may well be
a phase in the self-deceptive process, earlier or later on—one that can later be
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reversed by new variations within the force field, or that can be entered from
another state.
Lynch gets close to this when he says that a self-deceiver may at times go as far
as self-delusion. He thinks that self-delusion is not a paradigmatic case of self-
deception, but he shows an awareness of the variations to which I am drawing
attention. My proposal, however, is more radical, and certainly more liberal:
there is no need to persist in looking for a paradigmatic state when it is clear
that, by its very nature, the process of self-deception can be, and often definitely
is, highly dynamic, evolving and varying according to the opposing forces at
work in it.
It is apparent that, in a liberal view such as the one I am putting forward, tension
is fully preserved. First, such a liberal view preserves the tension that has been
associated with a certain single state, or set of states, by paradigmatic-state-
account theorists: if and when the state occurs, it has the tension that its propo-
nents correctly attribute to it. In addition, however, there is a further tension that
my account guarantees, and it is not clear that paradigmatic-state accounts take
it into account: namely, the tension that a more or less prolonged vacillation
produces over time.5 Note that more self-reflective subjects could also experi-
ence a sort of metacognitive tension—that is, they find themselves on an attitude
seesaw that they can intuit as such. To be sure, however, even if subjects do not
reach this metacognitive level of self-reflection, the psychological effect of going
on such a seesaw may make them experience tension, presumably of a more
opaque kind.6
I said that it is a totally empirical question whether a subject enters into any of
the possible states that the force field of self-deception allows. Equally, it is a
totally empirical question how long such an attitude seesaw can last. Only a
case-by-case empirical analysis of specific self-deceptive processes in individ-
ual subjects can give an answer to this question.
Let me then briefly recapitulate the main tenets of my proposal.
When one formulates a theory of self-deception, there seems to be no renounc-
ing a couple of necessary constraints—namely, that
(i) the process is triggered by a motivational state that leads the
subject to wish that things stand in a certain, desired way (p);
and
(ii) the subject driven by such motivation struggles with evidence,
or easily accessible evidence, that suggests how things really
stand.
The clash between motivation and evidence makes the process highly tensive
from a psychological point a view. Psychological tension is a descriptive feature
of self-deception that virtually all scholars refuse to renounce; rather, they all
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visibly want it to be preserved, predicted, and accounted for. When this desider-
atum is combined with the bias in favour of the search for a paradigmatic state,
scholars may feel the pressure to look for one single, characteristic state for
self-deception, which is also highly tensive and unstable in itself. This combi-
nation of drives has led to several competing theories of the characteristic state
of mind of self-deception, where what is at stake is the kind of state that can
best account for instability, while also satisfying our search for a paradigmatic
state of self-deception.
However, we will see that if we subscribe to (i) and (ii), we must accept the
consequence that whatever mental state turns out to be compatible with the
combined action of (i) and (ii) must be considered characteristic of self-deception.
And clearly, there is no reason why we should not extend this consequence to
mental states that may turn out to be even quite distant from the paradigmatic one.
Since a wide variety of states are compatible with (i) and (ii), my proposal is that
(A) we should liberalize the types of mental states that are repre-
sentative of self-deception; and
(B) to avoid remaining on a misleading track, we should replace
any paradigmatic-state accounts of self-deception with a dynamic
view of the self-deceptive process.
Lynch (2016) provided an argument to show that willful ignorance is not a case
of self-deception, whether paradigmatic or nonparadigmatic; therefore, it is a
different kind of phenomenon. I think, however, that if we liberalize self-decep-
tion along the lines suggested, we are in a position to see that it may be the case
that willful ignorance is sometimes a phase along the process of self-deception.
Willful ignorance may well be the kind of phenomenon that Lynch diagnoses it
as, and may fully retain its characteristic. The two phenomena need not be
conflated. Yet willful ignorance could surface along the liberalized self-decep-
tive process as a possible stage of it. It is also important to note that my liberal
view of the self-deceptive process does not rely on any of the three views of
self-deception that, according to Lynch, could be used to distinguish willful igno-
rance from self-deception. Since I am not relying on any of the three, I am in a
position to include willful ignorance as a possible stage of self-deception, and
to do so by Lynch’s own standards. For I am not proposing an unwarranted-
belief account, where the subject ends up believing that p self-deceptively (Mele,
1997, is an example of such an account). I am not proposing an implicit-knowl-
edge account either (e.g., Bach, 1981), where the subject does not believe that
p, but recognizes the truth of not-p, while that knowledge is “shunned, ignored,
or kept out of mind,” and the subject’s behaviour suggests that he or she believes
that p, though other behaviour may betray the knowledge that not-p (p. 514).
Nor do I propose an intermediate account, where the subject both believes that
p and believes that not-p (Davidson, 1985), or where what the subject believes
remains indeterminate (e.g., Funkhouser, 2009). Rather, I am proposing a view
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whose focus is on a process within which more than is dreamed of by our para-
digmatic-state-account philosophy of self-deception may happen.
My sense is that there might be room to apply a liberal solution to twisted self-
deception as well. Twist-self-deception (Mele, 1999) is typically described as a
case of self-deception where a subject does not end up believing what he or she
desires or wants to be true. Rather, the subject ends up believing what he or she
fears and, in any case, does not want to be true. Even if investigating this would
lead me too far from my present purposes, it seems credible that a twisted self-
deceiver may experience an attitude seesaw fully compatible with (i) and (ii). If
this is correct, then twisted self-deception should cease to be seen as a nonpar-
adigmatic case of self-deception, as, Lynch notes, it is still generally considered
(2016, p. 513).
One may wonder whether any liberal view is too liberal after all. That is to say,
does a liberal view risk being too broad, thus erring on the side of overinclu-
siveness? Were a liberal view to include more states than really fall within the
self-deceptive kind, we would lose the unity of the phenomenon, as well as its
specificity.
I do not think that overinclusiveness is a genuine risk for a liberal view, except
when liberality is completely unrestricted. But I set (i) and (ii) as constraints for
self-deception. Thus, I have reason to think that as long as (i) and (ii) are active,
none of the states that can possibly be entered by subjects during their self-decep-
tive attitude seesaw is outside the phenomenon of self-deception. Of course,
should either (i) or (ii) stop being active, then the subjects might well enter
another kind of phenomenon altogether, such as permanent self-delusion or, in
the event of their exiting self-deception completely, full adherence to reality.
I conclude with a final remark on what my analysis seems to suggest in terms
of the adequacy of the conceptual apparatus we deploy for capturing self-decep-
tion. Even if I agree with Lynch (2012) that we should ameliorate our concep-
tual categories and look for more fine-grained concepts to capture psychological
reality (p. 438), I also think that we should be ready to apply the categories we
already have more liberally whenever our psychology shows a complexity that
no single traditional mental category can capture in isolation. Sometimes,
psychological complexity just requires us not to force and freeze it into snap-
shots. Rather it clearly invites us to look more closely at the richness embedded
both in its static dimension and in its temporally evolving dynamic.
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NOTES
1 Famously, the other paradox is the “dynamic paradox.” Since it is not immediately useful for
my argument, although it is closely connected to it, I will not go into it in this paper.
2 I will not address the partitioning solutions to the static paradox here. See Deweese-Boyd
(2017).
3 I thank one anonymous reviewer of this journal for pointing this extremely crucial aspect out
to me.
4 Funkhouser (2005) relies on Nelkin (2002) here. They both think that self-deceiver reaches a
false, second-order belief that he or she believes that p because that self-deceiver is primarily
moved by a mind-directed desire to believe that p, not by a world-directed desire that p be
true. For views that go in the same direction, see also Holton (2001) and Fernández (2013). For
comments on the mind-directed desire, see also Pedrini (2012; 2013).
5 I am grateful to one anonymous reviewer of this journal for pointing out the importance of
emphasizing this variety of tension.
6 Cf. Pedrini (2018).
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ABSTRACT:
Philosophical accounts of self-deception have tended to focus on what is necessary for
one to be in a state of self-deception or how onemight arrive at such a state. Less atten-
tion has been paid to explainingwhy, so often, self-deceived individuals resist the proper
explanation of their condition. This resistance may not be necessary for self-deception,
but it is common enough to be a proper explanandum of any adequate account of the
phenomenon.The goals of this essay are to analyze this resistance, to argue for its impor-
tance to theories of self-deception, and to offer a view of self-deception that adequately
accounts for it. The view’s key idea is that, in at least some familiar cases, self-deceived
individuals maintain their condition by confusing a nonepistemic satisfaction they take
in their self-deceived beliefs for the epistemic satisfaction that is characteristic of warran-
ted beliefs. Appealing to this confusion can explain both why these self-deceived indivi-
duals maintain their unwarranted belief and why they resist the proper explanation of
their condition. If successful, the essay will illuminate the nature of belief by examining
the limits of the believable.
RÉSUMÉ :
Les explications philosophiques de l’auto-illusion ont eu tendance àmettre l’accent sur ce
qui est nécessaire pour que quelqu’un soit considéré comme étant sous l’emprise de
l’auto-illusion ou encore sur la façon dont quelqu’un parvient à un tel état. Moins d’ef-
forts ont été dirigés vers les raisons pour lesquelles, si souvent, les individus sous l’em-
prise de l’auto-illusion opposent une résistance à l’explication véritable de leur condition.
Cette résistance n’est peut-être pas essentielle à l’auto-illusion, mais elle est suffisam-
ment courante pour constituer un explicandum approprié pour tout traitement adéquat
du phénomène. Cet essai a pour buts d’analyser cette résistance, de défendre son impor-
tance pour les théories de l’auto-illusion, et de proposer une conception de l’auto-illusion
qui en rend compte de manière adéquate. Cette conception repose sur l’idée suivante :
au moins dans certains cas connus, les individus sous l’emprise de l’auto-illusion main-
tiennent leur condition en prenant la satisfaction non-épistémique qu’ils retirent de leurs
croyances illusoires pour la satisfaction épistémique qui caractérise les croyances justi-
fiées. C’est en faisant appel à cette confusion que l’on peut expliquer à la fois pourquoi ces
individus conservent leur croyance infondée et pourquoi ils opposent une résistance à
l’explication adéquate de leur condition. Si tant est qu’il y parvienne, cet essai éclairera la
nature de la croyance en examinant les limites du croyable.
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What a fool believes he sees
No wise man has the power to reason away
– Michael McDonald and Kenny Loggins,
“What a Fool Believes” (1978)
A fool who cannot be swayed by reason may not be self-deceived, but often he
is. Consider the fool of McDonald and Loggins’s song. He meets an old acquain-
tance who, he thinks, once longed for him romantically and might feel the same
way again. She never had such feelings, and she never will; perhaps out of pity,
she apologizes to the fool for the fact. Loggins and McDonald tell us that “as he
rises to her apology, anybody else would surely know/ he’s watching her go.”
Anybody else would surely know that she is going, and for good, because this
is what the evidence overwhelmingly suggests. In spite of this evidence, the fool
believes that she will return to him someday. On accounts of self-deception that
Dion Scott-Kakures (2002) calls deflationary, little more needs to be said about
the fool to depict him as self-deceived.1 On Alfred Mele’s version of deflation-
ism, we need only to add that the fool’s false belief results from him treating the
relevant data in a motivationally biased way (Mele, 1997, p. 95). On Mark John-
ston’s version, we need only to add that the belief is the result of a distinct sort
of mental tropism (Johnston, 1988, p. 86). OnAnnette Barnes’s version, we must
only add that what Johnston calls a tropism is specifically a form of anxiety
avoidance and that the fool underestimates the causal impact that this has on the
maintenance of his belief (Barnes, 1997, p. 117). These views are deflationary
because they characterize the apparent goal-directedness of self-deception non-
intentionally; they thus contrast with intentionalist views, such as Donald
Davidson’s (Davidson, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c). Scott-Kakures’s own account
takes a middle way between deflationism and intentionalism: he claims that in
order to be self-deceived, the fool would have to engage in reflective reasoning
that maintains his unwarranted belief (Scott-Kakures, 2002; 2009). On this view,
the self-deceived fool would not intentionally bring himself into his condition,
but nor would he fall into it as the result of some blind motivation.
Although these views disagree on the roles of intentions and reasoning in
producing self-deception, they would all agree that the self-deceived fool
believes that his acquaintance once had romantic feelings towards him and may
feel this way again. Some recent accounts have called into question whether the
self-deceived fool has any such belief. Eric Funkhouser and David Barrett would
claim that, if the fool holds such a belief, then he is self-deluded but not self-
deceived (Funkhouser, 2005; Funkhouser and Barrett, 2016; 2017). To be self-
deceived, on their view, the fool would have to behave in a way that suggests he
does not believe he has a chance romantically with his acquaintance. This beha-
viour is at odds with what the fool asserts—namely, that she might one day long
romantically for him. To account for his nonlinguistic behavior, Funkhouser and
Barrett would recommend that we ascribe to the fool the belief that she does not
and will not care romantically for him; to account for his assertion to the
contrary, we are to characterize him as falsely believing that he believes she
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might want him one day. The difference here between self-delusion and self-
deception is not merely terminological. Funkhouser explicitly asserts that self-
deception is philosophically interesting in a way that self-delusion is not—in
due course I will explain why. Jordi Fernández does not go as far as Funkhouser
and Barrett, for Fernández allows cases they would describe as mere self-
delusion to count as instances of self-deception (Fernández, 2013). Nevertheless,
Fernández agrees with Funkhouser and Barrett that these cases are not of much
philosophical interest; to be philosophically interesting, the fool must be char-
acterized roughly in line with Funkhouser and Barrett’s definition of self-decep-
tion. This requires that the fool hold the first-order belief that he has no romantic
future with his acquaintance while simultaneously holding the false metabelief
that he believes they will one day be together.2
Now it is one thing to explain what it takes for the fool to be self-deceived, which
is a task pursued by all of the accounts just mentioned; it is another to explain
why, so often, no one, no matter how wise, has the power to reason the self-
deceived fool out of his condition. One might produce an intuitively plausible
characterization of being self-deceived and perhaps even a causal account of
how one arrives at the condition without explaining why, so often, self-decep-
tion resists rational revision. The resistance I have in mind may not be necessary
for self-deception, but I believe it is common enough to be a proper explanan-
dum of any adequate account of self-deception. The central goals of this essay
are to analyze this resistance, to argue for its importance to theories of self-
deception, and to offer a view of self-deception that adequately accounts for it.
To bring this resistance squarely into view, consider the following specific but
straightforward way in which the wise man in the song might fail in his attempts
to correct the self-deceived fool. Suppose the wise man points all of the relevant
evidence out to the fool and asserts that, on its basis, it is reasonable to conclude
that his acquaintance has never wanted him and will never want him. If the fool
accepts this, then, at least for that moment, on any account of self-deception, he
is no longer self-deceived. Assume this does not happen: the fool insists that, in
spite of the evidence, his acquaintance wanted him once and may want him
again. The wise man shakes his head and tells the fool that he says this only
because admitting the opposite would be too painful. The wise man is wise, so
he makes no assumptions about the fool’s unconscious beliefs or higher-order
beliefs; he simply notes and explains what the fool will not admit.
The fool can go one of two ways at this point. On the one hand, he can give in
and accept the wise man’s explanation. This would seem to force the fool to
acknowledge that, as a first-order matter of fact, the acquaintance will never
want him, but perhaps he can resist this; perhaps he can acknowledge that the
evidence does not warrant what he claims about her, that he says what he does
only because admitting otherwise would be too painful, yet still maintain that she
has wanted him and might want him again. This case would be an instance of
what some have called epistemic akrasia.3 Like those who perform akratic
actions, epistemically akratic individuals know they are being unreasonable; in
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spite of this, they go on believing their unwarranted beliefs.We will consider this
epistemic condition in several places over the course of the argument. At pres-
ent, let us set it aside and suppose that the fool goes the other way and rejects
the wise man’s explanation.Without straightforwardly lying, the fool denies that
there is anything he is failing to admit. The reason he says she has wanted him
and might want him again has nothing to do with his desires, he asserts, though
he grants that he does desire her affection. The reason he says these things, he
claims, is that they are true. The fool, of course, is wrong, both about his acquain-
tance’s feelings and about the reason he insists he knows what she feels. Call the
former error self-deceptive resistance to evidence; this topic has been well exam-
ined in the literature on self-deception. The latter error, which I will call self-
deceptive resistance to self-knowledge, has received less attention.4 This
resistance to self-knowledge constitutes a failure of self-explanation: by commit-
ting the error, the fool resists the proper explanation of why he claims (or,
depending on one’s view of self-deception, believes) that his acquaintance may
one day want him again. This resistance is no accident, no simple mistake—as
the wise man knows, it is part of an overall epistemic condition that enables the
fool to go on believing what he does about his acquaintance.
The third section of this essay will provide an account of this self-deceptive
resistance to self-knowledge. To work up to it, I will begin by discussing the
views and arguments in Fernández (2009) and Funkhouser (2005).5 Fernández
might claim that my topic is not an interesting sort of self-deception, and
Funkhouser might deny that it even counts as self-deception. My goal in
responding to these complaints is to defend the claim that self-deceptive resist-
ance to self-knowledge warrants “self-deceptive” as part of its label and to argue
that this resistance is a proper explanandum for any account of self-deception. I
will close this first section by showing that Funkhouser’s and Fernández’s
accounts cannot explain the phenomenon. I will then turn to a discussion of
deflationary and intentionalist views of self-deception. I will borrow from Scott-
Kakures’s discussion of deflationism and intentionalism, which I find insightful.
Scott-Kakures’s account improves upon these views, but in the end, I argue, it
too lacks the resources to explain self-deceptive resistance to self-knowledge.
The next section presents my account of the phenomenon. Its key idea—which,
to the best of my knowledge, is novel to the literature on self-deception—is that
self-deception involves a distinct sort of confusion. The sort of confusion I have
in mind occurs when a person takes one thing to be something that it is not.6
The fool, I will argue, confuses what I shall call the epistemic satisfaction of
believing what is warranted with what I shall call the thumotic satisfaction that
results from believing what he wants to be true. I will explain this distinction as
well as my introduction of the term “thumotic” in section 3. At present, may it
suffice to say the following: the fool thinks his belief is satisfying because he
thinks it is warranted—i.e., he takes his satisfaction in the belief to be epistemic
satisfaction—but he is confused, for the belief involves a different sort of satis-
faction, the satisfaction one paradigmatically finds when one is esteemed or
valued or admired in a way one wants, which I am calling thumotic satisfaction.
My account here will draw upon recent work on the neurobiology of emotion by
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Lisa Feldman Barrett (2017). I close the essay with some brief remarks on how
the confusion account can explain so-called twisted cases of self-deception; this,
I hope, will further elaborate the view.
The success of the confusion account turns ultimately on the accuracy of the
characterization of the nature of belief in section 3. A key element of this char-
acterization is the claim that the pleasure a belief might bring can partially deter-
mine whether or not one holds that belief, sometimes over and even against the
belief’s warrant. I think this is simply a fact, one that is readily demonstrated by
the hopeful beliefs of some football supporters. Supporters may believe that this
is the year for their team. The proper explanation for their holding this belief
may in part be a matter of the evidence they consider—the season is young, and
the team has not yet shown that it is bound to fail. This may, however, not be the
whole story. To tell that story, one might also need to add that the hope brought
by the belief is far more pleasant to the supporter than the doxastic alternatives,
and that this too is part of the full explanation of the football supporters holding
their belief. Because my account turns on a substantive view of some nonevi-
dential but nonaccidental causes of belief maintenance, my discussion here may
prove relevant to the reader who is unconcerned with self-deception but who is
interested in doxastic voluntarism.7 This essay will not investigate the possible
connections between the confusion account and debates about believing at will.
I mention the latter simply to flag a focus that it shares with the present discus-
sion: the limits of the believable, as determined by the nature of belief.
1. AVOWAL AND CONFLICTING BEHAVIOUR IN SELF-DECEPTION
Let us start by considering the fool as we did at the outset—namely, as believ-
ing his acquaintance may one day want him again. As already noted, on
Funkhouser’s view this fool is self-deluded, not self-deceived; on Fernández’s
view this fool demonstrates only one of the two “remarkable features” of self-
deception (Fernández, 2013, p. 381). The feature the fool demonstrates is what
Fernández calls the normativity of self-deception, which is manifested by the
fact that we are supposed to find his epistemic condition objectionable. I expect
Funkhouser would agree that self-delusion involves some sort of normative fail-
ure. To be self-deceived, however, on Funkhouser’s view, the fool would have
to demonstrate the second of Fernández’s features of self-deception—namely,
the conflict feature.8 There does not appear to be any conflict in the fool’s over-
all psychological condition: he sincerely believes that his acquaintance may one
day want him again. Both Funkhouser and Fernández think this case is impor-
tantly different from cases in which there is a conflict between a person’s behav-
iour and what that person claims to believe. Consider, for example, Funkhouser’s
case of the self-deceived wife (Funkhouser, 2005, p. 302). She has ample
evidence that her husband is having an affair with a friend. She claims to believe
that he is faithful, but she behaves to the contrary; for example, she avoids driv-
ing by the friend’s house at times when it seems likely that her husband might
be there. Funkhouser thinks that the only way to make sense of the wife’s driv-
ing behaviour is to attribute to her the belief that her husband is having an affair.
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To make sense of her avowal to the contrary, we describe the wife as falsely
believing that she believes her husband is faithful.
Adopting Funkhouser’s labels for just this paragraph, we see that self-delusion
and self-deception present different problems to explain. The problem with self-
delusion is that evidence is not considered impartially, which leads to irrational
belief formation. The problem with self-deception, by contrast, is that of squar-
ing one’s behaviour with one’s conflicting avowals. There are at least two
reasons one might find the latter problem more interesting than the former.
Although Funkhouser and Fernández do not think of the problems this way, one
might think the latter problem entails the former. If we treat the wife’s avowal
as an expression of what she believes, then not only does her behaviour fail to
square with her avowal, but her belief also fails to square with the evidence,
which includes her own behaviour. On this way of conceiving of the issue, self-
deception is more problematic than self-delusion—it involves two problems,
not just one—which might license finding the former more problematic than the
latter. Funkhouser and Fernández do not characterize self-deception this way,
however; again, they deny that the wife believes what she avows. I suspect this
is due to their tacit acceptance of the following two principles of belief ascrip-
tion. The first is that actions speak louder than words, so the tension between
what the wife says and what she does is to be resolved by a belief ascription that
explains her deeds, not her words. The second is a version of the principle of
charity that prevents, as far as is possible, ascribing two flatly contradictory
beliefs to the same person. They, it seems, take characterizing the wife’s avowal
without violating these principles to be more challenging than explaining irra-
tional belief formation; this is the second possible reason one might find self-
deception more interesting than self-delusion.9
I have no interest here in adjudicating what one should find more or less philo-
sophically interesting, but I do want to argue, contra what is at least implied by
Funkhouser’s and Fernández’s accounts, that there is something philosophically
interesting about self-deceptive resistance to self-knowledge. First of all, even
if resistance is not a necessary feature of self-deception, it is not uncommon for
self-deceived individuals to be disposed to resist the proper explanation of their
self-deceived condition. Funkhouser’s cases suggest as much. For example, he
describes the self-deceived wife as follows: “She laughs off the concerns of her
girlfriends, and thinks to herself that Tony is certainly a faithful husband”
(Funkhouser, 2005, p. 302). This demonstrates her self-deceptive resistance to
the evidence, and her girlfriends lack the power to reason this resistance away.
Now imagine one of these girlfriends saying, “Look, the only reason you insist
Tony is faithful is that you can’t bear to think otherwise, even though the
evidence overwhelmingly suggests that he is cheating on you.” It is surely possi-
ble, if not likely, that the self-deceived wife will dismiss this just as she laughed
off their other concerns. This resistance to self-knowledge, then, is something
that even a restricted view of self-deception such as Funkhouser’s or Fernán-
dez’s should seek to explain.
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It is not clear, however, that they can explain the resistance without attributing
a pair of contradictory beliefs to the wife. As we have already seen, they explic-
itly characterize her as believing that she believes that her husband is faithful.
If she is not epistemically akratic—set this possibility aside—then she also must
at least tacitly believe that her belief about what she believes is warranted. To
believe the higher-order belief is unwarranted is simply to believe that she lacks
the first-order belief; again, it is a central component of their view that she
believes she has the favourable first-order belief about her husband. They are
committed, however, to explaining her resistance to self-knowledge by charac-
terizing her as also and simultaneously believing that her higher-order belief is
unwarranted. This follows from the way they explain avoidance behaviour. They
explain the wife’s avoidance of driving by her friend’s house by characterizing
her as believing that her husband is cheating. Her resistance to self-knowledge
also involves an object of avoidance: she is avoiding the fact that her belief that
she believes her husband is faithful is unwarranted. According to their explana-
tory approach, she can avoid this fact only by believing that it is, indeed, a fact,
so they are committed to characterizing her as believing that her higher-order
belief about what she believes about her husband is unwarranted. If we are to
avoid such contradictory ascriptions—and, again, this seems to be a principle
that guides Funkhouser and Fernández—then this false-higher-order-belief
approach to self-deception cannot characterize self-deceptive resistance to self-
knowledge.10
2. INTENTIONALISM,DEFLATIONISM,AND REFLECTIVE REASONING
Funkhouser and Fernández are not alone in thinking that it is the internal psycho-
logical conflict of self-deception that makes the condition philosophically inter-
esting. For example, in summarizing self-deception, Davidson says the
following: “Finally, and it is this that makes self-deception a problem, the state
that motivates self-deception and the state it produces coexist; in the strongest
case, the belief that p not only causes a belief in the negation of p, but also
sustains it” (Davidson, 2004c, p. 208). Unlike Funkhouser and Fernández,
Davidson thinks that the conflict of self-deception exists between a pair of incon-
sistent first-order beliefs, one of which sustains the other. Nevertheless, all three
agree that the internal psychological conflict of self-deception, whatever exactly
it is, is the condition’s most philosophically interesting element. Davidson’s
attempt to explain this conflict proceeds as follows. The self-deceived individ-
ual brings about an unwarranted belief through intentional activity, such as selec-
tively attending to evidence that supports that belief. To explain how the
unwarranted belief can be held even as the self-deceived individual goes on also
holding its warranted contradictory, Davidson claims that the individual’s mind
is divided. Davidson insists that this division is functional;11 he does this so as
to allay worries of what we might call “homuncularism”—i.e., the idea that parti-
tioning the mind requires partitioning the person into separate agents, each with
its own agenda concerning what the person should believe.12 The challenge of
explaining the conflict of self-deception, then, is met by dividing the mind and
attributing the contradictory beliefs to the separate parts.
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Davidson’s view is intentionalist because it claims that the self-deceived indi-
vidual does something intentionally to bring about the belief that, though unwar-
ranted, that individual prefers to hold. One need not divide the mind as Davidson
does to hold an intentionalist view; indeed, Kent Bach holds an intentionalist
view that agrees with Funkhouser, Barrett, and Fernández—namely, that the
self-deceived individual does not believe the unwarranted but preferred belief
(Bach, 1981).13 Intentionalists provide a straightforward account of the way in
which self-deceived individuals’motives can influence their beliefs: the motives
produce intentional activities that allow the agents to ignore (if not eliminate)
their unfavourable beliefs. A challenge for all intentionalists, then, is to explain
how self-deceived individuals are able to do this while simultaneously acknowl-
edging that the unfavourable beliefs are warranted by the evidence; as Scott-
Kakures puts the point, the intentionalist is “under great pressure to claim that
the contrary evidence is not really believed or that such evidence is somehow
forgotten or otherwise pushed into inaccessibility” (Scott-Kakures, 2002, p. 577,
italics in original). Scott-Kakures does not present the point as counting deci-
sively against the intentionalist, but it provides a good reason for wondering
whether one can account for self-deceived beliefs or avowals in less cognitively
robust terms.
This is the project of the deflationist. There are, as noted at the outset, all sorts
of deflationist views, but they all agree that self-deception is a sort of biased
belief formation. Most views characterize this bias as motivated, but some deny
that this is necessary (e.g., Patten, 2003). The challenge for these accounts, Scott-
Kakures argues, is to distinguish self-deception from other sorts of biased belief
formation, which do not seem to involve the characteristic tension of self-decep-
tion. The worry here is similar to the one that motivates Funkhouser and Barrett
to distinguish self-delusion from self-deception.14 For Scott-Kakures, however,
the point is not that deflationist accounts pick out an uninteresting human condi-
tion; rather, it is that they cannot distinguish self-deception from the represen-
tational state a brute may enter under the effects of motivational bias.
Scott-Kakures’s example of such a brute is Bonnie the Cat, who is usually good
at distinguishing cat-food sounds from non-cat-food sounds but who overreacts
to non-cat-food sounds when she is very hungry. It seems natural to say that
Bonnie’s representations are affected in these situations by a motivational bias
towards finding cat food; the challenge the deflationist faces is explaining how
self-deception differs from Bonnie’s biased representations.
The different limitations of intentionalism and deflationism are also shown by
the difficulty each has in explaining self-deceptive resistance to self-knowledge.
If the intentionalist is correct, then this resistance is intentional. For example,
when the fool claims that he believes his acquaintance will return to him because
this is what the evidence warrants, he is, on the intentionalist view, intentionally
avoiding the correct explanation of his belief. Now the goal of avoiding a given
sort of explanation is quite cognitively sophisticated; it is the sort of thing
lawyers might do on behalf of their clients, and it is not something that Bonnie
the Cat can so much as attempt. It is not clear how a person can intentionally
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pursue such a sophisticated goal while sincerely denying doing so, but the inten-
tionalist is committed to characterizing the self-deceived fool in this way, for
such fools will sincerely deny the proper explanation of their resistance. The
only hope for the intentionalist here, it seems, is the homuncularism that even
Davidson wants to avoid. It is not clear that the deflationist fares any better,
however; given the cognitive sophistication involved in avoiding the proper
explanation of one’s self-deceived condition, it is not clear how it could be
pursued in anything less than an intentional manner. Deflationism may be an
attractive alternative to intentionalism when it comes to explaining self-decep-
tive resistance to evidence, but its resources are strained if it is called on to
explain the cognitively sophisticated resistance to self-knowledge.
Scott-Kakures’s own view takes a middle path between intentionalism and defla-
tionism.15 According to Scott-Kakures, Bonnie the Cat is not self-deceived,
because she plays no active role in generating or maintaining her biased repre-
sentations. Self-deceived individuals, by contrast, play an active role in at least
maintaining their unwarranted beliefs through reflective reasoning. Scott-
Kakures grants that the unwarranted self-deceptive belief may be generated by
non-self-deceptive means; what matters—and on this point, he is surely right—
is the way in which the belief is maintained, not the way in which it is initially
formed. On his view, for the fool in the song to be self-deceived, he must at least
occasionally reflect on his beliefs about his acquaintance’s feelings. When the
fool does this, he must fail to reason clearly: his reasoning must be swayed
towards believing what he prefers instead of what is warranted by the evidence.
Scott-Kakures explains this capacity for wrongful reasoning in terms of the
psychological account of “pragmatic hypothesis testing.”16 According to this
account, we are to make sense of the fool’s reasoning by identifying the differ-
ent costs associated with false-positive and false-negative hypotheses concern-
ing his acquaintance. Consider the proposition, “My acquaintance has had and
may again have feelings for me,” conceived of as a hypothesis. If the fool settles
in favour of this proposition and it is false, it is a false positive; if the fool settles
against this proposition and it is true, then it is a false negative. From the fool’s
perspective, a false negative of this hypothesis would be worse than a false posi-
tive. If he does not believe it, but it turns out to be true, he will miss his chance
with his acquaintance; if he believes it, but it turns out to be false, he will have
given himself every chance with her, and he will have enjoyed temporarily
believing in her affection.17 This asymmetry of costs produces an asymmetry of
acceptance thresholds for the positive and negative of the hypothesis: effectively,
the fool tests the positive for sufficiency and the negative for necessity. He thus
reasons his way to the false conclusion that he still has a chance with his acquain-
tance. Scott-Kakures is not the only writer to claim that reasoning plays a criti-
cal role in self-deception; he cites David Sanford (1988) as agreeing with him
on this point. Sanford, however, depicts the reasoning involved as a false ration-
alization for one’s belief, which serves to mask the genuine causes of one’s self-
deceived belief. Scott-Kakures argues that the reasoning conducted by the
self-deceived individual functions not to disguise the genuine causes of the rele-
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vant belief, but actually to maintain the belief; he says of the self-deceived indi-
vidual that “her putative reasons are her reasons and they do, as a causal matter,
explain why she has come to believe as she does” (Scott-Kakures, 2002, p. 597).18
It is surely correct that the reasoning performed by self-deceived individuals can
sustain their unwarranted beliefs and thus play a causal role in the maintenance
of these beliefs. It is not clear, however, that this can explain all of the beliefs that
may be involved in self-deceptive resistance to self-knowledge. The putative
reasons that constitute the fool’s false self-explanation may indeed have the func-
tion of sustaining his self-deception. The existence of these self-explanatory
beliefs, contra Scott-Kakures’s account, is not explained by acts of reasoning
that might have them as their conclusions. Their existence is explained by the
fact that it would be too painful for the fool to admit the truth, either about what
the evidence warrants believing about his acquaintance or about why he believes
she will return to him one day. Scott-Kakures might think he can capture this fact
by reiterating his point about acceptance thresholds, but appeal to these thresh-
olds makes sense only if we think of the fool’s false self-explanatory beliefs as
something he might treat as hypotheses. This may not be impossible, but there
are certainly cases (which, I suspect, are typical) in which the causal role is
reversed. We can think of the fool’s false self-explanation as comprising beliefs
he has not adopted due to biased reasoning and does not sustain by such reason-
ing. For this fool, his self-beliefs do not have the status of hypotheses; they are
not held on the basis of an examination of their epistemic credentials. The beliefs
are prior to any reasoning about his acquaintance and they are prior to any
reasoning about the cause of his beliefs about her. His false self-explanation
expresses a presumption about the legitimacy of his reasoning, both about his
acquaintance and about the cause of his beliefs about her. Commitment to such
a false self-explanation is a condition of his reasoning counting as self-deceptive;
it is not a product of any such reasoning.
If this is possible, then not even Scott-Kakures’s account can fully explain self-
deceptive resistance to self-knowledge. For Scott-Kakures, this resistance would
have to manifest itself as an openness to the possibility of the truth of the proper
self-explanation, which is then resisted. If the fool is as I have described him, the
object of resistance is the possibility that the proper self-explanation is true—
again, his preferred self-explanation is taken as fact, not treated as a hypothesis.
By focusing on the role that reasoning can play in self-deception, however, Scott-
Kakures’s account points us in the right direction. The key is to see how we can
become confused about what governs our mental activity as we rationalize our
beliefs and actions, for it is in terms of this confusion, I think, that we are able
to explain self-deceptive resistance to self-knowledge. I turn now to this.
3. CONFUSION AND RESISTANCE
My account starts with what I take to be an uncontroversial point: reasoning is
a sort of agential mental activity.19 As such, reasoning shares some metaphysi-
cal characteristics with other sorts of agential activity, including intentional
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bodily action. Our agential activity, both mental and bodily, is a product of our
nature as rational living beings. As specifically living beings, we have a general
tendency to do what is satisfying and not to do what is dissatisfying. This
tendency can affect the body by leading us to indulge in sexual, gastronomic, or
drug-induced pleasure or to avoid arduous or fearful situations. This tendency
can also affect the mind, and in similar ways—for example, in the same way
that we have a tendency against putting ourselves in fearful or sad situations,
we have a tendency against thinking fearful or sad thoughts. I am not denying
that we sometimes tend towards or even fixate on unpleasant thoughts—more on
this in section 4. At present, I am simply noting something that I think John-
ston’s tropistic account and Barnes’s anxiety-avoidance account get right: there
is a tendency of the mind to avoid thinking unpleasant thoughts.20
According to the constructivist account of emotion advanced by Lisa Feldman
Barrett (2017, ch. 4), the basic affective components of all of these tendencies
are surprisingly simple. They are the product of introception and are two-dimen-
sional: they all are valenced and so are more or less pleasant, and they all involve
some level of arousal, the lowest being exemplified by the lethargy characteris-
tic of deep depression. On her view, the affective components of anger and fear
are the same—both are more unpleasant than pleasant and involve arousal rather
than calmness or lethargy. The difference in subjective experience between these
two emotional categories is primarily a matter of nonaffective interpretation,
which is heavily influenced by a person’s understanding of emotional concepts.
Affect can thus be common across emotional categories; it can also be common
across perceptions of fact and mere contemplation of thoughts. On her account,
the affect underlying severe ophidiophobes’ aversion upon seeing actual snakes
has the same components—displeasure and arousal—as their aversion to merely
thinking about snakes. Combining this line of thought with that of the previous
paragraph yields the following: there is a tendency, in many if not most of us, to
avoid unpleasant and arousing affect, whether that affect is part of one’s body’s
engagement with the external world (including, e.g., actual snakes) or is merely
part of one’s mind (including, e.g., mere thoughts of snakes). This holds for other
agential tendencies as well (e.g., towards pleasure).
I take the following also to be uncontroversial: many if not most of us have a
tendency to want the approval of at least some humans, whose opinion of us we
value in some way. I call the satisfaction at which this tendency aims thumotic.
The root of this term is the Ancient Greek “thumos,” which is commonly trans-
lated into English as “spirit” and is sometimes understood narrowly as a psycho-
logical faculty of anger or, still more narrowly, revenge. Not hamstrung by any
English version of the term, I intend “thumotic” more broadly, in line with the
variety of uses of “thumos” in Ancient Greek—I use it to pick out the sorts of
self-satisfaction that follow from one’s perception of the positive judgments of
others and the sorts of dissatisfaction that follow from corresponding negative
judgments.21 The satisfaction of many sorts of pride is, in my sense, thumotic.
When one feels good in victory, the satisfaction is thumotic; when one basks in
the praise of a superior, the satisfaction is thumotic. These are cases in which one
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feels pleasant affect at having achieved a particular social standing—the good
feeling follows from how one perceives oneself to be judged by others. Various
sorts of admiration can also give rise to thumotic satisfaction: teachers may take
thumotic satisfaction in the admiration of their students; someone fit and smartly
dressed may take thumotic satisfaction in the desirous glances of others. The
affect in all of these cases is pleasant; it seems typically to be arousing as well.
Shame, guilt, and other emotions of social inadequacy or social failure involve
thumotic dissatisfaction. The affect of these is unpleasant; when they manifest
as a sort of sadness or depression, they are also low on arousal, not stimulating.
These remarks on thumotic satisfaction and dissatisfaction are, admittedly, quite
rough—one might worry that these are ad hoc categories, and one might wonder
what else belongs to them outside of the examples I have just listed. These are
worthy concerns, which I will not address here. It will presently suffice if I can
adequately distinguish the satisfaction one can take from the esteem of others
from the satisfaction one can take in learning or discovering or understanding
something, which I call epistemic satisfaction. The latter may seem like a strange
sort of satisfaction, but it is found, I believe, in a variety of mundane mental
activities. Consider the philosopher who wonders how to explain why we cannot
form beliefs at will. The perplexity of the person troubled by this topic is accom-
panied by a distinct sort of epistemic tension, which that person seeks to resolve
with a satisfying solution. Or consider the person who loves detective stories;
this person takes pleasure in the explanatory tension posed by a good mystery
and seeks to resolve this tension with a satisfying resolution to the story. In both
of these cases, an explanatory tension persists until an answer is found that satis-
factorily resolves the tension. The satisfaction in each case is epistemic, for it is
satisfaction at having arrived at what one takes to be an understanding of the
matter at hand. In these cases, the affect is pleasant and calming, for it resolves
the arousal of the epistemic tension. To be clear, I am not claiming that all, or
even most, epistemically satisfying states involve a perceived feeling of satis-
faction. The satisfaction in question is often experienced as a sort of epistemic
ataraxia or tranquility—many, perhaps most, epistemically satisfying states are
those from which a feeling of epistemic dissatisfaction is absent.22 The dissatis-
faction in question is the genus to which the negative affect of cognitive disso-
nance belongs—satisfaction can simply be the absence of this feeling of negative
affect.23 Although it is easiest to exemplify epistemic satisfaction by focusing on
cases in which a felt perplexity is resolved, no such feeling is necessary for a
belief or explanation to be epistemically satisfying.24
If the difference between thumotic and epistemic satisfaction is not already clear,
note that people sometimes seek to satisfy explanatory tensions even though
they believe the resolution they seek might be otherwise unpleasant. Consider
the person who is betrayed by a friend and who wants, among other things, an
explanation that makes sense of the friend’s betrayal. It seems wrong to think that
this person aims at an overall condition of pleasure in wanting to understand the
cause of the friend’s betrayal, yet the betrayed person still wants an explanation
that makes what the friend has done intelligible. The betrayed person wants an
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explanation that is epistemically satisfying, even if it is one that also involves a
feeling of disappointment, a sense of being insufficiently valued by one’s friend.
This latter feeling is one of thumotic dissatisfaction. Indeed, it may involve
anger, perhaps at the friend for the betrayal, or perhaps at oneself for trusting
someone who turns out to be untrustworthy. Even if the feeling is not the
unpleasant arousal of anger, the dissatisfaction is thumotic: it is the displeasure,
whatever the level of arousal, that follows from the negative evaluation implied
by the friend’s act of betrayal. The betrayed person may thus pursue an expla-
nation that is epistemically satisfying even while expecting it will be thumoti-
cally dissatisfying.
Although we are capable of distinguishing epistemic satisfaction from thumotic
satisfaction, we do not always exercise the capability. On occasion, the failure
to exercise the capability can lead to a distinct sort of confusion, which in turn,
I argue, can produce self-deception. I should be clear here about what I mean by
“confusion” and its cognates. As stated in the introduction, as I understand the
phenomenon, confusion occurs when a person takes one thing to be something
that it is not. One may confuse instances of a common kind (as happens when,
e.g., I confuse a person with that person’s twin), or one may confuse instances
of different kinds (as happens when, e.g., I confuse molybdenum with
aluminum). One may be confused because one lacks the ability to discriminate
between two discriminable items, but one may also be confused because one
has a discriminative ability yet fails to utilize it properly on some occasion. One
may be confused without knowing that one is confused, so confusion should be
distinguished from the affective condition of feeling perplexed. If, for example,
I do not know there is anything called “molybdenum,” then I will not know when
I confuse molybdenum with aluminum that I am confusing the two. Even if I do
know that they are two distinct sorts of metals, I may on occasion confuse the
one with the other without being aware in the least that I am doing so.
Many cases of self-deception, I think, result from an individual confusing
thumotic satisfaction with epistemic satisfaction. These sorts of satisfaction can
be confused when their underlying affective components are sufficiently simi-
lar. Consider the fool again. The thought that his acquaintance may return to
him one day satisfies him. The valence of this thought is pleasant, and the
valence of the alternative is unpleasant. The satisfaction he finds in this thought
cannot be exclusively epistemic, for an impartial review of the evidence would
lead anyone, himself included, to conclude that she never has wanted him and
never will want him. To make the point clear, assume that, if the fool were given
similar evidence about a different pair of people, he would immediately conclude
that the admired individual has no reciprocal affection for her admirer. At least
part of the satisfaction he finds in the thought is thumotic—it is the pleasure he
takes in believing that she wants him. He takes the relevant pleasure, however,
as an indication that the thought is true, not that it is what he wants to be true.
The thought feels right to him: he confuses this feeling, which is the pleasure of
thumotic satisfaction, with the affect of epistemic satisfaction. So confused, he
believes the thought. (This is not to say that the thought must be completely
devoid of epistemic satisfaction: more on this below.)25
37
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
Someone sympathetic to Scott-Kakures might complain here that the confusion
account, at least as it has just been presented, does not capture the active role the
self-deceived agent plays in maintaining his or her condition. In order for the
confusion account to be adequate, the complaint here goes, it must depict self-
deceived individuals as playing some agential role in maintaining their confu-
sion, as that, according to the account, is the source of their self-deception. This
complaint can be met, I think, if the view is augmented by adding the following
conditional claim: if self-deceived individuals are asked why they hold their
unwarranted beliefs, they will, without lying, typically provide epistemic reasons
in support of them, and they will never acknowledge that the unwarranted beliefs
are unwarranted. Were such individuals epistemically akratic, they would not
offer any epistemic defence but instead would admit that their beliefs are unwar-
ranted; as ever, let us set this possibility aside. Consider again the fool from
Loggins and McDonald’s song: because he is confused about the satisfaction he
takes in his belief, he will not say that he holds it because it would be too painful
to do otherwise; instead, he will offer reasons that he takes to warrant holding
the belief. His disposition to defend and to support his self-belief is clearly agen-
tial—this is the sort of thing agents and agents alone do—so his condition is
maintained, at least counterfactually, by his agency.
Appealing to confusion and counterfactuals as I have gives rise to another,
perhaps more basic, worry. Most, if not all, cases of self-deception at least appear
to be motivated. Confusion, however, is often the result of an accident; how then
can my account capture the at least apparently motivational aspect of self-decep-
tion? To answer this worry, consider the order of explanation I have been
presenting: the self-deceived individual finds some thought satisfying, he confus-
edly takes the satisfaction to be epistemic satisfaction when it is in fact thumotic,
so he believes the thought, and is thereby disposed to explain the belief as he
would other beliefs of his. It should be clear that the belief here is motivated; it
is held not on the basis of epistemic credentials but instead for the thumotic satis-
faction it brings. The question, then, is whether the confusion itself is motivated,
or whether it is a mere accident, or whether there is some third way it might
come about.
To understand self-deception as self-deception, I think we must understand the
confusion as motivated. This, however, does not require that we see it as some
strategy executed by the self-deceived individual. For a given individual’s
thought to be a self-deceived belief, the thought, obviously, must be a possible
belief. As such, it is the sort of thought that can be epistemically satisfying. It
also, however, must be the sort of thought that can be thumotically satisfying to
the individual; were it not, the person’s epistemic stance towards the thought
would be simply and exclusively determined by the extent to which that person
finds it epistemically satisfying. (Perhaps most of our beliefs are like this, devoid
of any thumotic component, and perhaps this is why most of our beliefs are not
candidates for self-deception.) If the thumotic satisfaction of such a thought can
be maintained only by believing it, and if the affective consequence of giving up
the thought would be intolerably dissatisfying, then nothing more is needed to
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generate self-deceived confusion. The presence of these elements does not guar-
antee self-deception; it is a mark of epistemic courage to believe what is
warranted even when the belief is thumotically or otherwise dissatisfying. To
exercise this courage, however, one must clearly distinguish the different sorts
of satisfaction that are present in a given belief. If one is not skilled at distin-
guishing these elements, then it is easy for one to settle on what is thumotically
satisfying. Should this happen, then the resulting condition—including the
confusion that sustains it—is motivated, for the result is that one believes what
one wants.26
Describing the self-deceived individual as believing what is thumotically satis-
fying might give rise to yet another basic worry. One might complain that,
although some thoughts are thumotically satisfying and others are not, only
someone pathological would take the thumotic pleasure of some thought as an
indication of its being true. Most take self-deception, however, to be a nonpatho-
logical sort of irrationality. If the confusion account succeeds only by making all
self-deception pathological, the complaint concludes, then it is not plausible.
The way to resist this complaint, I think, is to note that confusion-based cases
of self-deception often (if not always) involve a genuine element of epistemic
satisfaction in the overall condition. Unlike confusing, for example, aluminum
with molybdenum, which involves the complete confusion of the one with the
other, there is likely to be an element of epistemic satisfaction sustaining the
fool’s belief about his acquaintance. If he concocts a rationalization for the belief,
that rationalization will supply reasons for it that, were they true and decisive,
would warrant his holding it. The rationalization, like any chain of reasoning a
person finds compelling, is epistemically satisfying. Indeed, this explains why
the fool seizes on these reasons as a rationalization for his belief; because he
takes the belief to be epistemically satisfying, and because the relevant reasons
provide grounds for this epistemic satisfaction, he settles on them as his expla-
nation for his belief. It is not pathological to hold a belief that one takes to be
backed by epistemically satisfying reasons, so the fool’s condition, although
irrational, is not pathological.
These remarks concerning self-deceived rationalization bring the confusion
account partially in line with Scott-Kakures’s view. The views differ, however,
on the way in which they explain self-deceptive resistance to self-knowledge.
Specifically, they differ on how to account for the fool’s false self-explanation
of why he believes his acquaintance will return to him one day. As noted in the
previous section, Scott-Kakures seems committed to claiming that biased
hypothesis testing is the cause of the fool’s belief that his belief about his
acquaintance is evidentially grounded.27 The fool’s self-belief here, however, is
not the result of hypothesis testing; rather, it expresses the presumption that his
belief that his acquaintance will return to him one day is warranted. This self-
belief, which concerns the proper explanation for his maintaining his belief about
his acquaintance, may be only tacit. At least as we have been conceiving of the
case, however, it must be there; it explains why he resists the wise man’s
(correct) explanation of his condition. This self-belief is an immediate result of
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the epistemic satisfaction he mistakenly takes in his belief about his acquain-
tance: the fool believes the self-belief to be true because its truth is a condition
of the truth of his belief about his acquaintance. As long as he takes his satis-
faction in the latter to be, at base, epistemic, he will also take the former to be
true. Scott-Kakures is right, I think, to insist that an adequate account of self-
deception must explain the agent’s role in maintaining the condition in non-
intentional terms; I also think he is right to focus on reasoning as the primary
means of this maintenance. His hypothesis-testing model, however, cannot
correctly characterize the self-deceived individual’s resistance to being told
either that or why he is maintaining his self-deception. If a disposition to resist
the proper explanation of one’s self-deceived belief is a common feature of the
condition—and I hope to have shown here that it is—then the confusion account
should be preferred for its ability to explain it.
4. CONCLUSION:TWISTED SELF-DECEPTION
I have argued that the confusion account can explain both what the fool believes
and why no wise man has the power to reason him out of his condition. The
fool’s anticipation of the pain he would feel upon giving up his preferred belief
drives both his maintenance of the belief and his insistence that it is warranted.
Not all cases of self-deception are like the fool’s, however; there are cases of
self-deception in which the individual maintains an unwarranted belief whose
valence, at least apparently, is unpleasant. Mele (1997, 1999, 2001) has dubbed
this “twisted” self-deception. For an example, imagine a jealous husband who
has no evidence that his wife is cheating on him and overwhelming evidence
that she is faithful, yet who persists in believing that she is having an affair. This
sort of case poses at least a prima facie challenge to views such as Mele’s and
Barnes’s, for it is not immediately obvious what could motivate this husband to
maintain his jealous belief, nor is it immediately obvious how this husband’s
condition reduces anxiety (indeed, it might seem to provoke it). Both Mele
(1997, 2001, ch. 5) and Barnes (1997, p. 44-46) have sought to defend their
views from this challenge. Funkhouser (2005, p. 307-309), Scott-Kakures (2009,
p. 101-105), and Fernández (2013, p. 386) also consider twisted self-deception;
for them, it is a phenomenon that a full account of self-deception should be able
to explain.28 The confusion account can, I think, explain the phenomenon, and
showing how it does will help to elaborate the view, in part by saying a bit more
about thumotic satisfaction. Let me close, then, with some remarks on how it
may be used to approach twisted cases.
In all cases, twisted and nontwisted alike, the explanatory value of the confusion
account comes out when considering resistance to self-knowledge. Imagine,
then, that the jealous husband is correctly told that he does not think his wife is
unfaithful because that is what his best estimate of the evidence suggests; rather,
he believes what he does because, even though the belief is unpleasant, it is
somehow satisfying to him. Suppose he resists, asking how such an unpleasant
belief could be satisfying in any way. Here, we can answer him by first taking a
clue from etymology. The term “satisfaction” derives from Latin terms that
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signify the idea of doing (“facere”) enough (“satis”). There are all sorts of things
that we can satisfy by doing enough: we can satisfy demands, expectations,
contractual obligations, etc. These sorts of satisfaction need not involve pleas-
ure. The satisfaction the jealous husband takes in his unpleasant belief, then,
could be the thumotic satisfaction of angrily upholding a code of honour, which
he confuses with willingly accepting an unpleasant truth. These are confusable,
for both anger and considering unpleasant truths are negatively valenced. To be
sure, there may be other ways of characterizing the jealous husband; all I want
here is to sketch the kind of explanation the confusion account is positioned to
give. It does not have to appeal to pleasure to make sense of satisfaction, so nor
must it appeal to pleasure to make sense of confusion, self-deception, or resist-
ance to self-knowledge. Reflecting on twisted cases, then, may help not only
clarify the confusion account but also bring out its explanatory power.
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NOTES
1 Scott-Kakures adopts this term from Alfred Mele’s self-characterization (Scott-Kakures, p.
577, n. 3) but applies it more broadly than Mele does.
2 Funkhouser, Barrett, and Fernández are not the first to develop views along these lines. They
all acknowledge the influence of RobertAudi (1985, 1988, 1997) and Kent Bach (1981, 1997)
on their work.
3 See, e.g., Hookway (2001), Owens (2002), and Greco (2014).
4 Although little has been written about this resistance to self-knowledge, plenty has been writ-
ten on self-deception as involving a failure of self-knowledge. Scott-Kakures, Funkhouser,
and Fernández all present self-deception in this way, as do Sanford (1988), Cohen (1992),
Holton (2001), and Bilgrami (2006).
5 I focus on Funkhouser (2005) rather than Funkhouser and Barrett (2016) because the former
relates more immediately to the present discussion.
6 Joseph Camp (2002) has suggested that the sort of confusion I am discussing might be more
perspicuously labeled “ontological confusion” (Camp, 2002, p. 3). I, like Camp, will stick to
using the simpler “confusion.” My thinking about confusion owes much to Camp’s insightful
work on the topic.
7 The literature on this topic is vast. See, inter alia, Alston (1988),Audi (2001), Bennett (1990),
Chrisman (2008), Hieronymi (2006), Setiya (2008), Scott-Kakures (2000), Shah and Velle-
man (2005), and Williams (1970).
8 See Lynch (2012) for an extensive discussion of this feature.
9 If this last point is what leads them to find self-deception interesting, then they are not alone.
Tamar Gendler (2010b, 2010c) has introduced the concept of “alief” to account for cases in
which individuals act contrary to what they believe; one of her main explanatory goals is to
account for these actions without characterizing the individuals as holding inconsistent pairs
of beliefs. For critiques of this notion of alief, see Hubbs (2013) and Mandelbaum (2013).
Gendler (2010a) does not explain self-deception in terms of aliefs; instead, the phenomenon
is characterized as a sort of pretense. Whatever virtues this account might have, it will not
help explain the fool’s self-deceptive resistance to self-knowledge—sustaining this resistance
is not a matter of pretending.
10For more problems with Funkhouser’s position as it is elaborated in Funkhouser and Barrett
(2016), see Doody (2017); for a response, see Funkhouser and Barrett (2017).
11On this, see Davidson (2004a, p. 185).
12 I take the term “homuncularism” from Johnston (1988).
13Other, somewhat more recent intentionalist views can be found in Talbott (1995) and in
Bermúdez (1997, 2000).
14Similar, but not identical. Funkhouser and Barrett claim that “philosophers and psychologists
have a hard time keeping the deception in self-deception” (Funkhouser and Barrett, 2017,
p. 682). The deception mentioned here is distinguishable from the tension discussed above.
15Scott-Kakures (2002), elaborated and developed in Scott-Kakures (2009).
16Scott-Kakures is not alone here; see also Mele (2001), as well as Scott-Kakures (1996), which
draws on and critiques Mele (1987). As Scott Kakures (2009, p. 76, n. 12) notes, sources for
this approach include Friedrich (1993) and Trope and Liberman (1996).
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17With something close to this last point in mind, McDonald and Loggins tell us, “What seems
to be is always better than nothing.”
18Scott-Kakures (2009) elaborates this view using the resources of cognitive dissonance theory—
these elaborations are irrelevant to the criticism I pursue in this section (but cf. n. 23 n. 27).
19For more on agential mental activity, see Soteriou (2005) and Soteriou and O’Brien (2009).
20This is not a recent discovery: the fact that our minds are susceptible to forces that are stan-
dardly thought of as operating on the body is a major theme of Freud’s work. For a particu-
larly illuminating discussion of the matter, see Freud (1911).
21See Padel (1992, p. 27-30) on “thumos.” Drawing very loosely on the view Socrates presents
in Plato’s Republic, I take thumotic satisfaction to be distinguishable from the appetitive “plea-
sures of food, drink, sex, and others that are closely akin to them” (Plato, 1992, p. 111) and
from the epistemic satisfaction I discuss later in this section. Mine can only be a loose inter-
pretation, however, as Socrates characterizes thumos as the part of the soul we “get angry
with” (Plato, 1992, p. 111). I take the space between food, drink, and sex, on the one hand, and
learning and knowledge, on the other, to leave room for social emotions other than anger.
22Barrett agrees that an affective condition can be satisfying without involving a detectable feel-
ing; “even a completely neutral feeling is affect” (Barrett, 2017, p. 72).
23Scott-Kakures (2009) draws explicitly on the literature on cognitive dissonance to develop an
account of self-deception. I return to this below; cf. n. 27.
24 Jonathan Lear (1988) discusses this tendency towards epistemic satisfaction as a desire for
understanding; adapting a term from Melanie Klein, he calls this desire epistemophilia (see
Lear, 1988, p. 3-10). I might have characterized this tendency as aiming at truth or knowledge
or understanding, but I wish to avoid the debates that surround these topics.
25 I have focused here just on valence, but for the two sorts of satisfaction to be confusable, the
levels of arousal will also need to be sufficiently similar. I suspect there are some ways of
depicting the fool where the arousal is elevated and others where it is low. I set this aside. My
point here is made, I hope, by understanding how the common valence—which in the fool’s
case is pleasure—could be confused.
26By using the virtue-theoretic language of “epistemic courage,” we can accurately locate, I
think, the sort of responsibility that self-deceived individuals have for their condition. In saying
this, I thus disagree with Neil Levy’s view that self-deception is a simple mistake that lacks
any necessary connection to culpability (Levy, 2004).A full discussion of the normative ques-
tions surrounding self-deception is beyond the scope of the present essay. For more on the
topic, see Mary van Loon’s contribution to this issue of Les ateliers de l’éthique/The Ethics
Forum.
27Also, as noted in n. 23, Scott-Kakures has elaborated this view by drawing on cognitive disso-
nance theory. This is an account of what might drive one to test a (biased) hypothesis, but it
keeps the hypothesis-test model intact. Moreover, cognitive dissonance is necessarily a disso-
nance between two separate epistemic states. The confusion view on offer here concerns two
sorts of satisfaction one might find in a single epistemic state.
28For other discussions on twisted self-deception, see Nelkin (2002) and Michel and Newen
(2010).
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HOW TO TRAGICALLY DECEIVE YOURSELF
JAKOB OHLHORST
GRADUATE STUDENT, UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE
ABSTRACT:
This paper introduces the concept of tragic self-deception. Taking the basic notion that
self-deception ismotivated belief against better evidence, I argue that there are extreme
cases of self-deception even when the contrary evidence is compelling. These I call cases
of tragic self-deception. Such strong evidence could be argued to exclude the possibility
of self-deception; it would be a delusion instead. To sidestep this conclusion, I introduce
theWittgensteinian concept of certainties or hinges:acceptances that are beyond eviden-
tial justification.One particular type of certainties—iHinges,which are adopted formoti-
vational reasons—explain the phenomenon of tragic self-deception: they warrant the
subject’s dismissal of the evidence without loss of rationality from the subject’s point of
view. Subsequently, I deal with some objections that can be raised against this account of
self-deception.
RÉSUMÉ :
Cet article présente le concept d’auto-illusion tragique. En prenant la notion de base selon
laquelle l’auto-illusion consiste en une croyance motivée à l’encontre de meilleures
preuves, je soutiens qu’il existe des cas extrêmes d’auto-illusion qui persistentmême face
à des preuves contradictoires incontestables. J’appelle ces cas : auto-illusion tragique.On
pourrait soutenir que des preuves d’une telle force excluent la possibilité d’auto-illusion
et qu’il s’agirait plutôt de délire. Afin d’éviter cette conclusion, j’introduis le concept witt-
gensteinien de certitudes ou de propositions charnières (hinges) : des admissions qui se
situent au-delà d’une justification de nature probante. Un type de certitudes en particu-
lier – iHinges, qui sont adoptées pour des raisons d’ordremotivationnel – rend compte du
phénomène d’auto-illusion tragique.Ces certitudes justifient que le sujet rejette la preuve
sans que cela implique, de son propre point de vue, une perte de rationalité. Subséquem-
ment, je traite de certaines objections qui peuvent être soulevées contre cette explica-
tion de l’auto-illusion.
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INTRODUCTION
Self-deception is emotionally motivated belief against better evidence. This is a
common way of glossing the phenomenon. It is a very expansive notion: for
example, wishful thinking will also fall under this umbrella. There is a debate on
whether self-deception needs to be intentional. I ignore this question, because
intentional self-deception excludes certain phenomena that I take to be clear
cases of self-deception (cf. Mele, 2001, p. 9).
I think that there is a special form of self-deception, which is usually overlooked.
I call it tragic self-deception: in such cases the subject is able to dismiss any,
even compelling, evidence. This is the sort of self-deception from which, for
example, religious fanatics suffer: the tragically self-deceived are in that state
because, to them, certain things cannot be true.
Tragic self-deception is overlooked because it does not fit with our usual epis-
temological concepts. Either the contrary evidence seems to be too weak, so that
it leads to ordinary self-deception, or the evidence is considered to be too strong.
In the latter case, the subject would have to be mad or delusional, rather than
merely self-deceived, in holding such a belief.
Note that “delusional” is ambiguous. There is the medical sense—such a patho-
logical delusion means that the subject suffers from some mental illness. I will
come back to how this sense of “delusional” appears to exclude tragic self-
deception in the case of compelling evidence. The other sense is loose talk: “he
is delusional” just means there is something very wrong with his beliefs. This
looser sense of “delusional” does not seem to demarcate a class of its own and
is often synonymous with “self-deceived.” I shall therefore ignore it (cf.
Bortolotti and Mameli, 2012).
Our usual concepts of self-deception provide only a limited arsenal of ways to
avoid an abhorred conclusion: selective sampling, selective treatment, biased
weighing, and misinterpretation of evidence (Mele, 1997). These self-deceptive
tricks cannot dispel compelling evidence against the false belief. Therefore, we
overlook the possibility of tragic self-deception. A regularly self-deceived
subject confronted with sufficiently strong evidence would therefore snap out of
it and find truth. Such a subject who failed to do so would be so deeply irra-
tional that that subject would be pathologically delusional—his or her mind
would have to be defective.
Nevertheless, I think we should take the possibility of tragic self-deception seri-
ously. Indeed, if we extend our conceptual framework to include hinges or
certainties, then we can account for tragic self-deception. Hinges were intro-
duced by LudwigWittgenstein inOn Certainty (1969). We can use the notion to
account for how and why tragic self-deception arises. Additionally, we can
explain away the impression that tragic self-deception is impossible and that it
collapses into pathological delusion.
49
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
I will begin by presenting an example of what I take to be tragic self-deception.
Indeed, I believe that such cases are quite common. I then explain how our
understanding of rationality threatens the concept of tragic self-deception. I
believe that this idea explains why tragic self-deception seems to collapse into
delusion. I will then introduce certainties as the feature of our epistemological
apparatus that is able to explain tragic self-deception.
My account of certainties loosely followsWittgenstein’s (1969).Apeculiar form
of such certainties can cause self-deception. I call them iHinges, and they are
adopted for subjective motivational reasons. This paper shows how they explain
the possibility of tragic self-deception, where the subject is absolutely resistant
to contrary evidence.
While this account deals with the mentioned objection of irrationality, other
objections can be raised. I conclude by explaining and responding to those other
objections: that my definition of tragic self-deception seems to make it indis-
tinguishable from pathological delusion as it is usually defined, that it does not
account for stubbornness or the nagging doubts usually accompanying self-
deception, and that it is too heavy-handed an approach for something so straight-
forward as self-deception.
TRAGICALLY DECEIVING ONESELF
Tragic self-deception arises when a subject has a belief that is immune to any,
even compelling, evidence. This is analogous to regular self-deception being
mere resistance against evidence. What is meant by “immunity,” and what do I
mean by “compelling evidence”?
Abelief is immune when there is no possible evidence that could rebut or under-
mine it. I name this immunity to evidence because the belief could be lost due to
other psychological factors like being shocked or overwhelmed, but no eviden-
tial reasons could dislodge it.
Evidence is compelling when it is impossible to ignore, when it entails what it
is evidence for, and when the entailment is also impossible to ignore. When
neither the evidence nor its evidential relations can be ignored, this makes the
evidence compelling: the evidence forces us to believe.
Now this seems to make tragic self-deception an inconsistent concept: how can
we be immune to believing something that we’re forced to believe? I will work
out this inconsistency more precisely in the section on tragic self-deception and
madness. Ultimately, I shall argue that the appearance of inconsistency is
resolved by epistemic certainties. But first I will give an example of tragic self-
deception and develop the notion to show that it is nevertheless rather natural.
MISBEGOTTEN: A young woman is accused of a heinous crime: the
evidence laid out by the prosecutor against her is crushing and she has
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confessed to it repeatedly. Notwithstanding this, her parents remain
convinced of their baby’s innocence. If they accepted that their daughter
was a criminal, they would be devastated: in their eyes, they did every-
thing for their daughter, they gave her their values, and their identity is
built on their idea of their daughter’s moral character.1
This is an example of what I named tragic self-deception—it is the first exam-
ple that comes to my mind when I am thinking about self-deception in general.
It fits the idea that self-deception occurs when people believe something against
better evidence because they desire or fear it to be true.
I have to note, however, that I think that self-deception is a multifarious phenom-
enon—I am not certain that all self-deception is a matter of believing against
better evidence.2 Let us then take a closer look at the example.
The parents of “Misbegotten” are self-deceived. Most people would be called so if
they believed something because of some motivation without appropriately
accounting for their evidence. They believe that their daughter is innocent because
they desire her to be so and because they fear the contrary.Meanwhile, such a desire
has no epistemic force. Nevertheless, they dismiss the compelling contrary evidence
they have: all that has been laid out in the judiciary proceedings.
Still, “Misbegotten” differs from run-of-the-mill examples used for self-decep-
tion as characterized by motivated resistance against evidence. Take the story of
Sid and Roz as an example.3 Sid is in love with Roz; Roz, however, does not
share this sentiment. Because she fears hurting his feelings and because she
nevertheless appreciates him as a friend, Roz does not simply rebuff him. Rather,
she implicitly communicates in a way that any sensible person would under-
stand that she is not interested. Unluckily, Sid is not sensible; he is in love. Given
his emotional state, he misreads Roz’s refusals as encouragements.
Sid has evidence against p but because of his motivational state—desiring Roz
to love him—he misinterprets the situation and comes to believe that she also
loves him. The difference from “Misbegotten” is that, if Roz had explicitly told
Sid that she does not want to be with him, then Sid would snap out of it. He is
not deluded either, so runs the thought, except in a hyperbolical sense. And he
would not resist any evidence against the desired outcome: if Roz wrote him a
letter, he would maybe want to double-check with her; but he would not out of
hand dismiss it as a forgery sent to him by his malevolent competitors. That is,
Sid is insensitive but not immune to evidence.
The parents in “Misbegotten”, however, are so deeply entrenched in their belief
that no evidence could convince them otherwise. I therefore call “Misbegotten”
a case of tragic self-deception—tragic, because it is characterized by total immu-
nity to evidence.4 Tragic self-deception is then a special kind of self-deception,
which is characterized by its being emotionally motivated and immune to
evidence—something that Mele’s classical model (2001, p. 50-51) arguably
cannot account for.
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Given the above considerations, I shall followAlfred Mele’s (1983, p. 370; 2001,
p. 50-51; 2009, p. 267) deflationist approach to self-deception in order to char-
acterize tragic self-deception. The following characterization is a modification
of Mele’s:
S enters tragic self-deception in acquiring a belief that p iff
(1) the belief that p that S acquires is false;5
(2) S treats the evidence relevant, or at least seemingly relevant, to
the truth value of p in a motivationally biased way;
(3) this biased treatment is a nondeviant cause of S’s acquiring the
belief that p; and
(4) the body of evidence possessed by S at the time entails not-p, S is
aware of the entailment, and the evidence is such that S cannot
ignore it (cf.Mele, 2009, p. 267).6
By entailment I do not mean mere material implication but rather strict entail-
ment. It is the fourth condition that makes self-deception tragic, as it strength-
ens the evidential relation to entailment and makes the evidence impossible to
ignore. Consequently, the subject is aware of the evidence and of what it entails.
For the general debate on self-deception, I shall be relying more or less on Mele’s
position and work (2001). I do not think that tragic self-deception and defla-
tionist self-deception are the only types of the phenomenon. Nor do I think that
the intention to deceive oneself is a prerequisite for being self-deceived. For, if
we survey how the nonphilosophical literature describes self-deception, we find
instances of motivated belief against evidence.7 These are philosophically inter-
esting phenomena, whether they are called self-deception or not. But if we
consider the sort of examples I have mentioned, these seem (at least to me) well
captured by the term “self-deception” or “tragic self-deception.”
REMAINING SUFFICIENTLY RATIONAL
Egocentric and Objective Rationality
Tragic self-deception raises a whole nest of issues. Immediately, there is the
question of rationality. Holistically speaking, if we take into account all the
reasons a subject might have, tragic self-deception may be rational. It allows the
subject to pursue his or her life as before. However, I am concerned with the
epistemology of self-deception and focus on the self-deceived’s epistemic ration-
ality. There are two senses of epistemic rationality: objective and egocentric
rationality.
Objectively, the self-deceived are clearly irrational. We do criticize people for
having objectively irrational beliefs—for example, when an agent does not
account for all the evidence that agent has available or when an agent believes
mutually exclusive things. There is then a standard of rationality that everybody
can be measured against. Richard Foley calls this “objective rationality” (Foley,
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1991, p. 369), and it is circumscribed by how a knowledgeable outside observer
would evaluate the situation.
But this is not everything. There also is an inside perspective on rationality,
which evaluates the subject’s own point of view:
We are sometimes interested in evaluating your decisions from your own
egocentric perspective. Our aim is to assess whether or not you have
lived up to your own standards … or, perhaps, the perspective you would
have had were you to have been carefully reflective. (Foley, 1991,
p. 367–368)
Following Foley, I call this weaker notion egocentric epistemic rationality. We
all have standards of coherence for ourselves: our beliefs should be compatible
with each other and with the evidence we have available. If we become aware
of incoherence, either between our beliefs and our evidence or amongst our
beliefs, then we are required to revise either a belief or our interpretation of the
evidence. If we failed to account for all the evidence we are aware of or to deal
with our incoherence, we would become egocentrically irrational, believing
things we believe to be incompatible.
There is the common idea that we cannot be egocentrically irrational if we want
to preserve our sanity. That is, we as mentally healthy subjects are incapable of
believing contradictions while being aware of their contradictoriness.8 In the
same way, clear and immediate evidence against our beliefs cannot be ignored
just like that—if we did, something would be wrong with our minds. Becoming
consciously egocentrically irrational appears to be a form of madness; it implies
a mind in disarray.
Even if a consciously egocentrically irrational person were not crazy, it still
would be extraordinary. Could we make sense of what that person was doing
and thinking?9 If somebody seems to be consciously egocentrically irrational—
that is, holding inconsistent beliefs while aware of the inconsistency, not
accounting for evidence while recognizing it, but otherwise behaving normally
(if that is possible)—then we need some explanation for what is going on. I do
not think that a sane subject can be consciously egocentrically irrational.
Tragic Self-Deception or Madness?
So, we are also subject to egocentric rationality. The household of our beliefs is
subject to diverse constraints. Anything we are or would, upon reflection,
become aware of falling under these constraints constitutes our egocentric ration-
ality. As mentioned, we have to appropriately account for the evidence that we
are aware of, and we cannot believe a contradiction while being aware of it;
otherwise, we are consciously egocentrically irrational.
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Those who are tragically self-deceived seem to be consciously egocentrically
irrational—they dismiss evidence that they recognize to be compelling.
Conscious egocentric irrationality implies that the subject is mad. If all instances
of tragic self-deception are instances of madness, then what good is the concept?
It’s just madness. This reasoning creates the appearance that cases of tragic self-
deception with sane subjects are impossible. Consequently, tragic self-decep-
tion does threaten a subject’s egocentric epistemic rationality and thereby itself
as a concept.10
In tragic self-deception, the available evidence is compelling. The subject cannot
ignore that evidence without becoming consciously egocentrically irrational.
But if that subject accounted for the evidence by making the appropriate infer-
ences, this would lead to a contradiction with the strongly confessed self-decep-
tive beliefs. The subject would again be consciously egocentrically irrational.
How could a subject be tragically self-deceived without being egocentrically
irrational, given that as long as such a subject holds on to a self-deceptive belief
he or she will end up in an apparent incoherence?
Prima facie, there seem to be two options on how to interpret what is going on
here: either the subject ends up egocentrically irrational due to the compelling
evidence and his or her immunity to it, or the evidence was not actually as
compelling as it was made out to be.11, 12
The first option means that the subject is out of his or her right mind. Conscious
egocentric irrationality is not possible for a sane subject—consequently, the
consciously egocentrically irrational person must suffer from some mental
illness. Most probably, that person is delusional. Delusion is defined as “a false
belief … that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else believes and
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the
contrary” (DSM-5, 2013, p. 819). Now, if tragic self-deception were nothing but
a symptom of mental illness, calling it a kind of “self-deception” would be
unwarranted.
The other option is that actually the evidence is not compelling. If that is the
case, then this is not a case of tragic self-deception. Rather it is regular evidence
and the subject is just ordinarily self-deceived.
Notwithstanding this appearance, I want to defend the notion of tragic self-
deception as something that occurs with fanatics or in cases like “Misbegotten”.
I want to maintain that a sane subject can stay both egocentrically rational and
immune to any evidence, even if that evidence is compelling. This is possible
because the evidence may be compelling, but it cannot be certain. In a way, I
concede that compelling evidence is not as compelling as it might seem at first
sight. Evidence cannot compel us to just any belief, even when we have accu-
rately assessed it. That would be an unrealistic requirement. Evidence may
always be defeated. The evidential relation is one of entailment, and every
modus ponens has its modus tollens. Finally, there is a class of doxastic states
that defeat any evidence. These states are called certainties or hinges.
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HINGING
Regularly
I shall argue that tragic self-deception is grounded in a peculiar feature of our
epistemologies: hinges or certainties—two terms that I use interchangeably.
Historically speaking, hinges go back to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
(1969). But they have recently regained popularity in internalist epistemology
(cf. Coliva and Moyale-Sharrock, 2016).
Certainties or hinges are acceptances13 that are beyond evidential justification.
This immunity against evidence stems from their peculiar role: they are so
general or fundamental that one cannot possibly find any noncircular evidence
for or against them. They are the acceptances that are attacked and rendered visi-
ble by sceptical arguments. Wittgenstein gives the following example:
91. If Moore says he knows the earth existed etc., most of us will grant
him that it has existed all that time, and also believe him when he says
he is convinced of it. Has he also got the right ground for his conviction?
(Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 14e)
As Wittgenstein points out, there is noncircular evidence neither for nor against
such propositions. They are beyond the game of giving reasons. Consequently,
they are also beyond doubt. For Wittgenstein, genuine doubt is controlled by
evidence—we cannot really doubt something that is beyond evidence; it would
just be empty gesturing (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 18e).
These evidentially ungrounded certainties form the “rock-bottom” on which the
whole building of our knowing and believing is erected (Wittgenstein, 1969, p.
33e). Wittgenstein uses the bedrock metaphor because of the hinges’ solidity—
as mentioned, we cannot really doubt hinges, and we do not make sense if we
do because of their foundational role. Accepting certainties is necessary for
evidential relations, communicative interaction, and practical projects to work.
Without hinges, we would not be able to investigate, tell, or do anything inten-
tionally.
So how do hinges work? Mostly they are hidden and implicit. They form the
fixed background in front of which we operate. They are the things we take for
granted and on which our epistemic activity turns. But in peculiar situations,
they can come to the fore. Consider the following example.
ROSE: As you read this paper, you see how a rose appears out of thin air,
falls to the ground, and shatters. The shards dissolve into thin air again.
You do not trust your eyes and refuse to believe that a rose really
appeared and disappeared just now.
I would like to point out that the evidence in “Rose” is compelling, you see the
rose appearing—if the evidence is not strong enough for your tastes, strengthen
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it as you like. The certainty that is active in this example can be formulated as
follows: “midsized massive objects do not just appear and disappear.” This is
certain. You would have a hard time furnishing evidence for it. And evidence
against it, such as “Rose”, is dismissed even if it is compelling. Indeed, the
certainty warrants dismissing any evidence against it.
For, if you were to accept the evidence from “Rose”, you would lose the ability
to know many things about objects—especially if the rose’s appearance
remained a unique or random event. Your memory would become useless; you
could not tell others about things elsewhere. You would not even be able to inten-
tionally get milk from the fridge the way you usually do, as it could have disap-
peared in the meantime. You would only ever be able to intentionally go check
whether there is still milk. Depending on your milk management, that might be
what you actually do, and, in that case, imagine yourself to be more reliable.
The constancy of objects is not the only certainty. There are large swaths of inter-
connected propositions that can be taken to be certain—for example, the belief
that the world is more or less as we perceive it to be, the idea that causal rela-
tions hold between certain events, or the conviction that other living beings also
have consciousness. These certainties inform our world picture (Wittgenstein,
1969, p. 24e). We need such certainties, lest we be unable to act intentionally or
to believe genuinely.We would not be able to interact with the world in any way.
Hinges are a necessary condition for epistemic and practical agency.
To use a slogan: without certainties, mind-to-world, world-to-mind, and mind-
to-mind adaptation would break down. That is, neither could the mind adopt a
picture of the world nor could it act upon the world or exchange thoughts with
other minds. It is therefore both epistemically and practically rational14 to treat
certain fundamental beliefs as certainties or hinges. From this particular role
flows the epistemic rationality of dismissing any evidence that is incompatible
with our hinges.
The attentive Wittgensteinian will already have realized that I do not follow an
orthodox interpretation of what hinges are, because I treat them as logically
related to other beliefs and maybe even truth apt instead of animal (a rule of our
form of life) and beyond evaluation (cf. Moyal-Sharrock, 2016). Indeed, I am not
at all certain that this epistemic account of certainties (cf. Kusch, 2016) accounts
forWittgenstein’s own view. Nonetheless, I believe that such an epistemic account
of hinges is the way to go; it is a powerful tool. In other words, I am not wedded
to the noble enterprise of reconstructing Wittgenstein’s own philosophy.
Variant Hinges
Things are however not as simple as they may have seemed until now: there is
no natural class of certainties. Being a hinge is not an essential feature of propo-
sitions. Rather, this depends on the environment in which we live and the kinds
of organisms that we are: a member of the San people living in the thirteenth
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century has and needs a different world picture than an Indian Brahman from the
third century, and their world pictures are profoundly different from a dolphin’s.
A salient example of how hinges can be under tension or shift is the theory of
relativity. Wittgenstein was aware that we changed hinges in that case. Notably,
he would refuse to say that people’s former certainty that time and space are
independent measures was mistaken. Rather, they were “confused” about what
time and space are—namely, something that, for lack of better words, bends and
stretches (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 39e). Indeed, if you look at how we think, talk,
and behave today, we still largely treat space and time as independent.
Another example that Wittgenstein raises is that of faith:
Catholics believe as well that in certain circumstances a wafer completely
changes its nature, and at the same time that all evidence proves the
contrary. And so if Moore said ‘I know that this is wine and not blood’,
Catholics would contradict him. (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 32e)
These examples show that there is no salient criterion of which propositions
should be hinges—it is contingent for any proposition p whether it is certain or
not. Rather, hinges arise out of how we treat certain propositions. We take them
to be certain and indubitable—we take them for granted. Hinges fulfil a certain
functional role in the households of our believing and they are hinges because
they play this functional role.
Life Is Easier on iHinge
This opens up space for propositions to be treated like certainties that have little
to do with grounding our epistemic, communicative, and practical activities.
People do not treat only the existence of the world, or the acceptance that other
members of their community will understand what they say, as certain. There
may be also more subjective emotional or existential hinges.
Tragic self-deception results from this category of subjective hinges. If we
compare the examples of the “Rose” and the misbegotten daughter, then the
parallels become clear. In both cases, there is apparent and compelling evidence
for some proposition p. But the agent dismisses this evidence instead of adapt-
ing her beliefs to it. She does this because, from her point of view, things just
could not be as the evidence would indicate—that is, p.
Things could not be such because the agent is certain of propositions that imply
that not-p. Therefore, the evidence cannot be accurate. Thus, the agent’s hinges
are the grounds on which she dismisses the apparent evidence. Interestingly
enough, neither with regular hinges nor in tragic self-deception does the certainty
need to be held explicitly. The certainty may become apparent only if we asked
the subjects why they dismissed their evidence. The mechanism works auto-
matically.
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Further, the certainties preserve the agents’ egocentric epistemic rationality when
they dismiss even compelling evidence that goes against their hinges. Their func-
tional role as certainties make the dismissal of any contrary evidence egocen-
trically rational. The same also holds for tragic self-deception: the tragically
self-deceived may dismiss any evidence going against their fundamental certain-
ties, without becoming egocentrically irrational. Their self-deceiving hinges
parasitize the egocentric rationality-preserving function of regular hinges. I shall
call the hinges leading to tragic self-deception iHinges,15 given their central role
for our self-image.
What makes certainties into iHinges? It’s the basis on which they are adopted.
As mentioned, regular hinges serve to make action, communication, and inquiry
as such possible. They are a structural requirement. Without them, we would
end up with an infinite regress or a circularity of evidence justifying beliefs
about evidence. All our beliefs and actions would lose their rational grounds.
Wittgenstein therefore likes to call them “logical” requirements (Wittgenstein,
1969, p. 7e, 20e, 58e).
iHinges do not play the same fundamental role. They are necessary for our lives
in another way. Rather than being necessary for our world picture, they are
hinges necessary for our self-image. iHinges are the response to questions like
“What sort of person am I?” and not to questions that are dealt with by other
hinges such as “What is a person?”
Take, for example, the conviction that the people close to you genuinely care
about you and vice versa. Evidence for this is extraordinarily hard to come by.
All of their behaviour is compatible with the fact that, ultimately, it is only their
own enjoyment they seek in interaction with you. Indeed, there are people who
argue for a crude Homo oeconomicus anthropology, claiming that all actions
simply result from an egocentric utility calculus.16
Nevertheless, we trust ourselves and our close friends to spend time with us and
support us not because they expect some corresponding return value from this.
In Kantian terms, we have a hinge that to our close friends we are an end in
ourselves and not a means to something else. Without this certainty, the very
notion of friendship would fall apart. Imagine how empty the idea would be.
The only way to avoid this hinge is by believing that you have no friends at all.17
In other words, iHinges may help give sense to our lives. They tie together a self-
image, helping us to deal with our desires, doubts, and fears. iHinges play an exis-
tential role. If such a certainty becomes unhinged and is accepted to be false or
doubtful, it is not our very capability to interact with the world that is at stake.We
still have access to all the categories required to act and believe rationally.
Instead, what happens if we lose an iHinge is that we fall prey to an existential
crisis: many maxims on which we have put our stakes until now, many evalua-
tions that we took to be certain, and many ideas about who we are would fall
58
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
apart. While it would not hinder us from doing or investigating things by robbing
us of the prerequisite world picture, it would undermine our motivations, values,
and ideas, thus throwing us into lethargy.
We accept iHinges to avoid such existential devastation. They are a psycholog-
ical or motivational rather than an epistemic necessity for living our lives. In
sum, a certainty is an iHinge if and only if it has all the structural trappings of a
certainty – immunity to evidence, implications for a wide class of other beliefs,
and so on – but it is adopted because it is necessary for preserving our motiva-
tions and self-image rather than for preserving our epistemic and practical
agency as such. One consequence from this is that, from the point of view of
objective rationality, our iHinges ought to be susceptible to evidence. The fact
that they are not, because of their existential role, generates problems like tragic
self-deception.
PICK YOUR IHINGE FOR YOUR TRAGEDY
iHinges lead to the motivated manipulation of evidence in tragic self-deception.
Thus, in “Misbegotten”, the parents have invested everything in their daughter:
they instilled her with their morals and values, they cared for her, and scolded
her when she did something wrong. In sum, they built their lives around their
idea of their daughter.18 This means that, ultimately, their daughter’s moral
integrity has become more important to them than their own epistemic access to
the world. If they accepted that she did bad things, their world would break
down. Much of what they had done and believed since she was born would lose
its meaning.
At first sight, as in any case of tragic self-deception, this appears to be egocen-
trically epistemically irrational. In her parents’ eyes, the young woman could
not do any wrong. Notwithstanding this, the evidence is clear and compelling:
she did do something wrong. But for the parents, their daughter’s innocence is
certain. This allows them to dismiss the unpleasant evidence as fabricated or
misleading without a loss of egocentric rationality. Through their iHinge, they
tragically deceive themselves in the face of compelling evidence.
They do this as follows: They are aware of the evidence laid out by the prose-
cutor, and they are aware that this evidence entails that their daughter is guilty.
It is compelling, and they cannot simply ignore it. But the parents are also certain
that their daughter is innocent. Nothing can epistemically trump a certainty;
therefore, their iHinge that the daughter is innocent defeats the evidence from
their egocentric point of view. Either the iHinge rebuts the evidence by modus
tollens or the evidential relation is somehow undercut. How the evidence is
defeated will depend on the circumstances.
Consequently, from their egocentric point of view they deal with the evidence
in an appropriate manner. They dismiss evidence that in their eyes cannot be
accurate in favour of a certainty. The certainty even warrants taking some
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account of why the evidence is undercut or rebutted to be the most plausible
explanation. This allows them to preserve their egocentric epistemic rationality
in tragic self-deception and, consequently, to avoid delusion. In short, we are
tragically self-deceived when an iHinge is incompatible with the world and there
is compelling evidence for this incompatibility.
This, then, is the basic idea of tragic self-deception: certainties that are adopted
for motivational reasons lead to dismissal of accurate evidence. I will now
respond to four objections that can be raised against the iHinge view of tragic
self-deception. The first three have been raised against Mele’s deflationist stance
but apply to my view, too. The last one specifically attacks the approach of using
hinges to account for self-deception.
Nagging Doubts
Some authors argue that self-deception is essentially characterized by a certain
inner tension (Audi, 1997, p. 104; Bach, 1997, p. 105; Losonsky, 1997, p. 121).
In other words, when we are self-deceived, we will be aware that something is
amiss.We will frequently revisit our deceptive belief and have “nagging doubts”
(Losonsky, 1997, p. 121) about it. This point has been raised in response to a
paper by Alfred Mele, where he argues that self-deception as investigated by
empirical psychology arises out of our biases (Mele, 1997, p. 93-95), a view that
does not account for these supposedly essential nagging doubts. The idea behind
the objection is that the self-deceived subject is somehow implicitly aware of his
or her deceit, hence the nagging doubts.
In tragic self-deception, there can be no such nagging doubts at all. Doubt is
excluded by the very nature of certainty—iHinges need to be beyond doubt to
fulfil their role. Nevertheless, a form of tension remains in tragic self-deception,
but it is an outer rather than an inner tension.As Bach observes, the self-deceived
subject is at stark odds with reality—“truth is dangerously close at hand” (Bach,
1997, p. 105). First, the subject’s belief is false; second, contrary evidence is
easy to come by. The self-deceived subject will therefore quite frequently come
up against such contrary evidence—having to dismiss it each time. This is an
outer tension.
Consider how someone would react to not only a single, but repeated occur-
rences of “Rose”: suddenly roses start popping up and disappearing all over the
place. The first few times, she would probably simply dismiss it; but with time
she would start treating the events differently. She would start to ask others
whether they had experienced the same thing as she has, she might seek medical
help, and she might even try to examine the phenomenon more closely. In other
words, she would start to display the same behaviour as someone doubting—
mostly her own sanity. She would be subject to outer tension.
Analogously, those who are tragically self-deceived—always coming up against
contrary evidence, always having to do the epistemic work of dismissing it—
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may at a certain point start to display such doubting behaviour. Maybe they
would not doubt their own sanity but rather the sanity of people in their envi-
ronment. While this phenomenon is not the inner tension that Mele’s critics
demand, it may still suffice as an explanation for why there are “doubts” accom-
panying self-deception.19
Delusion
Like deflationist self-deception, the notion of tragic self-deception raises a
further spectre: that tragic self-deception is mere delusion. More specifically,
the question is, why would cases of tragic self-deception not simply be cases of
pathological delusion? The worry also arises for other accounts that take resist-
ance against evidence as a starting point to account for self-deception. This is so
because diagnoses for delusion are also characterized by immunity against
evidence:
Delusion. A false belief based on incorrect inference about external
reality that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else believes and
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence
to the contrary. (DSM-5, 2013, p. 819)
I emphasize the pathological side of delusion because in ordinary language
someone who is self-deceived may be called deluded without being a case
requiring psychiatric treatment. Tragic self-deception skirts the abyss of patho-
logical delusion. It is epistemically so irrational that it has itself the air of being
pathological; the tragically self-deceived looks like a case for a therapist—for
example, a psychanalyst. Nevertheless, I think the tragically self-deceived are
quite sane—there is no work for the medically trained psychiatrist.
A nice example that demonstrates the fine line between delusion and tragic self-
deception is the romantic partner who, out of jealousy, is self-deceived about
being cheated on. How exactly does this self-deceived person differ from some-
one who needs psychiatric help for morbid jealousy? Morbid jealousy is a
syndrome characterized by “a range of irrational thoughts and emotions, together
with associated unacceptable or extreme behaviour, in which the dominant theme
is a preoccupation with a partner’s sexual unfaithfulness based on unfounded
evidence” (Kingham and Gordon, 2004, p. 207).
Apart from the “unacceptable or extreme behaviour,” someone who is tragically
self-deceived fits the morbidly jealous’s profile. Epistemically speaking, the
self-deceived person is indiscernible from the delusional patient in this case. So,
is tragic self-deception nevertheless just a form of delusion?
While this is worrying at first sight, we should keep in mind that psychiatry is
anything but an exact science.20 Furthermore, delusions do not form an aetio-
logically unified class of phenomena. This is in contrast to illnesses like schiz-
ophrenia or depression, each of which is unified by a range of symptoms and
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neurological characteristics. Already morbid jealousy itself is only the surface
description of several other illnesses—for example, it occurs frequently in cases
of schizophrenia (Kingham and Gordon, 2004, p. 207).
I surmise that, rather than being a phenomenon of the same kind and at the same
level of generality as delusion, self-deception plays the role of a symptom of
delusion. That is, delusions will always be accompanied by behaviour that can
be described as deflationary self-deception, but there can also be isolated self-
deception that is not a symptom.21
This would explain why the two are hard to separate but nevertheless distinct.
An additional argument may be, that for someone to be diagnosed as patholog-
ically deluded, their agency and ability to live a normal life would have to be
seriously impaired. Arguably, cases of tragic self-deception exactly succeed at
preserving agency and a partially normal life. We can push this line of thought
further: one of the strategies in clinical psychiatry for distinguishing pathologi-
cal behaviour from merely unusual behaviour is whether it poses a threat to
either the subject or the subject’s environment.22 The fine line separating delu-
sion from tragic self-deception would then be how much danger the particular
case poses.
This differentiation is rather tentative. But given the main goal of this paper—
introducing the phenomenon of tragic self-deception—it may be sufficient to
show how delusion may tie in with tragic self-deception. Note, however, that,
given the multifariousness of delusion, each syndrome must be treated sepa-
rately, and that the moves we made for morbid jealousy will not necessarily work
universally (cf. Mele 2006, p. 116-123).
Stubbornness
Adifferent, though similar, difficulty is how to differentiate tragic self-deception
from mere stubbornness about being right. Kevin Lynch (2013) raised the prob-
lem and proposed a viable solution in the same go. The problem, as with delu-
sion, is that stubbornness is intuitively distinct from self-deception, even though
it is also characterized by motivated immunity against evidence. A stubborn
person does not care about the evidence and will stick to his or her guns.
Lynch brings to attention the idea that acceptances can be adopted because of
emotional attitudes towards their content or they can be adopted independently of
content for some other reason.According to Lynch, stubbornness is content neutral
(Lynch, 2013, p. 1342–1344). In tragic self-deception, the subject cares about what
he or she adopts as a certainty—the subject has an emotional attitude towards what
he or she accepts, be it fear, desire, or something else.Meanwhile, in stubbornness,
as introduced by Lynch, the content of the beliefs adopted is irrelevant. It is about
being right in general, not about any particular belief content. In contrast, in tragic
self-deception, we are certain about certain propositions.
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That is, if Lynchean stubbornness about being right also operates on certainties,
then the relevant hinges will not be about some specific content. Rather, they
would take the form “Those who do not share my ideas are intellectually care-
less” or something in this vein. This hinge would then warrant the dismissal of
any counterargument.
Tragic self-deception turns on certainties that are adopted because the hinges’
content fulfils a certain motivational, psychological, or existential role for us.
This distinguishes it from stubbornness as proposed by Lynch, for which the
content of beliefs does not play any role or only a secondary one. Meanwhile,
nothing seems to preclude the possibility that stubbornness as introduced by
Lynch is a form of self-deception.
Cannons at Sparrows
Another issue may be the hinge approach itself. Using hinges to deal with self-
deception may look like shooting cannons at sparrows. Bringing out the heavy
apparatus of certainties to deal with something as straightforward as self-decep-
tion when we have so many other options may seem overblown. Are we then
exaggerating?
I have two things to say about such general doubts: First, if we grant the notion
of hinges a role in our epistemology anyway, then the apparatus is already there,
and it will play a pervasive role rather than stay confined to some peripheral
phenomena. Second, certainty is not as heavy as it might seem: while there are
these very fundamental hinges that ground inquiry and agency, there are more
everyday, lighter, ways to acquire something similar to certainties. For example,
we take things for granted all the time: you do not always check whether your
bicycle brakes still work and whether there is enough pressure in your tires—you
just hop on (cf.Wright, 2004, p. 190).
Another line of this objection is to argue that we do not need hinges. We have
everything we need with the well-researched menagerie of biases that psychol-
ogy has to offer. So why use another category, certainties? First, biases are only
distorting effects. That is, they strengthen or weaken our credences. Arguably,
such distortion effects cannot account for the complete dismissal of strong
evidence as occurs in tragic cases of self-deception.
Second, even if biases were able to account for the discarding of compelling
unavoidable evidence, they do not give the same kind of explanation as hinges
do. Biases are psychological mechanisms; they leave open how a subject treats
his or her beliefs, epistemically speaking. We are always subject to epistemic
pressures and demands. The dismissal of compelling evidence demands some
epistemic explanation if anything does. Biases do not go far enough in that job
because they underdetermine what happens in tragic self-deception—so we need
something else to lift that explanatory weight: certainties.
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Another take on this objection is to argue that tragically self-deceived subjects
take their evidence in a way that will allow them to infer the self-deceptive
conclusion. The flippant response to this would be that, if they are able to rein-
terpret their evidence, then arguably this is not sufficiently compelling evidence
for tragic cases. But I do not think that this would hold up. Rather, I would argue
that in cases of tragic self-deception, people do not refuse the evidence by point-
ing to other independent evidence. This simply is not what happens in tragic
self-deception.
The parents in “Misbegotten”cannot point to any strong enough positive
evidence for why their child would never do such a thing, however privileged it
may be; no past evidence would be able to trump or rebut the current compelling
evidence.At least I do not know what such past evidence would have to look like
to warrant dismissing the compelling current evidence. Instead, it just could not
be otherwise to them—it is inconceivable.
Additionally, self-deceived subjects would read their past evidence differently
in the light of an iHinge. As mentioned, mere biased treatment of past evidence
without certainties would not suffice to generate tragic cases of self-deception
because the counterevidence could not be compelling in such cases. Something
needs to explain the strength of the skewed interpretation of the past: iHinges do
this job.
A different issue is borderline cases. There are hinges that are adopted as much
out of epistemic curiosity as out of personal pride or desire, which makes it hard
to determine whether the subject is self-deceived or not. Take for exampleAlbert
Einstein’s refusal to accept the indeterminacy of quantum phenomena. That
“God does not play dice” is a classic example of a certainty. Now take some
fictitious counterpart of his, Twinstein, who stakes a lot of his ego on his suppos-
edly correct insights into the nature of reality. Is Twinstein tragically self-
deceived? It is hard to say. However, I do not think we need to worry. As
vagueness appears in many mental phenomena, especially defects, it is not as
troubling as it may seem at first sight: we just have to live with it.
LOOKING BEYOND
What lessons are there to be drawn from the hinge-account of tragic self-decep-
tion? First, it shows that and how one can be tragically self-deceived without
being pathologically delusional or egocentrically irrational. Cases where a
subject proves to be absolutely resistant to evidence constitute an important
subclass of self-deception. Tragic self-deception shows how extreme the
phenomenon can get. Additionally, hinges explain how the subject can be in
such a state without becoming incoherent or egocentrically irrational—thereby
avoiding the open and apparent contradictions that certain patients of delusion
run into. Even somebody tragically self-deceived will appear to be more objec-
tively rational than someone with, for example, anosognosia. Anosognosia is
one symptom of hemiplegia among others, where patients do not recognize that
64
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
half their body is paralyzed. They confabulate in an often-inconsistent manner
to explain away their handicap and their incoherent behaviour.
Furthermore, iHinges give us a tool to diagnose what exactly is going on in tragic
self-deception. Notably, they give us a structure of beliefs that tragically self-
deceived subjects have. This contributes to understanding what is happening in
such cases: how subjects start treating certain beliefs as fundamental and thus are
led astray. Indeed, iHinges may be at work in an even broader range of cases of
self-deception than only the most extreme cases. In the long run, we may also
be able to differentiate different types of self-deception according to the epis-
temic mechanism at play.
Finally, the account of tragic self-deception as a manifestation of iHinges is able
to tie in self-deception with internalist epistemology. Given its structure, inter-
nalism always is subject to a certain pressure to account for what is going wrong
when something goes wrong with our rationality. My account can be used to
explain how tragic self-deception is possible for an egocentrically rational
subject. From an internalist point of view, the difficulties are especially press-
ing because tragic self-deception poses a threat to internalist accounts, raising the
spectre of egocentric irrationality.
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NOTES
1 A similar example is considered in Bortolotti and Mameli (2012) and Murphy (2012).
2 For example, Pascal’s-Wager-style undertakings of bringing oneself to believe something can
be argued to be a typical though different instance of self-deception (Jones, 1998, p. 167).
3 One of Mele’s favourite examples, as the following not necessarily complete list shows (Mele,
1987, p. 125; 2001, p. 26; 2006, p. 110; 2009, p. 262; 2010, p. 746).
4 It is their fate to believe this. Tragedy is always based on fate.
5 This is part of Mele’s characterization, but I would not strictly exclude the possibility of being
self-deceived even while believing the truth.
6 This characterization deviates from Mele’s on several counts (i.e., the italics): first, he simply
gave sufficient conditions for cases of self-deception, while I give sufficient and necessary
conditions for tragic self-deception. Second, Mele used “data” instead of “evidence.” I am
carefully optimistic that experiential data can be adequately captured by some corresponding
fine-grained proposition. I will therefore talk about evidence as propositional. Third, the fourth
condition is modified so as to make the evidence compelling.
7 Consider for example, how supporters of US president Donald Trump are occasionally
described by the press: because of their disdain for Hillary Clinton and their attachment to
their hero, they manage to not recognize his moral faults (e.g., Allen, 2016; Shapiro, 2016;
Douthat, 2017).
8 The impossibility of believing contradictions is not uncontested (see, for example, Priest,
1986, p. 102).
9 By this egocentric irrationality, I do not mean a dialetheist toying around with liar sentences
or metaphysical postulates about the nature of god. These are metalinguistic phenomena.
10 Noordhof (2003, p. 83-88) argues for something similar, though on different grounds. If the
subject is aware of the contrary evidence, but still maintains his or her belief, then that subject
cannot be self-deceived because self-deception essentially involves instability in the face of
contrary evidence. His example (Noordhof, 2003, p. 76) is structurally similar to my MISBE-
GOTTEN, so I would call it another case of tragic self-deception. Meanwhile, Noordhof appeals
to the intuition that we cannot be self-deceived if we are aware of the contrary evidence,
because there would apparently be no deception. I will not defend my position against this
claim, but simply point out that he takes a fine-grained view of what self-deception is, while
I take the broader deflationary approach (Mele, 2001) that bases itself on the circumstance that
instances of motivated resistance against evidence can be and are described as self-deception.
11 A third possibility is that the subject is not immune and loses his or her belief, but then that
subject would not be self-deceived anymore.
12 I thank my anonymous reviewers for pressing me on this point.
13 It is disputed whether hinges are beliefs, as many take beliefs to be essentially guided by
evidence. I therefore use the more neutral notion of acceptance.
14 The epistemic rationality in that case is however atypical: it is not evidential but rather conse-
quentialist or, maybe, transcendental.
15 Thanks to Nikolaj Pedersen for this apt nomenclature.
16 This is a hinge in its own right that often cannot to be dislodged by any amount of argument.
17 This hinge is compatible with the idea that friends betray each other. Betrayal presupposes a
friendship to be betrayed.
18 Without making their daughter the centre of their life, they would hardly get so far off-track
in their self-deception.
19 What I describe here is only a disposition to display doubting behaviour; however, I doubt that
one effectively must be under permanent tension in order to count as self-deceived.
20 This can, for example, be seen with the constantly changing catalogue of syndromes and with
the structure of their definitions: “S suffers from I if she/he fulfils at least x of the following
y criteria.”
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21 Mele takes a similar strategy, pointing out the multifariousness of morbid jealousy. Either the
phenomena of self-deception and delusion belong to entirely different classes or self-decep-
tion is a symptom of the delusion (Mele, 2006, p. 121). See also Bortolotti and Mameli (2012).
22 Take as an example the phenomenon of senile dementia: there are many patients where no
psychiatric treatment is necessary. They live their lives as they’ve done the past ten, twenty
years—with habit protecting them from the dangers of their condition. But at a certain point
they may start forgetting more crucial things—e.g., to turn off the stove—or begin to wander
aimlessly and get lost, thereby beginning to pose a threat.
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WHAT DOES EMOTION TEACH US ABOUT
SELF-DECEPTION?
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE IN SUPPORT OF
NON-INTENTIONALISM
FEDERICO LAURIA
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK/SWISS CENTER
FOR AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA
DELPHINE PREISSMANN
CENTER FOR PSYCHIATRIC NEUROSCIENCE, DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, LAUSANNE UNIVERSITY
HOSPITAL, PRILLY, SWITZERLAND
ABSTRACT:
Intuitively,affect plays an indispensable role in self-deception’s dynamic.Call this view“affec-
tivism.” Investigating affectivismmatters, as affectivists argue that this conception favours
the non-intentionalist approach to self-deception and offers a unified account of straight
and twisted self-deception.However, this lineof argument hasnot been scrutinized indetail,
and there are reasons to doubt it.Does affectivism fulfill its promises of non-intentionalism
and unity?We argue that it does, as long as affect’s role in self-deception lies in affective
filters—that is, in evaluation of information in light of one’s concerns (the affective-filter
view).We develop this conception by taking into consideration the underlyingmechanisms
governing self-deception, particularly the neurobiological mechanisms of somatic markers
and dopamine regulation. Shifting the discussion to this level can fulfill the affectivist aspi-
rations, as this approach clearly favours non-intentionalism and offers a unified account of
self-deception.Wesupport this claimby criticizing themainalternative affectivist account—
namely, the views that self-deception functions to reduce anxiety or ismotivatedbyanxiety.
Describing self-deception’s dynamic does not require intention; affect is sufficient if we use
the insights of neuroscience and the psychology of affective bias to examine this issue. In
this way, affectivism can fulfill its promises
RÉSUMÉ :
Intuitivement, l’affect joue un rôle indispensable dans la dynamique de l’autoduperie.
Appelons cette conception« l’affectivisme». Il imported’examiner l’affectivisme,étant donné
que les affectivistes soutiennent que cette conception favorise une approche non-intention-
nalistede l’auto-duperie et fournit uneconceptionunifiéedes formes classiqueet inverséede
l’auto-illusion. Or, ces arguments n’ont pas fait l'objet d'une étude détaillée. L’affectivisme
remplit-il ses promesses quant au non-intentionnalisme et à l’unité explicative ? Cet article
propose une nouvelle conception qui rend justice aux aspirations affectivistes. Selon notre
théorie, la duperie de soi résulte de filtres affectifs, à savoir de l’évaluation de l’information à
la lumièredenosbutsoupréoccupations (la conceptiondes filtresaffectifs).Nousdéveloppons
cette conception en portant une attention particulière aux mécanismes neurobiologiques
sous-jacents à la duperie de soi, à savoir lesmarqueurs somatiques et la régulation dopami-
nergique. Décrire le phénomène à ce niveau permet de justifier la conception nonintention-
nelle et d’offrir un modèle unifié de l'auto-duperie. Nous motivons cette approche en
critiquant lesprincipales théories affectivistes,à savoir l’idéeque laduperiede soi aurait pour
fonctionde réduire l’anxiétéouseraitmotivéepar l’anxiété.Lesmécanismesaffectifs éclairent
la dynamique de la duperie de soi sans faire appel aux intentions, comme de nombreuses
étudesempiriques sur lesbiaisaffectifs ledémontrent.L’affectivisme tientdoncsespromesses.
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Stevens has dedicated his life to rendering loyal service to Darlington Hall. He
is obsessed with dignity. He believes that a perfect butler must be exclusively
devoted to his profession, and he has lived his life accordingly. Confronted with
rumours of Lord Darlington’s Nazi sympathies, Stevens dismissed them as
nonsense. He was utterly convinced of Lord Darlington’s honesty. Years earlier,
Stevens started to develop romantic feelings for the housekeeper Miss Kenton,
and the feelings were mutual. Still, Stevens believed that their relationship was
strictly professional, as it should be for a perfect butler. Subsequent to Miss
Kenton’s marriage to another man, Stevens ventures on a trip, with ample time
to reflect. One day, he realizes that he has always loved Miss Kenton. He then
fathoms that Lord Darlington is corrupt. This fills Stevens with regret; his whole
life’s purpose has been based on an illusion. Time has come to focus on what is
left of his life.
So runs the plot of Ishiguro’s novel The Remains of the Day, a story that dram-
atizes self-deception. For decades, Stevens’s beliefs have been biased by his
desire to be a perfect butler and have not been formed in light of actual evidence.
Acknowledging his true feelings for Miss Kenton or his master’s dishonesty
would have devastated Stevens, as this would have been in stark conflict with
his desire to live as a perfect butler. Stevens thus formed beliefs that appeased
him and that aligned with his desire to be a perfect butler. The irony of the story
and its dramatic character lie in the pernicious effects of self-deception and of
its consolations: Stevens has wasted his life.
Intuitively, Stevens’s tragedy can be understood, at least partly, in affective
terms; he deceived himself to avoid distress. The prospect of pleasure is the crux
of self-deception (Johnston, 1988; Barnes, 1997). At least, it is intuitive to think
that Stevens’s anxiety eased him into deceiving himself (Galeotti, 2016). Call
“affectivism” the view that emotion or affect plays an indispensable role in self-
deception’s dynamic.
Affectivism offers a new conception of self-deception’s dynamic, alongside the
two main accounts: intentionalism and deflationism. A brief summary of each
account will allow us to understand affectivism’s relevance. Intentionalists claim
that self-deceived subjects intend, albeit unconsciously, to form the deceptive
beliefs (Davidson, 1982, 1985; Bermúdez, 1997, 2000). After all, self-decep-
tion seems to be analogous to interpersonal deception, which is intentional. By
contrast, non-intentionalists deny that self-deception necessarily involves an
intention to form the deceptive belief (Bach, 1981; Mele, 1997). Proponents of
deflationism claim that deceptive beliefs are biased by desire tout court (Mele,
1997, 2001) like other biases, self-deception need not be intentional.Affectivism
diverges from these accounts.Against intentionalists, affectivists argue that self-
deception need not be intentional; in contrast with deflationists, they claim that
emotion or affect also features in self-deception’s dynamic and plays a role that
is irreducible to that of desire.1
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Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that emotions play an indispensable
role in self-deception’s dynamic. What would this teach us about self-decep-
tion’s dynamic? This article tackles this question by examining affectivism
through the lenses of two heated debates on self-deception. First, and this
touches on the most vivid controversy concerning self-deception, affectivists
claim that their view justifies non-intentionalism (Barnes, 1997; Lazar, 1999;
Galeotti, 2016; Echano, 2017). This is the first promise of affectivism. Second,
affectivists claim that their view illuminates the more recent puzzle of self-
deception’s unity. While straight self-deception results in a belief that squares
with what one wants to be true (as in Stevens’s case), twisted self-deception
yields the belief in what one does notwant to be true (Mele, 2003; Nelkin, 2002).
For example, despite ample evidence to the contrary, Othello’s anxiety leads
him to believe that Desdemona is unfaithful, because he desperately wants her
to be faithful. Straight and twisted self-deception result in irrational beliefs that
are motivated by desire rather than founded on evidence. Thus, carving self-
deception at the joints calls for an account that covers both straight and twisted
cases, and affectivists claim that their view offers such an account (Lazar, 1999;
Galeotti, 2016; Echano, 2017). Affectivism thus promises non-intentionalism
and unity. Does it keep these promises? Scrutinizing affectivism’s relevance to
these two issues is important, as they are at the very core of self-deception’s
dynamic and invite us to capture the very route(s) of self-deception.2
There has been a recent surge of interest in the affective dimension of self-decep-
tion (Johnston, 1988; de Sousa, 1988; Barnes, 1997; Lazar, 1999; Sahdra and
Thagard, 2003; Bayne and Fernandez, 2009; Correia, 2014; Galeotti, 2016;
Echano, 2017). However, philosophers have paid little attention to the empiri-
cal literature on the subject. Now, these studies offer insights into self-decep-
tion’s dynamic and the affectivist promises mentioned. To fill this lacuna, we
propose a new affectivist approach—the “affective-filter view”—that illumi-
nates affect’s role in self-deception by describing the underlying mechanisms
governing self-deception. We claim that affect’s role in self-deception lies in
affective filters of information—that is, in evaluation of information in light of
our concerns. We develop this conception by integrating findings drawn from
affective neuroscience, particularly on the mechanisms of somatic markers and
dopamine regulation. We argue that describing the phenomenon at this neuro-
biological level fulfills the affectivist aspirations; this conception clearly favours
non-intentionalism and offers an elegant, unified account of self-deception. It is
time to leave the armchair and substantiate the thought that self-deception is
“belief under influence.”
The article is divided in seven sections. As a preliminary, section 1 clarifies the
affectivist agenda. We then examine the main affectivist accounts, starting with
the promise of unity: section 2 scrutinizes the claim that self-deception func-
tions to reduce anxiety, while section 3 criticizes the claim that self-deception is
motivated by anxiety. In section 4, we examine these accounts in light of the
promise of non-intentionalism. As this discussion suggests refining the mecha-
nisms involved in self-deception, we then present our affective-filter view, which
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hinges on such mechanisms (§ 5), before showing how it fulfills the promises of
non-intentionalism (§ 6) and unity (§ 7).
1. THE AFFECTIVIST AGENDA
Let us first consider the affectivist argument for non-intentionalism, as this sets
the stage for a careful defence of the affectivist research program. The standard
argument appeals to the influence of affect on belief (Kunda, 1999). We tend to
form optimistic beliefs when we are happy and pessimistic beliefs when we are
gloomy. Likewise, emotion biases belief. Beset by a burst of anger, Mary
believes that Sam is unworthy of her affection; after her rage has vanished, she
recognizes that her judgment was biased by emotion. Now—and this is the crux
of the argument—affect typically biases belief in an unintentionalmanner. Given
that affect biases deceptive beliefs, it follows that self-deception need not be
intentional (Lazar, 1999; Correia, 2014).
Although this is a compelling argument, intentionalists will hardly be impressed
by it. The argument rests on the assumption that self-deception operates analo-
gously to unintentional affective biases. However, intentionalists dispute this
assumption. They may grant that affect (e.g., moods) can bias belief in an unin-
tentional manner. They even concede that motivated cognition can be uninten-
tional, since wishful thinking is unintentional in their view (Bermúdez, 2000).
That said, they think that self-deception differs from unintentional affective
biases and operates analogously to intentional affective biases. For an example
of the latter, consider the positivity effect: with age, people tend to focus on
rewarding activities and to feel more positive emotions, which results in biased
beliefs. This bias can be explained by top-down effect and intentional reap-
praisals (Reed and Carstensen, 2012). Consequently, a question arises: Why
should we regard self-deception as analogous to unintentional bias, rather than
to intentional bias? In the absence of an answer to this question, the affectivist
argument begs the question. After all, intentionalists have never disputed
emotion’s role in self-deception, as emotions motivate the intention to form the
deceived belief. Thus, the affective dynamic of self-deception does not under-
mine their claim.
To substantiate this line of skepticism, intentionalists may reiterate one of their
main objections to non-intentionalism, the so-called selectivity problem.
Consider Talbott’s (1995, p. 60-61) seminal scenario:
Anxious Driving – While driving his car, Bill notices that the brake
pedal is not as firm as usual. He suspects that his car is not function-
ing properly. He feels anxious and stops to determine whether the car
is functioning properly.
Bill desires his car to function properly. He is presented with sufficient evidence
to the contrary. Still, he does not deceive himself. He feels anxious, and this
motivates him to act.Why does Bill not deceive himself? Only in certain circum-
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stances does desire lead to the formation of deceptive beliefs. The selectivity
challenge consists in contrasting cases where desire results in self-deception
with cases where it does not (the subject forms the rational belief). Now, inten-
tionalists argue that deflationism cannot offer a satisfactory solution to this prob-
lem. The claim that desire biases belief is insufficient to distinguish between
cases where desire results in deceptive beliefs and cases where it does not (see,
however, Mele 2001). By contrast, intentionalists claim to have a ready answer:
self-deception occurs only when the subject intends to form the deceptive belief
(Bermúdez, 2017, 2000). In our example, Bill does not deceive himself, because
he lacks the intention to form the deceptive belief.
Importantly, the objection is not simply that deflationism cannot adequately
predict self-deception. Such a challenge would be intractable and largely an
empirical issue (Mele, personal communication). To demonstrate why the selec-
tivity problem differs from the issue of predicting self-deception, consider inter-
personal deception. Prima facie, interpersonal deception involves the intention
to deceive. This offers one way of drawing the line between cases where decep-
tion occurs and cases where it does not: deception occurs only when the subject
intends to deceive. This, however, does not predict deception, as it does not spec-
ify when a subject will form the relevant intention. The selectivity problem
thereby differs from concerns about prediction.
Let us assume that the selectivity problem is a legitimate objection to deflation-
ism. A promising non-intentionalist account should be able to rebut it. Whether
affectivism supports non-intentionalism thus depends on whether it can solve
the selectivity problem. For argument’s sake, we do not examine the intention-
alist solution, nor do we consider alternative solutions to the problem (Pedrini,
2010; Jurjako, 2013); our only purpose is to refine the affectivist agenda. Our
first desideratum is the following:
Selectivity: Affectivism distinguishes the cases in which desires lead
to deceptive beliefs from the cases in which it does not.
If we turn to the affectivist promise of unity, it appears that the spectre of inten-
tionalism arises again. Intentionalists claim that the intention to form the decep-
tive belief unifies straight and twisted self-deception. Emotions, such as anxiety,
could motivate such intention. Therefore, the influence of emotion does not
undermine the intentionalist proposal; affectivists must provide further justifi-
cation for their argument. For argument’s sake, let us bracket any qualms about
the soundness of this issue and set aside the intentionalist solution (see Lazar,
1999). We also ignore other potential solutions (Scott-Kakures, 2000; Nelkin,
2002), as discussing them is beyond the scope of this paper. Our second desider-
atum focuses on affectivism’s merits on its own terms.
Unity: Affectivism offers a unified account of straight/twisted
self-deception.
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The agenda for affectivism is thus set.
To guide our investigation, let us assume that self-deception is a process that
results in deceptive beliefs. The role of affect may come into play at different
phases of the process. Affect may feature in the output of the process, as in the
claim that self-deception aims at pleasure (§ 2). Alternatively, affect could initi-
ate the process, as in the idea that anxiety motivates self-deception (§ 3). Finally,
affect could mediate desire’s influence on belief and thereby play a role at the
level of evaluating evidence (§ 5). These possibilities are distinct yet compati-
ble with one another. Let us start by examining the main account that situates
affect’s role in the output.
2. THE HEDONIC DYNAMIC OF SELF-DECEPTION: UNITY
Intuitively, we deceive ourselves to avoid distress; the dynamics of self-decep-
tion are inherently hedonic. According to the main variant of this idea, self-
deception’s function is to reduce anxiety. For example, Stevens’s belief’s in his
master’s innocence alleviates his anxiety. To wit, the deceptive belief that p
reduces anxiety about the nonsatisfaction of the desire that p (Johnston, 1988).
Prima facie, this proposal fares well with straight self-deception.3 However, it is
hardly generalizable to twisted cases. For instance, Othello’s belief in Desde-
mona’s infidelity fails to reduce his anxiety about the matter; rather, it increases
or, at least, sustains it.
In response to this difficulty, Barnes (1997) argues that self-deception functions
to reduce some anxiety, where the anxiety may or may not correspond to the
matter of the deceptive belief. Consider her example (Barnes, 1997, p. 41):
George’s Regard – John desires Mary’s faithfulness. Out of anxiety, he
believes that Mary is having an affair with George. Now, John badly
desires that George have high regard for him, and he is very anxious
about this. George has declined John’s requests many times, but has
always agreed to help Mary. John would be devastated if George had
a higher regard for Mary; it would be a source of acute anxiety. By
contrast, the belief that George and Mary are having an affair reduces
John’s anxiety about George’s regard, because it is compatible with
believing that George has equal regard for John. Hence, John deceives
himself into believing that Mary is unfaithful.
This suggests that there is a perceived hedonic gain in twisted self-deception as
well. The deceptive belief that p (Mary is having an affair with George) reduces
anxiety about some other matter q (George has a higher regard for Mary) because
the subject believes that, if p, then not q (Barnes 1997, p. 36). This is how Barnes
captures self-deception’s unity.
Let us raise two difficulties regarding the claim that, in twisted self-deception,
the belief that p reduces anxiety about some other matter q.
75
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
First, we do not dispute that twisted self-deception may reduce anxiety, as in
“George’s Regard.” However, it is doubtful that this proposal is generalizable
(Echano, 2017), as this example suggests. Sally is anxious that Penelope has
cancer.A sense of panic prompts Sally to believe that Penelope has cancer. Intu-
itively, Sally’s belief is motivated by her anxiety about this matter. What other
anxiety might the deceptive belief alleviate? This intuition is corroborated by
empirical studies on the biases involved in anxiety (henceforth called “anxiety
biases”), which correspond to, or partly overlap with, twisted self-deception.
Anxious people detect threats more efficiently than controls do. The bias oper-
ates at the levels of (pre)attention and the interpretation of evidence (Cisler and
Koster, 2010; Mogg and Bradley, 2016). Far from reducing anxiety, such a bias
often leads to a state of generalized anxiety. It is therefore questionable to
conceive of twisted self-deception as reducing anxiety.
Second, even if twisted self-deception results in anxiety reduction as proposed,
this proposal fails to do justice to the specificity of twisted self-deception. On this
proposal, twisted self-deception is modeled on, and somehow reduced to,
straight self-deception. The deceptive belief reduces anxiety because subjects
end up believing what they most desire to obtain. John believes that Mary is
unfaithful to retain his belief about what he desires most—namely, George’s
regard. The anxiety reduction that occurs in twisted self-deception ultimately
results from straight self-deception. Twisted self-deception is straight self-decep-
tion in disguise. However, it is unlikely or, at least, questionable that twisted
self-deception is reducible to straight self-deception. One may capture the unity
of self-deception at a more general level without reducing twisted self-deception
to straight self-deception. One way to do so is to outline that both forms of self-
deception involve similar mechanisms, which, however, operate in opposite
manners. Consider optimism and pessimism as an analogy. It is intuitive to
understand both phenomena through similar components, albeit ones that oper-
ate in opposite ways. By contrast, it would be counterintuitive to capture the
unity of both phenomena by reducing pessimism to optimism. Given the partial
overlap between optimism and straight self-deception as well as the close
connection between pessimism and twisted self-deception, a nonreductive
approach to twisted self-deception is an intuitive option.An account that captures
the specificity of twisted self-deception in its own terms would thus have the
upper hand.
Let us consider another variant of the proposal that does not suffer from the diffi-
culties just raised, by elaborating on Sally’s example.
Hypervigilant Sally – Out of anxiety, Sally deceives herself into believ-
ing that Penelope has cancer. This motivates her to act to avoid the
undesired state (she consults doctors, asks for a second opinion, etc.).
It turns out that Penelope has appendicitis. What a relief!
On this variant, the deceptive belief alleviates anxiety by motivating the subject
to reduce anxiety by acting (Barnes, 1997, p. 45). Whereas straight self-decep-
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tion reduces anxiety at the time of the belief, twisted self-deception reduces anxi-
ety in the future. On this proposal, twisted self-deception involves high anxiety
concerning the matter of the deceptive belief, which squares with empirical stud-
ies. That being said, as a kind of hypervigilance and “bitter medicine” (Pears,
1986, p. 42-43), twisted self-deception reduces anxiety through its impact on
action—that is, in a twisted manner.
However, does this proposal justify the claim that twisted self-deception func-
tions to reduce anxiety? In fact, this proposal is consistent with a conception of
self-deception as functioning to sustain or increase anxiety so as to ensure
protection from threats.4 On this interpretation, anxiety reduction would be a
byproduct of twisted self-deception, but not its function.After all, the specificity
of twisted self-deception consists in its mode of reducing anxiety: if anything,
it reduces anxiety by sustaining it, as opposed to other ways of reducing anxi-
ety, such as by forming the rational belief. It is thereby plausible to regard twisted
self-deception as functioning to sustain anxiety. After all, the function of anxi-
ety is arguably not to reduce anxiety, but rather to recognize threats and protect
oneself through action. If twisted self-deception recruits anxiety’s function, it is
natural to think that it aims at vigilance and protection, rather than at anxiety
reduction. Of course, there might be no way of determining whether anxiety
reduction is the function or a mere byproduct of twisted self-deception. However,
given that this reading of Barnes’s proposal is compatible with a conception of
twisted self-deception as functioning to sustain anxiety or protect oneself, it does
not imply that twisted self-deception functions to reduce anxiety. Therefore, it
is controversial whether anxiety reduction captures self-deception’s unity.
Strictly speaking, the dynamics of twisted self-deception may be anxious rather
than hedonic, which suggests that we consider the second main affectivist
account.
3. THE ANXIOUS DYNAMIC OF SELF-DECEPTION: UNITY
One natural suggestion is simply that anxiety motivates self-deception. This
claim is neutral regarding self-deception’s function and output. It situates anxi-
ety’s role at the input (Barnes, 1997) or in the mediation of the process. That
anxiety drives self-deception is straightforward in twisted cases. As for straight
self-deception, anxiety’s role appears more clearly at the level of the treatment
of evidence. Straight self-deception involves being presented with sufficient
evidence that one’s desire is doomed to frustration; one is presented with a threat
to the satisfaction of a desire. Now, anxiety and, more generally, fear are dedi-
cated to recognizing threats. When Melania is afraid of a bird flying in her direc-
tion, she experiences the situation as threatening (Tappolet, 2000); the same
applies to anxiety, despite some differences.As straight self-deception is formed
in the face of a threat, it thereby involves anxiety. This idea is thus compatible
with the possibility that anxiety coincides with the initiation of the process, with-
out anxiety being present beforehand. Stevens becomes anxious only when
presented with threatening evidence. Consequently, that people may deceive
themselves about matters that they were not anxious about beforehand does not
undermine anxiety’s role of motivating self-deception.
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Still, does desire not bias deceptive beliefs so subtly that the threatening evidence
is immediately reinterpreted in a reassuring way and anxiety does not arise
(Mele, 2003)? This may prevent conscious anxiety from arising, but it is compat-
ible with straight self-deception involving unconscious anxiety. Reinterpreting
threatening evidence requires having identified it; this is precisely anxiety’s role,
and anxiety may play this role even if it is unconscious. This bears on the contro-
versial issue of unconscious emotions. For argument’s sake, let us grant that
unconscious anxiety may play a role in self-deception, as we assume that affec-
tivism is true. For our purposes, let us explain how appealing to anxiety’s role
of motivating self-deception seems to have the resources to capture its unity.
Galeotti (2016) argues that the unity of self-deception revolves around anxiety’s
role. In straight self-deception, the subject desires that p, and negatively
appraises the evidence threatening p. This appraisal generates anxiety. In twisted
cases, the subject desires that p, and irrationally appraises evidence as favour-
ing not-p (in Galeotti’s terms, the subject “misappraises” evidence). This also
generates anxiety. In both cases, anxiety’s role is situated at the level of the treat-
ment of evidence. The next condition for self-deception consists in the subject’s
assessment of the costs of error (Friedrich, 1993; Klayman and Ha, 1987). In
self-deception, subjects assess the costs of forming the deceptive belief as low,
which explains why they form the belief. For instance, Stevens believes that his
master is innocent, because he assesses that this belief affords immediate relief,
while the opposite belief would cause him significant distress and thereby prove
costly. Similarly, in twisted self-deception, Othello assesses the belief in Desde-
mona’s fidelity as costly (for instance, it would result in his failure to take steps
to remedy the situation, for instance by ensuring that Desdemona will be faith-
ful in the future). Hence, he deceives himself and believes in Desdemona’s infi-
delity. Self-deception’s unity can be captured by the presence of anxiety,
followed by the assessment of the costs of error (Galeotti, 2016, p. 96).
This account does justice to anxiety’s role in self-deception without suffering
from the pitfalls of the output approach. However, it leaves one matter unex-
plained. When does anxiety lead to straight, as opposed to twisted, self-decep-
tion?A promising account should capture the unity of self-deception, as well as
the distinctive dynamics of straight and twisted self-deception. Now, the extent
to which this proposal captures such a distinction is unclear, as anxiety can bias
belief in each direction. Although the difference between straight and twisted
self-deception could be captured by the influence of anxiety on the assessment
of the costs of error, the question remains:When does anxiety influence the costs
of error in one way as opposed to the other? Far from a fatal objection, this
observation invites us to probe the mechanism by which anxiety leads to straight
self-deception or twisted self-deception.
To be fair, Galeotti (2016, p. 96-97) does address this concern. She claims that
straight and twisted self-deception involve different mechanisms; straight self-
deception relies on confirmation bias, whereas probability neglect (considering
the worst-case scenario) is responsible for twisted self-deception. However, this
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does not offer a clear-cut contrast. One may equally conceive of twisted self-
deception as involving confirmation bias due to anxiety.Alternatively, in straight
self-deception, subjects might be described as displaying probability neglect, as
they overlook the evidence supporting the most dreaded scenario. Can the affec-
tive dynamic of self-deception offer a unified account that captures the distinc-
tive routes of self-deception?5
Let us take stock. The two main affectivist accounts fail to adequately capture the
unity of self-deception. Two avenues suggest themselves. Intentionalists secure the
unity (and diversity) of self-deception by invoking intentions to form the deceptive
belief. Alternatively, we propose to refine the affective dynamic of self-deception
and secure the affectivist aspirations by shifting the discussion to the neurobiolog-
ical level. This same moral emerges from examining how the main affectivist
accounts fare with regard to selectivity. Let us now turn to this issue.
4. ANXIETY AND SELECTIVITY
How do the hedonic or anxious dynamics of self-deception solve the selectivity
problem? Stevens’s anxiety explains why he deceived himself. Yet, it could also
have led him to believe the exact opposite (that his master is dishonest), as it does
at the end of the story. Likewise, Sally’s anxiety explains her deceptive belief.
Still, a rational person would not deceive herself in similar circumstances. So,
when does anxiety lead to self-deception?
The anxiety-reduction account offers a principled answer to the problem. If the
function of self-deception is anxiety reduction, it follows that self-deception
would occur only when the deceptive belief is likely (or expected) to result in
anxiety reduction.Without the prospect of hedonic gain, self-deception does not
occur. In the “Anxious Driving” example, this idea provides a clear explanation
of Bill’s failure to self-deceive. Believing that his car is functioning well would
not have reduced anxiety; it would, instead, have increased anxiety, as Bill would
not have taken the necessary precautions to avoid an accident.A similar solution
is at the heart of Galeotti’s (2016) appeal to the costs of error. As observed,
people do not deceive themselves when they assess the costs of error as high.
Hence, Bill does not deceive himself, because he assesses the costs of error as
high, notably because he thinks that he can act to remedy the situation.6 Self-
deception occurs only when people assess the situation as beyond their control
(Galeotti, 2016; more on this in § 4).
This solution, in terms of (hedonic) costs of belief, is intuitive. However, it does
not apply to what we call the “hard cases” for selectivity. In such cases, subjects
assess the (hedonic) costs of error as low (notably for lack of control over the
situation), but do not deceive themselves. Here is such a case, which is inspired
by Bermúdez’s (2000) observations, with some differences that are irrelevant
for our purposes.
Guilty Son – Don has been accused of treason; the evidence is ambigu-
ous, but suggests that he is guilty. Don’s parents, Mark and Juliet, desire
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their son’s innocence and are anxious about their son being guilty. Juliet
believes that Don is innocent, and this thereby reduces her anxiety. By
contrast, Mark does not deceive himself; he believes that his son is
guilty, and this sustains his anxiety. He would prefer to believe the
contrary, as this belief would appease him. However, the evidence
speaks for itself.
This case reveals that the hedonic dynamic of self-deception fails to solve the
selectivity problem. The belief in Don’s innocence would alleviate Juliet and
Mark’s anxiety equally, whereas the belief in Don’s guilt would devastate them.
Given that the prospect of hedonic gain is the same for Juliet and Mark, there
should be no difference with regard to self-deception. However, they differ in
this respect. Why does Mark not believe that Don is innocent, when this would
clearly alleviate his anxiety?7 Intentionalists have a ready answer: Mark does
not intend to form the deceptive belief and thereby does not deceive himself.
The objection also applies to the solution in terms of costs of error. Mark assesses
the costs of believing that Don is innocent as low. Whether Don is innocent is
beyond Mark’s control, so self-deception would not come with the high costs
associated with the failure to take precautionary measures. Nonetheless, Mark
does not deceive himself. Why?
It is important to distinguish this case from variations of it that are compatible
with the solution at hand. Consider that Mark believes that forming the decep-
tive belief would be dangerous (e.g., Don might fool him in the future) or imag-
ine that Mark thinks that he can act to improve the situation. These scenarios
would elevate the costs of error and explain his failure to self-deceive. The prob-
lematic case is different. Mark and Juliet desire Don’s innocence equally, and
there are no further desires involved. Both are convinced that Don will not fool
them and that they cannot remedy the situation. They concur that the deceptive
belief would reduce their anxiety and that they have nothing to lose in deceiv-
ing themselves. However, Mark does not deceive himself. Why do people some-
times face an unwelcome reality? The main affectivist proposals cannot
adequately solve the selectivity challenge. Rather than taking the intentionalist
route, we can make progress by describing the underlying neural mechanisms
governing the affective dynamics of self-deception.8
5. THE AFFECTIVE-FILTER VIEW
This section presents our conception of straight self-deception, which we then
use to approach the issues of selectivity (§ 6) and of unity (§ 7). We claim that
self-deception involves affective “filters” of information (Lauria, Preissmann
and Clément, 2016). Let us start with a few clarifications.
The metaphor of filters of information points to the fact that people evaluate
information. For instance, they assess the reliability of sources of information
(Sperber at al. 2010). Affective filters consist in the evaluation of information in
light of one’s goals, such as pleasure or any other concern. In psychology, affec-
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tive filters are the crux of the appraisal theory of emotion. On this view, emotions
are elicited via a sequence of cognitive appraisals of the situation in light of
one’s goals (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer et al., 2001; Ellsworth, 2013). For instance,
in fear, people typically appraise a situation as goal-obstructive (i.e., danger-
ous), as being in their control (i.e., escapable), etc. Our conception of self-decep-
tion relies on appraisals of this type.
Furthermore, we make significant use of neuroscientific findings on affective
mechanisms involved in decision making and selective information processing.
This mechanistic level of description is well suited to describing the very
dynamic of self-deception, as it will appear.
As a consequence, our picture is a hybrid, integrating the psychological and the
neurobiological levels of description into a philosophical view. Some compo-
nents of our account spring from the armchair, while others refer to mechanisms
studied in the empirical sciences. Our conception should thus be partly read as
a conceptual truth (conditions [i]-[iv]) and partly read as an empirical claim
(conditions [v]-[vii]). Let us now delve into the proposal.
Given that affective filters are assessments of information, our conception situ-
ates affect’s role at the phase of the evaluation of evidence. More precisely, self-
deception involves affective filters that take the form of four appraisals and two
neurobiological mechanisms (the order is an expository one). In straight self-
deception, a subject S desires that p, is presented with sufficient evidence favour-
ing not p (henceforth “distressing evidence”), and forms the belief that p only if
(i) S assesses the distressing evidence as ambiguous (weight of
evidence);
(ii) S appraises the distressing evidence as having a significant negative
impact on his or her well-being (affective coping);
(iii) S appraises his or her control on the situation as low (coping poten-
tial); and
(iv) S appraises the welcome situation p and the evidence for p as posi-
tive (affective coping).
Let us justify each condition. The first condition is the idea that self-deception
precludes certainty about desire’s frustration. Stevens would not deceive himself if
he appraised the evidence as speaking unambiguously in favour of Lord Darling-
ton’s dishonesty. This would be more akin to delusion than self-deception. Of
course, subjects might assess the evidence as ambiguous, even when the evidence
clearly isn’t ambiguous. This appraisal is epistemic rather than affective, yet it is
importantly biased by affect (Lauria, Preissmann and Clément, 2016).
The first affective filter is spelled out in the second condition. As self-deceived
subjects are presented with threatening evidence, self-deception involves a nega-
tive appraisal. Appraising a given situation as negative (e.g., as goal obtrusive,
as unbearable) can arouse anxiety, sadness, or other negative emotions. In the
81
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
appraisal theory of emotion, a variety of specific appraisals are dedicated to this
task (e.g., goal-conduciveness appraisal, affective-coping appraisal). They can
operate unconsciously and may lead to conscious or unconscious instances of the
emotions mentioned. We shall return to this momentarily.
The third condition concerns the idea that people appraise events in light of their
own ability to act (coping-potential appraisal). For instance, sadness typically
involves the appraisal that there is nothing one can do to remedy the situation.
In self-deception, we appraise our coping potential as low; we appraise that we
have little or no control over the distressing situation. Self-deceived subjects
might appraise the situation as being in their control, yet reckon that acting on
the situation would come at a critical cost. This explains why people do not
deceive themselves when they think that they can act to neutralize the threat, as
in the example “Anxious Driving.” In such circumstances, it is natural to protect
oneself by acting. After all, the matters about which people deceive themselves
(personal relationships, health, intelligence, etc.) are typically matters that most
would not appraise as being under their full control. Likewise, the populations
especially prone to self-deception (e.g., addicts, terminal patients) concern condi-
tions over which control is critically missing or believed to be absent (Martínez-
González et al., 2016; Echarte et al., 2016). Finally, empirical studies suggest that
people are less inclined to gather more information about a given disease when
they consider the disease untreatable (Dawson et al., 2006); the best predictor of
information gathering is the treatability (and not the severity) of the disease, as
predicted by the third condition.
The fourth and final condition is the inverse of the second; it concerns the situ-
ation in which the desire is satisfied. Self-deceived subjects positively appraise
this situation and the evidence that supports desire satisfaction. This takes the
form of conscious or unconscious positive anticipation.
These conditions are necessary. They are justified conceptually and empirically
(see Lauria, Preissmann and Clément 2016). However, they are insufficient, or,
more to the point, this level of description does not adequately capture self-
deception’s dynamic. Consider the example “Guilty Son.” Mark appraises the
evidence in favour of Don’s guilt as both ambiguous and devastating. He
assesses his ability to remedy the situation as low. He positively appraises the
situation in which Don is innocent. Nevertheless, he does not deceive himself.
Our picture, so far, fails to explain how the positive appraisal takes precedence
over the negative one; it fails to capture the dynamic relation between the
appraisals. We therefore need an additional component or, at the least, some way
of refining our account. This is where the neurobiological mechanisms enter the
picture.
At the neurobiological level, straight self-deception involves the following
conditions:
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(v) the appraisal of the distressing evidence is accompanied by nega-
tive somatic markers;
(vi) the appraisal of the positive situation is accompanied by dopamin-
ergic activity; and
(vii) dopaminergic activity takes precedence over frontal activation and
negative somatic markers in the processing of information.
The fifth condition correlates with the negative appraisal presented earlier
(condition [iii]; for more on the relation, see below). Initially, somatic markers
were intended to describe how people implicitly rely on affect when making
decisions (Damasio, 1994). Negative affect automatically leads us to discard
certain courses of action, by simulating the impact of options on well-being and
by eliciting somatic states (e.g., hunches). This has been called “gut feeling
unconscious intelligence” (Bechara, 1997; Gigerenzer, 2007, 2008). Broadly
speaking, somatic markers refer to this mechanism and correspond to specific
neural structures, particularly the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the amyg-
dala. For instance, patients with lesions in these regions suffer from emotional
deficits that explain their inability to make optimal decisions. Likewise, addicts
tend to ignore the negative signals of somatic markers in their decision making,
which explains the persistence of the irrational behaviour. Similarly, experiments
suggest that self-deceived people disregard the negative signals of somatic mark-
ers, unlike rational subjects (Peterson et al., 2002, 2003). This is corroborated by
studies revealing that the neural structures that correspond to somatic markers
are involved in self-deception (Westen et al., 2006). Somatic markers can
account for the inhibition of the treatment of the distressing evidence in straight
self-deception because their role is to discard further processing of negative
information, as studies on decision making show.
Conversely, the mechanism of dopamine regulation accounts for the preferred
treatment of positive information. Dopamine is the neurotransmitter of desire. It
encodes reward anticipation and prediction errors, especially in the proximal
future (Schultz, 1997; Schultz et al., 1998). It is heavily released in uncertainty
and it modulates attention to cues that are relevant to desire’s satisfaction.
Dopaminergic deficits correlate with apathy, depression, and anxiety, as revealed
in Parkinson’s disease. Importantly, self-control relies on the balance between
dopaminergic transmission and prefrontal-cortex activation. For instance, addic-
tion is characterized by the predominance of dopaminergic activity over frontal
activation (Heatherton andWagner, 2011; Crews and Boettiger, 2009). The same
holds for irrational behaviours or cognitions, such as hypersexuality, gambling
behaviour, stereotypic behaviour, and delusions. Similarly, there is compelling
evidence that self-deception involves a significant increase in dopaminergic
transmission (Sharot et al., 2012; Delgado et al., 2005; Westen et al., 2006) and
a decrease in frontal activation (McKay et al., 2013). Just as the precedence of
dopamine partly explains addiction, it also illuminates the selective treatment
of positive information in straight self-deception. The dominance of dopamin-
ergic activity is central to understanding phenomena that revolve around the
preference for immediate reward, such as addiction and straight self-deception,
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even if they have long-term negative consequences. When people are uncertain
and appraise a significant inevitable threat, somatic markers and dopamine
protect them from forming the distressing belief.
Our proposal is neutral with regard to the exact relation between the appraisals
and the neurobiological mechanisms described. It is compatible with the possi-
bility that the appraisals are identical to the relevant neurobiological mecha-
nisms, with the appraisals causing them, supervening on them, or being
grounded in them. What matters for our purposes is that these neurobiological
mechanisms capture how the positive information takes precedence over nega-
tive information in straight self-deception. By definition, these mechanisms
describe how the affective part of our brain competes with the rational one
(roughly, the prefrontal cortex) in the treatment of information, which can lead
to a state of imbalance in addiction and in self-deception. To put it metaphori-
cally, they describe the “hydraulics” of information processing and obey the
principle of communicating vessels. In this sense, they are inherently dynamic.
As it appears, our conception differs in type from the other accounts examined.
Strictly speaking, it is compatible with the hedonic dynamic of self-deception,
although it does not imply this view. It refines the idea that self-deception is
driven by anxiety, as it describes the underlying mechanisms governing its
dynamic. Shifting to this level of description allows us to fulfill the affectivist
aspirations.
6. THE AFFECTIVE-FILTER VIEW: SELECTIVITY
Not every desire results in self-deception, and our view explains why this is so.
At the psychological level, three appraisals delineate the conditions in which
desiring subjects do not deceive themselves.A desiring subject does not deceive
herself in the presence of distressing evidence if
(i) S does not appraise the evidence as ambiguous;
(ii) S does not appraise the evidence as having a significant negative
impact on S’s well-being; and
(iii) S does not appraise S’s coping potential as low.
The first condition correctly predicts that people cease to deceive themselves
when distressing evidence accumulates, such that the evidence is no longer
appraised as ambiguous. The second condition relies on the fact that the affec-
tive-coping appraisal is not an all-or-nothing matter. Subjects who estimate that
they can bear with a distressing fact will not self-deceive. Regarding the third
condition, we have already observed that self-deception does not occur when
people appraise that they can act on situations. Consequently, the verdicts of
various filters generate several routes out of self-deception.
However, as emphasized, the psychological appraisals are compatible with form-
ing the rational belief. Therefore, staying at this level of description does not
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solve the selectivity challenge, which is why our solution relies on neurobio-
logical mechanisms as well.
Our solution can be summarized as follows: subjects do not deceive themselves
if dopaminergic activity fails to take precedence over other neural structures,
such as frontal activation and negative somatic markers. This accounts for the
hard case of “Guilty Son.” Mark appraises the situation as negative and as falling
beyond his control, but does not deceive himself, because dopaminergic trans-
mission fails to dominate other structures. This can happen for several reasons.
For instance, subjects may suffer from dopaminergic deficits that are compati-
ble with the retention of desire; they just render such desire inert, so to speak.
This might explain why some subjects do not self-deceive. Alternatively,
dopamine can fail to take precedence if people are hypersensitive to threats.
Such people would not ignore the negative signals of somatic markers; somatic
markers would triumph over dopamine. For instance, depression and anxiety
involve acute sensitivity to threats via somatic markers, at the expense of
dopaminergic activity (Surbey, 2011). Our view hereby offers a clear-cut contrast
between cases where desire leads to self-deception and cases where it does not—
in neurobiological terms and, particularly, in dopaminergic terms.
This solution captures the grain of truth of the alternative proposals examined,
but does not fall prey to the same pitfalls. It does not imply that self-deception
occurs only when it would reduce anxiety, which is a virtue (§ 2). In the absence
of a predominance of dopaminergic activity, people do not self-deceive even
when self-deception would reduce anxiety. Our solution also goes beyond the
idea that self-deception occurs when the subject assesses the costs of error as
low. On our view, the subject may assess the costs of error as low, yet not self-
deceive if dopamine fails to dominate other neural structures. The neurobiolog-
ical mechanisms explain when the assessment of the costs of error as low leads
to self-deception.Although our proposal is compatible with the other affectivist
solutions, shifting the discussion to the level of these neurobiological mecha-
nisms has the advantage of capturing the process in inherently dynamic terms,
given the imbalance between the rational/frontal and the affective brain regions
described.
One might be skeptical. Our solution hinges on the dominance of dopaminergic
activity in information processing. This raises the following question:Why does
dopaminergic transmission take precedence in some cases only? In other words,
the selectivity problem might arise again.Although dopamine and somatic mark-
ers are important predictors of self-deception, we concede that we have not
explained when dopamine will triumph. However, as observed, the selectivity
problem would be intractable if it required predicting self-deception. Our solu-
tion is satisfactory because appealing to dopaminergic transmission provides a
contrast between cases in which desire results in deceptive beliefs and cases in
which it does not.
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However, the intentionalist spectre might arise once more.Why should our solu-
tion justify non-intentionalism? After all, the neurobiological mechanisms
proposed are compatible with the intention of forming the deceived belief.Affec-
tive filters cut no ice. In response to this objection, let us observe that the affec-
tive filters described, such as the neurobiological mechanisms, operate
automatically—that is, unconsciously and unintentionally. Somatic markers
function to signal and simulate threats, whereas dopamine’s function is partly to
direct subjects’ attention to cues that are relevant to desire’s satisfaction. For
these functions to be fulfilled, these mechanisms are better understood as oper-
ating unintentionally; they would lose their economical character if they
involved the intention of forming beliefs. This is compatible with affective filters
eliciting the intention to attend to relevant stimuli; this is where these biases are
partly subject to control. However, intentionalists claim that self-deception
involves the intention to form the deceptive belief—not merely the intention to
attend to some information (Lynch, 2014). Moreover, given the balance between
dopaminergic transmission and frontal activation, it is empirically implausible
to regard self-deception as intentional. Its neural signature would involve signif-
icantly more frontal activation than it actually does, given that intentions to
deceive should come with strong frontal activation, such as in interpersonal
deception (Christ et al., 2008). Self-deception thus differs from other affective
biases, like the positivity effect, that involve significant frontal activation. It
aligns itself with unintentional affective influences on belief. The affective-filter
view thereby offers empirical justification for non-intentionalism.
7. THE AFFECTIVE-FILTER VIEW:UNITY
How does our proposal apply to twisted self-deception? Recall that a promising
account should not reduce twisted self-deception to straight self-deception (§ 2).
Instead, it is preferable to conceive of twisted and straight self-deception as
involving similar components that operate in opposing ways. This opens a path
for an amendment of our proposal on straight self-deception, which will allow
us to capture twisted cases. In straight self-deception, the evaluation of positive
information takes precedence over that of distressing evidence via dopaminer-
gic activity triumphing over somatic markers and other neural structures.
Conversely, in twisted self-deception, the evaluation of distressing evidence
takes precedence over that of positive evidence via negative somatic markers
triumphing over dopamine and other neural structures. Straight and twisted self-
deception involve the same components, but they differ in terms of the domi-
nance of one over the other. More precisely, a subject S, who desires that p and
is presented with sufficient evidence in favour of p, forms the belief that not-p,
if and only if
(i) S appraises the evidence in favour of p as ambiguous;
(ii) S appraises the distressing evidence as negative;
(iii) S appraises his or her coping potential as low;
(iv) S appraises p and the evidence for p positively;
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(v) the appraisal of the distressing evidence is accompanied by negative
somatic markers;
(vi) the appraisal of the positive evidence is accompanied by dopamin-
ergic activity; and
(vii) negative somatic markers take precedence over frontal activation
and dopaminergic activity in the processing of information.
The first, second, and fourth conditions were justified earlier. The third condi-
tion is more controversial. Isn’t twisted self-deception compatible with apprais-
ing the situation as being within one’s control, as it functions to protect oneself
through action? Consider an example. Sarah deceives herself into believing that
she has left the stove on, which ensures that she will check whether the stove is
on. Doesn’t she appraise her coping potential as high? Let us recall that the
coping potential appraisal allows for degrees. In some cases, one appraises one’s
coping potential as low, even if one regards the situation, strictly speaking, as
under one’s control; acting may be costly or one may have only indirect control
of the situation. Imagine that Sarah suspects that she left the stove on while she
is at home. It is unlikely that she will deceive herself; rather, she will make sure
that the stove is off, because she appraises her coping potential as high. This
third condition is compatible with twisted self-deception functioning to protect
oneself via action because the relevant actions ensure only indirect satisfaction
of a desire.
The core of our proposal lies in the last components pertaining to the relation
between the neurobiological mechanisms, especially the precedence of somatic
markers over frontal activation. Common accounts of the anxiety bias square
with the somatic-markers hypothesis. Anxious people regard their anxious
hunches as evidence for certain beliefs (Mogg and Bradley, 2016). This corre-
sponds to negative somatic markers, as hunches come with negative anticipation,
as revealed by studies on decision making (Miu et al., 2008).Whereas the signals
of negative somatic markers are discarded and block further processing of nega-
tive information in straight self-deception, subjects do not neglect the signals of
negative somatic markers in twisted self-deception. On the contrary, the antici-
pation and simulation of threats take precedence over frontal activation (Cisler
and Koster, 2010). This is compatible with the presence of dopaminergic trans-
mission, notably because dopamine is released especially in cases of uncertainty
and it increases attention to cues relevant to desire’s satisfaction, even when
these point toward desire’s frustration. Still, in twisted self-deception, negative
somatic markers trump dopaminergic transmission and frontal activation in the
processing of information.
It appears that the only crucial difference between the dynamics of straight and
twisted self-deception involves the last condition. Twisted self-deception is the
inverted analogue of straight self-deception.
For these reasons, our proposal has advantages over competing accounts, while
retaining their intuitive character.As observed, it does not imply that self-decep-
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tion functions to reduce anxiety, so it does not suffer from the difficulties asso-
ciated with this claim (§ 2). For instance, it is compatible with the idea that
twisted self-deception aims at protection, because somatic markers and the
neural structures of anxiety have this function. Moreover, the proposal substan-
tiates the idea that self-deception is motivated by anxiety and explains the differ-
ent routes that anxiety might take in self-deception (§ 3). It offers a clear-cut
contrast between straight and twisted self-deception by describing the differ-
ence between them at the subpersonal level. Finally, for the reasons mentioned
above, our account of twisted self-deception is clearly non-intentionalist.
Somatic markers, along with the influence of anxiety on belief, operate at the
early stages of processing. The neural structures responsible for the anxiety bias
are far from corresponding to the frontal activation involved in intentional
behaviour. It is therefore unlikely that twisted self-deception is intentional.
One might doubt it. As the proposal reduces twisted self-deception to beliefs
formed under the influence of anxiety, does it truly capture the specificity of
self-deception? How does it avoid generalizing to all types of affective bias? In
our picture, straight and twisted self-deception both result in beliefs motivated
by desire and formed through similar mechanisms, but operating in inverted
fashion. This secures the unity of the phenomenon. By contrast, other affective
biases need not involve these components. For instance, the influence of sadness
on belief is not explained by dopamine, as revealed by studies on depressive
realism (Surbey, 2011), and the negative biases of sadness do not rely on antic-
ipation, as somatic markers do (Koster et al., 2010). Likewise, we have already
mentioned how the positivity effect depends on other mechanisms. Of course,
our components may partly feature in other emotional biases, given that they
are central to protective mechanisms in general (Ansermet and Magistretti,
2017). Yet, as far as self-deception is concerned, they are the paramount ones.
Let us step back and consider a final objection concerning the role of emotion
in our picture. The focus on the underlying mechanisms of self-deception might
come at the price of eluding affect’s role in self-deception. What, exactly, is
emotion’s role in self-deception, according to our picture? Does the picture truly
do justice to emotion’s role in self-deception? The answer to this question
depends on the vexed question of the relation between emotion and affective
filters. Consider the relation between emotion and cognitive appraisals. One
possibility is that emotions are cognitive appraisals, as in the idea that emotions
are experiences of values (Tappolet, 2000). In that case, self-deception would
involve emotions, such as anxiety and positive anticipation, as these correspond
to the appraisals described. Unconscious instances of those emotions may play
a role, as appraisals can be unconscious. Alternatively, appraisals might be
conceived as a cause or a component of emotions, in which case emotion’s role
in self-deception would be less straightforward in our picture. Nonetheless, on
this interpretation, affect would still play a role, through “proto-affective”
phenomena. These phenomena are components of emotions and lead to full-
fledged emotions only under some conditions (e.g., when a sufficient degree of
integration is attained or when the subject is conscious of them [Ortony et al.,
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2012]). For some authors, cognitive appraisals and the neurobiological mecha-
nisms mentioned above are among proto-affective phenomena. The affective
nature of these phenomena hinges on the fact that they constitute appraisals of
situations in light of one’s goals. Our conception is neutral with regard to the
relation between emotion and affective filters. Whatever one’s interpretation of
the relation, affect’s role consists in the assessment of information in light of
personal concerns, whether this takes the form of discrete emotions or proto-
affective phenomena.
CONCLUSION
Affectivism touches on key issues, such as the dynamic of self-deception, its
unity, and its contribution to happiness. Surprisingly, it has been seldom scruti-
nized with the help of empirical findings, despite the insights that studies on
affective biases provide into this issue. In this article, we have aimed to redress
this imbalance. The examination of the main affectivist accounts has invited us
to leave the armchair and to offer an empirically minded approach to the affec-
tive dynamic of self-deception.
We have argued that affect’s role in self-deception is better understood at the
phase of the evaluation of evidence. Understanding its role as the mere input or
as the function of the process is less promising. We do not deny that affect may
and often does play a role at these other levels. However, this role does not lead
us very far with regard to the promises of affectivism. By contrast, the idea that
self-deception involves evaluating information in light of one’s concerns (the
affective-filter view) fulfills the two promises of affectivism. First, our concep-
tion disentangles the latest challenge to non-intentionalism—namely, the selec-
tivity problem—as the affective filters capture the selective treatment of
information in non-intentionalist terms. Second, our approach offers an original
account of twisted self-deception. Twisted self-deception involves the same
affective filters as straight self-deception does, with the single difference being
the predominance of one mechanism over the other. In our proposal, self-decep-
tion’s dynamic may involve discrete emotions, such as anxiety and anticipated
pleasure, or proto-affective phenomena. Be that as it may, the affective-filter
view supports the idea that self-deception need not be intentional. The battle
among dopamine, somatic markers, and frontal activation vindicates the thought
that self-deception is “belief under influence.” This conception could be devel-
oped further to tackle other types of motivated biases, such as wishful thinking,
motivated information gathering, and repression, but this will wait for another
occasion. Affective filters are central to self-deception’s dynamic. Ultimately,
the aspirations of affectivism are realized.
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NOTES
1 It is assumed that in this debate desires differ from emotions.
2 For this reason, we do not consider the idea that emotions can be self-deceptive (De Sousa,
1978) or the claim that self-deception involves conflicting beliefs because it results in anxi-
ety. These claims do not address the dynamics issue.
3 As we assume that the product of self-deception is the welcome belief, we ignore doubts about
whether straight self-deception results in anxiety reduction because it involves conflicting
beliefs.
4 See Scott-Kakures (2000, 2001) for the idea that self-deception functions to promote one’s
interests broadly speaking, with anxiety reduction being one of many goals.
5 Echano (2017) claims that anxiety’s role in twisted self-deception lies in triggering unwel-
come hypotheses, just like desire triggers welcome hypotheses in straight self-deception. We
do not consider this proposal, as it restricts the role of emotion to twisted self-deception only.
Given anxiety’s role in straight self-deception, we think that there is more room for emotion’s
role in self-deception.
6 Ironically, Talbott (1995) offered a similar solution to the selectivity problem within his inten-
tionalist framework. We shall not consider his argument in detail here, as the solution exam-
ined does not appeal to intention. See Scott-Kakures (2000, 2001) for a discussion.
7 Barnes (1997, p. 80) acknowledges that the tendency to self-deceive can be trumped by other
dispositions, such as the disposition to protect oneself from danger. However, this proposal
does not apply to cases in which no action is available to protect oneself, as in “Guilty Son.”
Although other dispositions might trump the tendency to self-deceive, the problem consists
precisely in specifying the conditions in which people self-deceive.
8 We shall not discuss the computational model of the role of emotion in self-deception (Sahdra
and Thagard, 2003), because the authors do not argue that their picture favours non-inten-
tionalism (Sahdra and Thagard, 2003, p. 227-228), nor that it covers twisted self-deception
(see, however, Thagard and Nussbaum [2014] for a computational model of twisted self-
deception). That being said, our conception can be seen as a way of developing the computa-
tional model with the help of empirical findings.
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COSTLY FALSE BELIEFS: WHAT SELF-DECEPTION AND
PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT CAN TELL US ABOUT
THE RATIONALITY OF BELIEFS
MELANIE SARZANO
PHD STUDENT, UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH
ABSTRACT:
In this paper, I compare cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment and
argue that confronting these cases generates a dilemma about rationality.This dilemma
turns on the idea that subjects are motivated to avoid costly false beliefs, and that both
cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment are caused by an interest to
avoid forming costly false beliefs. Even though both types of cases can be explained by the
same belief-formationmechanism, only self-deceptive beliefs are irrational: the subjects
depicted in high-stakes cases typically used in debates on pragmatic encroachment are,
on the contrary, rational. If we find ourselves drawn to this dilemma,we are forced either
to accept—against most views presented in the literature—that self-deception is ratio-
nal or to accept that pragmatic encroachment is irrational. Assuming that both conclu-
sions are undesirable, I argue that this dilemma can be solved. In order to solve this
dilemma, I suggest and review several hypotheses aimed at explaining the difference in
rationality between the two types of cases, the result of which being that the irrationa-
lity of self-deceptive beliefs does not entirely depend on their being formed via a moti-
vationally biased process.
RÉSUMÉ :
Dans cet article, je compare les cas classiques de duperie de soi aux cas que l’on trouve
dans les débats sur la question de l'empiètement pragmatique et défends l’idée selon
laquelle ces deux types de cas peuvent être compris comme étant produits par unmême
mécanisme visant à éviter la formation de croyances fausses coûteuses. Cette comparai-
son nous mène naturellement à former un dilemme à propos de la rationalité des
croyances. Le dilemme repose sur l’idée que bien que cemécanismemène à la formation
de croyances irrationnelles dans les cas de duperie de soi, il ne semble pas affecter la
rationa-lité du sujet dans les cas d'empiètement pragmatique : alors que les sujets auto-
dupés sont irrationnels, les sujets décrits dans les cas d’empiètement pragmatique ne le
sont pas. Pour résoudre ce dilemme sans rejeter les présupposés selon lesquels les
croyances issues de la duperie de soi sont irrationnelles et que les cas sur lesquels repose
l'empiètement pragmatique sont rationnels, je propose plusieurs hypothèses visant à
expliquer cette différence, prouvant ainsi que ce dilemme n’est qu’apparent et que l’irra-
tionalité de la duperie de soi ne peut uniquement dépendre de ce mécanisme sous l’in-
fluence de considérations pratiques.
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0. INTRODUCTION
Sometimes, subjects hold irrational, motivated beliefs in the face of evidence to
the contrary, mistreat the evidence at hand, and seem impervious to any evidence
contradicting their desire. Such subjects are likely to be self-deceived.
In reaction to more traditional views, motivationists about self-deception have
recently argued that self-deceptive beliefs can be understood as motivationally
biased beliefs: they are the result of the subjects’motivation, such as a desire or
an emotion, that biases their treatment of the evidence, leading them to form
this irrational belief (Johnston, 1988; Barnes, 1997; Funkhouser, 2005; Scott-
Kakures, 2002; 2012; Lazar, 1999; Mele, 1997; 1999; 2001; Nelkin, 2002).
In this paper, I argue that, understood this way, self-deception shares interesting
similarities with high-stakes cases borrowed from the literature on pragmatic
encroachment. Despite these striking similarities, these two types of cases have
rarely, if ever, been compared in either part of the literature.1Although these two
types of cases differ in many ways, I argue that they can both be explained by
reference to the same underlying belief-formation mechanism: a mechanism
characterized by the influence of practical factors—in particular, the influence
of costly errors. While Mele (1997; 1999; 2001) refers to this mechanism to
explain the distorted ways in which subjects come to form irrational, self-decep-
tive beliefs, the same mechanism can be invoked to explain the subject’s epis-
temic behaviour in rational high-stakes cases.
My argument rests upon the assumption that self-deceptive beliefs generated by
this type of belief-formation mechanism are irrational, whereas high-stakes cases
typically aren’t. If this mechanism really does participate in making the former,
but not the latter, irrational, we then face a dilemma about the rationality of
beliefs. According to this dilemma—or, as we will see, what I take to be an
apparent dilemma—we are forced either to accept that self-deception is rational
or to accept that high-stakes cases are irrational.2 In order to solve this dilemma,
I suggest and review several hypotheses to explain this difference in rationality,
and I argue that the best way of articulating the difference is by drawing a line
between two types of motivation, or two types of costs influencing the belief-
formation process. If this line of thought is correct and if there really is a way
of dissolving the dilemma, then the irrationality of self-deceptive beliefs, and of
irrational beliefs in general, cannot be explained merely by the fact that the
beliefs in question result from a motivationally biased process.
In section I, I introduce self-deception as presented in the motivationist frame-
work. In section II, I turn to classical high-stakes cases borrowed from the liter-
ature on pragmatic encroachment and put forward the idea that, contrary to cases
of self-deception, these cases are cases in which the subject’s epistemic state is
rational. In section III, I begin by showing how both sets of cases can in fact be
explained by referring to the same type of belief-formation mechanism:
Friedrich-Trope-Liberman (FTL) model of lay hypothesis testing. On this basis,
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I argue that, if we assume that this belief-formation process is what causes these
beliefs to be irrational, then we are led to a dilemma about the rationality of
beliefs. Finally, in section IV, I suggest several hypotheses for explaining this
difference in rationality and evaluate them in turn, finally putting forward a solu-
tion to the dilemma.
I. SELF-DECEPTION
Some beliefs are undoubtedly irrational. Self-deceptive beliefs are of this type,
they are beliefs held in the face of evidence to the contrary. Such cases typically
involve subjects refusing to believe that their unfaithful partner is cheating on
them, parents resisting the fact that their children aren’t as perfect as they take
them to be, and lovers mistakenly believing, despite continuous rejection, that
their love is requited. In all of these cases, subjects aren’t merely hoping or wish-
ing reality were different: they seem to strongly believe that reality is such, that
it matches their desires and respond to evidence in a very biased way, despite the
facts being clear to everyone but themselves.
There are two main families of theories about self-deception. On the classical,
intentionalist view (Davidson, 1985; 2004; Pears, 1984; Rorty, 1988; Talbot,
1995), self-deception is understood literally, as a case of deception in which the
deceiver and the deceived are one and the same person. This model is closely
built on our common understanding of interpersonal deception, of cases in which
a first subject intentionally tricks another into believing something false. On the
intentionalist view, then, subjects are self-deceived only if they intentionally
deceive themselves and, at least on most intentionalist accounts, hold contra-
dictory beliefs (an initial belief that not-p and a self-deceived belief that p). This
approach has famously led to intricate puzzles, for pretty obvious reasons; what
can easily be applied to two distinct minds in cases of interpersonal deception
becomes overly complicated and tricky when applied to a single mind. How
does a single mind intentionally deceive itself, since it is probably aware of its
own intention to do so? And how is it possible for a single subject to come to
believe pwhen that subject already believes, and knows, that this belief is false?
In response to these thorny issues, motivationists (sometimes also called non-
intentionalists) have recently argued that self-deception need not involve an
intention or any contradictory beliefs. On the motivationist view, all that is
required for a self-deceptive belief to be formed is a motivational factor influ-
encing the subject’s belief-formation process (Johnston, 1988; Barnes, 1997;
Funkhouser, 2005; Scott-Kakures, 2002; 2012; Lazar, 1999; Mele, 2001; Nelkin,
2002). Here, it is the subjects’ desire or emotion that biases their belief forma-
tion and influences their treatment of the evidence, thereby resulting in them
holding a self-deceptive, irrational, belief. Because the intentionalist view is
problematic in many aspects, I will here assume that the motivationist frame-
work is correct and work with the following—fairly uncontroversial—charac-
terization of self-deception primarily inspired by Alfred Mele’s deflationary
97
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
account (1997; 1999; 2001). On Mele’s account, a subject S is self-deceived in
believing a proposition p if the following conditions obtain:
(a) unwarranted belief
S’s belief that p is false (or at least, unwarranted).
(b) doxastic alternative3
S possesses, or has been in contact with, evidence supporting the belief that
not-p.
(c) motivated belief
S’s belief that p is the result of a motivationally biased process.
These conditions capture what is essential to most motivationist accounts of self-
deception: (a) that the self-deceptive belief is unwarranted (i.e., that the subject
should not in fact believe p given the evidence at hand but believes p neverthe-
less);4 (b) that the subject has been presented, or has been in contact with,
evidence supporting the exact opposite of what he or she currently believes (i.e.,
that, given the evidence, he or she should in fact believe not-p);5 and (c) that S’s
belief that p is a direct consequence of the subject’s motivation that p. To illus-
trate this view, consider the following example.
Fernando
Fernando is a soft-hearted postdoc who happens to be madly in love
with Steve. His fondness for Steve has grown into an obsessive love
over the years and it is clear that he is now craving to see his love
returned. The two men accidentally run into each other every few
months at conferences and workshops, make small talk, and act
politely. Steve has, so far, never shown any sign of mutual attraction
and his small talk and polite behaviour only ever warranted Fernando
to believe that Steve simply appreciates him as a colleague. In fact, it
should even be clear to Fernando, after several refusals to have coffee
together, or spend time together, that Steve isn’t romantically inter-
ested in Fernando. Nevertheless, Fernando fallaciously interprets
Steve’s every little gesture and word as conclusive proof of their
impending love affair.
In this example, (a) Fernando unwarrantedly believes that his love is requited,
(b) when he should in fact believe the exact opposite (i.e., that Steve isn’t roman-
tically interested), and, what is more, (c) Fernando’s belief is formed and main-
tained through a motivationally biased process that influences his interpretation
of the evidence at hand. In other words, Fernando is self-deceived, and sadly
Steve isn’t about to declare his love to him.
As I said, it is central to motivationist accounts that the subject mistreats the
evidence at hand (cf. condition [c]) or is insensitive to evidence. According to
Mele (1997; 1999; 2001), there are several ways in which a subject can mistreat
evidence. In the aforementioned case, Fernando is mistreating the evidence,
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mainly by ignoring the evidence against Steve being romantically interested, as
well as by freely interpreting Steve’s behaviour as conclusive proof that Steve
loves him.
More generally, as Mele (2001) rightly describes, self-deceived subjects mistreat
evidence in a number of ways. For example, self-deceived subjects may posi-
tively misinterpret evidence (interpret evidence that doesn’t support p as
evidence supporting p), they may negatively misinterpret evidence (interpret as
not supporting p evidence that in fact supports p), they may selectively focus on
or attend to evidence according to whether it supports p (selectively focus on
evidence supporting their belief that p and/or fail to attend to evidence counting
against p), or they may selectively gather evidence (overlook available evidence
counting against p or actively search for less accessible evidence supporting p).
According to Mele, these are all ways in which subjects’ desire (or motivation)
may lead them to misinterpret the evidence at hand, depending on the particu-
lar cases.
Motivationists, Mele included, generally assume that it is a desire that p that
plays this biasing role. Nevertheless, there are variations and disagreements
amongst motivationists regarding what kind of motivation can trigger this type
of fallacious reasoning. Nelkin (2002), for example, argues that it is a desire to
believe p rather than a desire that p that is at play in self-deception. Mele himself
also admits, in his article on twisted self-deception (1999), that an emotion (e.g.,
jealousy) can play a similar biasing role that leads a subject to form a self-decep-
tive belief that that subject in fact wished were false.
How exactly these motivations, desires, and emotions might psychologically
play a role in leading the subject to mistreat evidence is amply discussed in the
literature (see Mele, 1997; 1999; 2001). In section III, we will focus on what
Mele identifies as one of the underlying psychological mechanisms leading self-
deceived subjects to mistreat evidence. But before turning to this aspect of self-
deception, I will first present a different type of cases: high-stakes cases
borrowed from the literature on pragmatic encroachment. As we will see,
contrary to self-deceptive subjects, subjects presented in this type of case do not
seem so irrational.
II. PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT
Contrary to what traditional views in epistemology assume, defenders of prag-
matic encroachment argue that knowledge doesn’t purely depend on truth-related
factors but also varies according to the subject’s practical interests—i.e., what
is at stake for the subject in a given situation6 (Stanley, 2005; Hawthorne, 2004;
Fantl and McGrath, 2002; 2007; Hookway, 1990). In other words, advocates of
the pragmatic-encroachment thesis defend the idea that a difference in the
subject’s practical circumstances, that a subject’s interests and related risks, can
encroach on the subject’s epistemic state. This, of course, drastically departs
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from the default view in epistemology, purism, according to which only truth-
related factors such as truth, justification, reliability, and so on determine alone
whether a subject is in a position to know.7
One way of motivating this original position is by appealing to a set of cases, the
most famous of which are the so-called bank cases, originally presented by
DeRose (1992).8
Low Stakes. Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday
afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit
their paychecks. It is not important that they do so, as they have no
impending bills. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the
lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons.
Hannah remembers the bank being open on Saturday morning a few
weeks ago, so she says, ‘Fortunately, it will be open tomorrow, so we
can just come back.’ In fact, Hannah is right—the bank will be open on
Saturday.
High Stakes. Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday
afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit
their paychecks. Since their mortgage payment is due on Sunday, they
have very little in their account, and they are on the brink of foreclo-
sure, it is very important that they deposit their paychecks by Satur-
day. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are
very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Hannah remembers
the bank being open on Saturday morning a few weeks ago, so she
says, ‘Fortunately, it will be open tomorrow, so we can just come back.’
In fact, Hannah is right—the bank will be open on Saturday.
(Schroeder, 2012)
The reason why these cases support pragmatic encroachment is because our intu-
itions about whether the subject knows whether the bank will be open seem to
shift from one case to the other. While we all tend to agree that Hannah knows
that the bank will be open in the low-stakes case, many tend to disagree that
Hannah is in a position to know that the bank will be open when the stakes are
raised. Only, to admit this shift in intuition, to say that what is at stake for Hannah
and her wife affects whether Hannah is in a position to know or not, amounts to
denying purism and conceding that practical factors actually play a role in deter-
mining whether a subject is in a position to know.9 For, if purism were true,
Hannah would know that the bank will be open on Saturday morning both in the
low-stakes case and in the high-stakes case, since the only variation between
the cases is what is at stake for Hannah and her wife—i.e., the practical costs of
being mistaken. Evidence, on the contrary, is stable across the cases.
This shifting intuition can, of course, be explained in a variety of ways. One
might reject the validity of these intuitions and argue in accordance with purism
that, if the subject knows p in one case, the subject must also know p in the other.
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Another might argue that what is actually going on in the high stakes case isn’t
that the subject isn’t in a position to know, or that the subject doesn’t believe the
target proposition, but rather that the subject isn’t in a position to act rationally
on the basis of this belief. There are indeed many ways of dealing with these
cases, some of which are sympathetic to purism, others plainly rejecting it. As
Engel (2009) notices, there are even different varieties of pragmatic encroach-
ment, varying along two dimensions: (i) the kind of epistemic notion upon which
these factors impede (whether it is knowledge, justification, belief, or rational-
ity); and (ii) the degree of this influence.
Since my focus here concerns the rationality of beliefs, I will follow Schroeder’s
(2012) contribution, where he articulates pragmatic encroachment as a thesis
about the rationality of beliefs. In his paper, Schroeder explores how we can
make sense of the idea that practical considerations could encroach on knowl-
edge. His solution to this puzzling idea is to say that practical considerations
don’t directly affect knowledge; rather, there is pragmatic encroachment on
knowledge only because there is pragmatic encroachment on epistemic ration-
ality. Given that epistemic rationality is a condition of knowledge, if high stakes
defeat epistemic rationality, they defeat knowledge by defeating epistemic
rationality. On his view, then, in the high-stakes case Hannah isn’t in a position
to know because she isn’t in a position to rationally hold the belief that the bank
will be open on Saturday.
As I said, pragmatic encroachment is a controversial position, and I do not wish
to defend it here, since this would go far beyond the purposes of this paper. All
I need to assume for the purposes of this paper is that there are at least some
high-stakes cases in which the subjects would be more rational to suspend their
belief, given the high stakes, than to believe p, and that, were they to believe p,
their belief would be irrational. If you are not convinced that the bank cases meet
these criteria, consider the following case.
Molly
Molly is about to pick some mushrooms in the forest to prepare the
evening dinner for her family. She has good evidence that most if not
all mushrooms in this area are edible (let us say her grandmother is a
knowledgeable mushroom hunter who told her so).All the same, Molly
is aware that many mushrooms are highly poisonous and that mistakes
in identifying them can happen. Because Molly is motivated to avoid
making a lethal mistake (she might die or poison her family as a result
of this mistake), Molly suspends her belief and decides to check her
Mushroom Book before serving dinner to find out whether the mush-
rooms she picked are edible.
In this case, there is less controversy about what exactly is going on, since it is
explicitly mentioned that Molly suspends her belief. All the same, I think this is
a plausible and ordinary case: sometimes, when the stakes are high, we suspend
belief for the very reason that mistakenly holding the belief in question could
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bear disastrous consequences. Following Schroeder’s (2012) argument, as well
as our intuitions, I think we can easily assume that there is something signifi-
cantly more rational, if not plainly rational, in Molly’s suspension of belief
contrasted with Fernando’s self-deceptive belief described in section I.10
Bearing this in mind, we will now see how comparing cases of self-deception
with high-stakes cases of this type can generate a(n apparent) dilemma about
the rationality of beliefs. I will thus begin by presenting the belief-formation
mechanism that Mele (1997; 1999; 2001) appeals to, to explain how self-decep-
tive beliefs are formed. I will then argue that this very mechanism can also
explain high-stakes cases.
III. THE (APPARENT) DILEMMA
As I suggested, both self-deception and high-stakes cases can be explained with
reference to the same type of belief-formation mechanism, a type of belief-
formation process under the influence of pragmatic considerations. This mech-
anism might not be sufficient for explaining all the puzzling aspects of
self-deception, nor might it be capable of explaining all types of cases. All I
claim is that it is sufficient to explain at least some cases, and that this is suffi-
cient for generating a dilemma about the rationality of beliefs. What is more, it
also seems to be this pragmatic influence that renders the resulting belief irra-
tional. Only, if this is the case, then it becomes unclear why high-stakes cases
aren’t cases in which the subject is being irrational—a conclusion that I deem
unlikely. Whereas self-deceptive beliefs are considered a paradigm of epistemic
irrationality, high-stakes cases are (as we saw section II) at least somewhat more
rational than cases of self-deception. Before articulating the dilemma, I will thus
begin by explaining why I think both types of cases can be explained by the
same type of mechanism.
In describing the psychological mechanisms underlying the various ways in
which a subject may be led to misinterpret evidence in a motivationally biased
way, Mele (1997; 1999; 2001) refers to what he labels the Friedrich-Trope-
Liberman (FTL) model of lay hypothesis testing and ordinary reasoning, inspired
by Friedrich’s (1993) and Trope and Liberman’s (1996) findings in psychology.
The FTLmodel, alongside a variety of biases Mele mentions (1997; 1999; 2001),
contributes to explaining the distorted ways in which self-deceived subjects
mistreat evidence, just as Fernando does in this example.
According to the FTL model, subjects are pragmatic thinkers whose cognitions
are first and foremost concerned with minimizing costly errors rather than driven
by an interest for truth. This way of testing hypotheses and forming beliefs incor-
porates the subject’s practical interests into the way in which the subject
searches, gathers evidence, and forms or rejects beliefs. This mechanism for
hypothesis testing and belief formation isn’t purely truth oriented in the way
scientific hypothesis testing would be. On the contrary, the type of hypothesis
testing displayed in everyday reasoning is largely influenced by the practical
costs thinkers associate with the possibility of forming a false belief or rejecting
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a true one. The subjects’motivation for avoiding costly errors is implemented in
their belief-formation process through a system of thresholds for belief forma-
tion and rejection that determine the amount of evidence required for forming or
rejecting a belief. These two thresholds—which needn’t be symmetrical—vary
according to the costs of mistakenly believing (forming a false belief) or mistak-
enly rejecting a belief (rejecting a true belief), as well as according to the costs
of information (that is, the costs of gathering further evidence, including
resources, time, and effort) (Trope and Liberman, 1996; Mele, 2001). For exam-
ple, a subject who associates high costs with falsely believing pwill have a high
threshold for forming this belief. If the costs of information are reasonable rela-
tive to the costs of falsely believing p, the subject will search for more evidence
about this matter. The costs of falsely believing something aren’t limited to mate-
rial consequences.As Friedrich (1993) notes, self-serving motives, such as main-
taining one’s self-esteem, can also play a role in the determination of errors to
be avoided. Thus, the practical costs of falsely believing include a wide range of
costs, including psychological ones (those linked to the subject’s self-image, for
instance) as well as material ones (such as poisoning).11
To see how this model functions, consider the following example. Imagine you
are walking in your back garden and notice a few rhubarb leaves growing there.
You know that this plant is somehow edible, but you aren’t quite sure which part
of the plant you can actually eat, or whether some of it might be indigestible. You
also remember eating delicious rhubarb pie but cannot quite remember which
part of the plant had been used in the preparation. You form the following
hypothesis.
(H) Rhubarb leaves are edible.
Knowing that the risks of forming a belief on the basis of this hypothesis might
be fatal (you are aware that some plants are poisonous), you are cautious and do
not jump to conclusions. Instead, you test the hypothesis by searching for discon-
firming evidence—that is, evidence that rhubarb leaves are poisonous—for this
will give you the best chances of avoiding forming a false belief. And because
the costs of falsely believing that rhubarb leaves are edible are high (i.e., the
risk of suffering some sort of food poisoning), the amount of evidence you gather
before forming the belief in question is important: you do not want to make a
mistake about this particular matter and poison yourself or your guests. In other
words, the higher the stakes or the costs of falsely believing p, the more evidence
one needs in order to form a given belief.
The FTLmodel, as Mele points out, participates in the formation of self-decep-
tive beliefs. If we apply this model to a case of self-deception such as the one
presented above, we can see how the model predicts and explains the distorted
ways in which some self-deceived subject forms his or her belief. In this partic-
ular case, Fernando is self-deceived in believing that Steve is in love with him.
Fernando not forming the appropriate belief on the basis of the evidence can be
explained by the fact that he associates high costs with forming the belief that
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Steve isn’t romantically interested, and low costs with falsely believing that his
love is requited. The truth (not-p) might break Fernando’s heart and lead to
severe emotional consequences for him, whereas the costs of falsely believing
that his love is requited are low, as the belief serves only to maintain him in a
happy bubble.12 These costs of believing not-p (i.e., that Steve isn’t in love with
him) thus set a high threshold for forming the appropriate belief, and the amount
of evidence required for believing not-p is correspondingly high. If this is
correct, then at least some cases of self-deception, if not all, can be explained by
referring to this type of belief mechanism as the one described by the FTL
model.13
Self-deceptive beliefs, we have seen, are formed through a motivationally biased
process. The FTL model presented above explains how a subject can be led to
mistreat evidence in order to avoid forming costly false beliefs.14 This mecha-
nism for belief formation participates in making the belief irrational since it
causes the subject to not form the appropriate belief. The motivation to avoid
forming costly false beliefs—as well as, more generally speaking, the influence
of practical considerations on beliefs—is typically deemed irrational. This
suggests that the FTL model can at least explain some cases of self-deception:
the costs of falsely believing function as a motivation to avoid certain undesired
consequences that influences the subject’s treatment of evidence and leads the
subject to form a self-deceptive, irrational, belief.
Interestingly, these high-stakes cases can easily be explained by referring to the
FTL model, with the very same mechanism that was responsible for the gener-
ation of irrational beliefs in cases of self-deception. In high-stakes cases such as
the one described above, the costs associated with falsely believing p are high:
Hannah and Sarah will be in a very uncomfortable situation if they fail to deposit
their paycheques before Sunday. Since these costs are high, the threshold for
belief formation is equally high and the amount of evidence required for believ-
ing that the bank will be open on Saturday is greater than that in the low-stakes
case. This can explain why the amount of evidence can be sufficient for belief
formation in the low-stakes case, without being sufficient when the stakes are
high. Hannah’s concern for avoiding costly false beliefs influences her thresh-
old for belief formation and leads her to suspend her belief until further evidence
is gathered. The same goes for Molly: her position is perfectly analogous to the
example used to illustrate the FTLmodel. It is because the costs associated with
falsely believing that the mushrooms are edible are extremely high that the
threshold for belief formation is equally high. This results in Molly not forming
the belief that the mushrooms are edible until she gathers further evidence from
her Mushroom Book.
But, contrary to cases of self-deception such as the one described previously,
the stakes here influence Hannah and Molly’s beliefs in a rational way. Indeed,
as I said, cases of this sort are used in the context of debates on pragmatic
encroachment to bring about the intuition that there’s a good reason for subjects
to suspend their belief and search for further evidence. In what follows, I rely on
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the intuition that in such cases the perceived costs of falsely believing actually
have a positive effect on the subject’s belief, in the sense that, even if we under-
stand high-stakes cases by referring to the system of adaptive thresholds
described by the FTL model, this does not affect the subject’s rationality.
Cases of self-deception thus provide us with an example in which pragmatic
factors (in particular, the costs of forming a false belief) influence the subject’s
belief formation. This influence is what makes the belief irrational and insensi-
tive to evidence. Take the example of Fernando again. Fernando believes
(falsely) that Steve is in love with him. This belief results from the fact that
Fernando associates high costs with falsely believing that Steve doesn’t love
him and associates low costs with believing that Steve does love him. Accord-
ing to the standard understanding of self-deception, what makes self-deceptive
beliefs irrational lies precisely in the fact that the beliefs are formed through a
motivationally biased process: a process under the influence of practical factors
(such as desires, the motivation to avoid costly false beliefs, and so on), an influ-
ence that leads the subject to mistreat the evidence at hand. But, as we have
seen with cases of pragmatic encroachment, the same mechanism can influence
a subject’s belief without affecting that subject’s rationality. On the contrary,
this influence seems warranted: when the stakes are high, it is more rational for
subjects to suspend their belief until further evidence is gathered, rather than
holding onto it. Indeed, were Hannah or Molly to believe p in the high-stakes
situation—that is, were the stakes to not influence her belief—her belief would
be irrational. In these cases, it might be more rational for Hannah or Molly to
suspend her belief. Both sets of cases are cases in which the practical costs of
forming false beliefs affect the subject’s belief through what seems to be a
system of thresholds for belief formation and rejection. But, while in the first
case this influence seems to make the subject’s belief irrational,15 in the second
this influence does not undermine the subject’s rationality. The puzzling aspect
of this comparison is precisely that this biased mechanism is what determines the
rationality of the belief in the first case. If we accept these claims, we are then
led to the following dilemma about rationality.
Dilemma
Either this mechanism produces irrational beliefs, and both self-
deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment are irrational
or this mechanism affects beliefs in a rational way, and both cases
of pragmatic encroachment and cases of self-deception are rational.
There are of course three options for responding to this dilemma.We can decide
either to embrace either the first horn or the second or to reject the dilemma by
explaining why it doesn’t hold. In what follows, I assume that neither horn is
likely (that self-deception is indisputably irrational and that there is something
rational—or at least significantly more rational—about suspending one’s belief
in high-stakes cases). If we want to find a way out of this dilemma, we need to
deny that the rationality of one’s belief has anything to do with being formed via
the mechanism of adaptive thresholds described by the FTL model. If this line
of thought is correct, the dilemma is merely apparent, and the irrationality of
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self-deception lies elsewhere: it has to be found in a feature of self-deception that
cases of pragmatic encroachment do not possess.
IV. HYPOTHESES AND SOLUTIONS
In this final section I spell out several differences between the two cases to find
out which element, present in self-deception but not in cases of pragmatic
encroachment, is responsible for the irrationality of self-deceptive beliefs. The
hypotheses listed in the table below represent some, and hopefully all, of the
relevant differences between the two cases. I do not intend to say that these
hypotheses are mutually exclusive or that they cannot be combined to furnish a
full explanation of this difference in rationality, nor do I mean to say that they
bear no logical connection to one another. As we will see, I think some of the
hypotheses are in fact related.
Hypothesis Self-deception Pragmatic Encroachment
H1 Falsity Truth
H2 Formation Suspension
H3 Quick reasoning Slow reasoning
H4 Costs of believing p Costs of p being false
Hypothesis 1: Truth versus falsity
According to the first hypothesis, the fact that in cases of self-deception the
subject’s belief is false, whereas in cases of pragmatic encroachment the belief
is true, can explain why cases of self-deception are irrational and high stakes
cases are not. This difference might seem like a very trivial and simplistic one,
for, as we know, falsity of the belief isn’t a necessary condition for self-decep-
tion. It is indeed easy to see how, even though in most cases the self-deceptive
belief will happen to be false, it could also accidentally be true. Irrationality and
falsity are independent from one another, and a subject could be warranted to
believe p even though p is false.
Hypothesis 2: Suspension versus formation
One can draw attention to the sort of impact these practical costs have on the
subject’s belief. In one case, self-deception, the subject’s belief results from prac-
tical considerations, whereas in the case of pragmatic encroachment the subject
merely suspends his or her belief. In his (2012) article, Schroeder argues that
reasons to withhold belief are necessarily nonevidential. He writes:
Why is it that reasons to withhold cannot be evidence? It is because the
evidence is exhausted by evidence which supports p and evidence which
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supports ~p. Consequently, the reasons to withhold must come from
somewhere else. So they cannot be evidence. (Schroeder, 2012)
If Schroeder is correct, and if reasons to believe must be evidential, whereas
reasons to withhold belief can only be practical, then this might explain the
difference between the two sets of cases. This argument would allow us to
explain why the influence of practical costs makes beliefs irrational in the case
of self-deception, but not in typical cases of pragmatic encroachment, if, as I
said, cases of self-deception are cases in which subjects form beliefs, and cases
of pragmatic encroachment are cases in which subjects suspend beliefs. But is
this true?
Although I think all cases of the second type—that is, cases of pragmatic
encroachment—are cases in which subjects suspend their belief, the question of
whether there can be cases of self-deception in which the self-deceptive subjects
also suspend their belief is less straightforward. Indeed, despite self-deception
being mostly defined as a process by which a belief is formed, applying only to
cases in which a subject is self-deceived in believing p, this definition might be
too restrictive (cf. the definition in section I). It does not seem to be true that one
cannot be self-deceived in simply refusing to believe something, in suspending
one’s belief in the face of strong evidence instead of forming the warranted
belief. There are cases in which the subject suspends belief for practical reasons,
but these cases fail to be rational, and these cases are cases of self-deception.
Here is an example of this sort.
Suspension Jo
Jo is meeting Laurie for a drink by the lakeside. She has very good
reasons to believe that this is a date and that Laurie is romantically
invested: he regularly sends her handwritten letters and red roses and
bakes her delicious cookies. Their best friend also confirmed that Laurie
does this only when he’s madly in love. Nevertheless, Jo refuses to
believe that Laurie is romantically interested, and suspends belief. Her
reason for doing so is that the mere thought of him liking her in return is
overwhelming and puts her in a general state of emotional distress.
Although the case doesn’t fit with the definition of self-deception presented
above (insofar as the definition mentions only cases in which the subject forms
or holds a belief), I think some might still hold the intuition that Jo is self-deceiv-
ing in suspending belief. Imagine a discussion between Jo and her sister Beth:
Beth is insisting that Laurie is in love with Jo, but Jo refuses to see the evidence
supporting this belief. Would Beth be tempted to tell her sister that she is self-
deceived? Maybe. Maybe not. Some might want to argue that self-deception
necessarily involves forming a belief and that merely suspending one’s belief,
however irrational this may be, cannot constitute a genuine case of self-decep-
tion. However, it isn’t crucial that we agree on calling this a case of self-decep-
tion; all we need is to agree that Jo is being irrational in refusing to believe that
Laurie is romantically interested in her, which I think she is. If so, then the third
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hypothesis does not account for the intuitive difference in rationality between the
two sets of cases.
Hypothesis 3: Quick versus slow16
Another way of explaining the difference in rationality between the two cases is
by referring to the way in which the beliefs are formed—i.e., the type of reason-
ing by which they are formed. One could argue that for a belief to be self-decep-
tive it should not be sufficient that the belief-formation process be influenced by
the costs of falsely believing. In addition to this, the belief should be formed
through a certain type of reasoning. Accordingly, the threshold variation isn’t
what causes beliefs to be irrational in cases of self-deception; rather, it is the
biased treatment of the evidence that causes the belief to be irrational. Mele
(1997; 1999; 2001) refers to several cognitive biases that can be triggered by
desires or emotions and that might participate in the formation of self-deceptive
beliefs. Such biases include the confirmation bias, the vividness-of-
information bias (Mele, 1997; 1999; 2001), and even the availability-heuristics
bias (Mele, 1997; 1999; 2001).
By contrast, subjects in cases of pragmatic encroachment do not go through this
type of process, and this is why their attitude isn’t irrational. A more precise
formulation of this idea can be given by referring to dual-process theory (Evans,
2010; Evans and Frankish, 2009; Frankish, 2010). Mainly developed by Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1974), dual-process theory provides a schematic vision of
our cognition divided into two systems, two distinct ways of reasoning and treat-
ing information: system 1 and system 2. The first system is intuitive: it is quick,
implicit, and effortless. The second process on the contrary is reflective; it is
slower and relies on controlled, analytic thinking. Cognitive biases are under-
stood as belonging to system 1: they allow us to treat information effectively
while investing little cognitive effort, but can lead to errors. System 2 is more
rational, but requires more cognitive effort and time.
This second hypothesis draws upon the dual-process theory to explain what
might be irrational about self-deception and rational in cases of pragmatic
encroachment. The relevant difference between these cases has nothing to do
with motivation. In fact, the difference has to do only with the way in which this
motivation affects our thinking. In cases of self-deception, what makes the belief
irrational is that it results from a certain type of reasoning process, an intuitive,
associative way of treating information, that results in a false belief. It is the
motivation, the emotion, or the desire that leads the subject to think in system
1: the self-deceptive subjects don’t reason analytically. And this is what differ-
entiates them from the subjects in cases of pragmatic encroachment. Subjects in
cases of pragmatic encroachment engage in slow, analytical thinking. Their moti-
vation for reevaluating their belief might be a practical one, but their thinking
isn’t biased by their motivation. It isn’t the belief in itself that is irrational, but
only the process by which it is formed. According to this hypothesis, the influ-
ence of the practical costs of falsely believing in one’s thresholds for belief
10
8
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
acceptance and rejection doesn’t play a role in determining whether the result-
ing belief is rational or not: what matters is the type of reasoning or thinking
that leads to this belief.
This hypothesis fails to explain the difference for the following reason: many
rational beliefs are formed through system 1; therefore, relying on biases and
heuristics does not necessarily make a subject’s belief irrational. If this is correct,
as I think it is, then why would this type of reasoning be what determines the
belief’s rationality only in this specific case? Since the answer to this question
forces us to search for a further criterion, it cannot be a convincing solution to
the dilemma.
Hypothesis 4: Costs of believing p versus costs of p being false
According to the fourth hypothesis, the relevant difference between the cases
concerns the kind of practical costs at play. Indeed, cases of self-deception are
cases in which the costs influencing the subject’s threshold for belief are those
related to holding the belief itself rather than the costs related to falsely believing
p. In other words, what influences the subject’s belief doesn’t depend on the falsity
of the belief; it merely depends on holding the belief regardless of whether it might
be true or false.What matters to the self-deceived subject is to believe p no matter
what the evidence suggests, regardless of whether p might be true or not. In the
high-stakes cases, on the contrary, Hannah is concerned with the truth of p—what
she wants to find out is whether p is true or not. Although the amount of effort
invested in the inquiry is influenced by pragmatic considerations (the practical
costs of falsely believing p), her interest is to reduce the possibility of making a
costly error—what matters to her is that her belief be true.
This distinction in fact neatly overlaps one offered by Jordan (1996), who pres-
ents two types of pragmatic arguments for belief formation: truth-dependent and
truth-independent arguments. Truth-dependent arguments are pragmatic argu-
ments for believing something because, if p happens to be true, then the practi-
cal benefits of believing p will be great. They are truth dependent precisely
because these practical benefits depend on p being true. If p turned out to be
false, then there would be no benefits to holding the belief in question. Truth-
independent arguments, on the contrary, are pragmatic arguments for believing
p, the benefits of which do not depend on p being true: the benefits gained by
believing p hold whether or not p turns out to be true (Jordan, 1996). If you think
of Fernando again, you will realize that what influences his threshold for belief
formation doesn’t depend on what will happen were he to believe falsely, but
depends on the emotional costs of believing that Steve doesn’t love him, some-
thing he is afraid to admit. The self-deceived subject isn’t interested in finding
out whether p is true or not—this is precisely not the point of their inquiry.
A wining hypothesis?
What conclusions can we draw from the evaluation of these hypotheses?
Hypothesis 1 isn’t convincing as it merely indicates an accidental feature of self-
10
9
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
deception. Hypothesis 2 does set up an interesting basis for explaining the differ-
ence between the cases, but assumes that there are no cases of self-deception in
which the subject suspends belief, which is misleading. It is difficult to see how
hypothesis 3 could ground a proper difference in rationality since many rational
beliefs are formed through automatic reasoning. But as we will see, maybe
hypotheses 2 and 3 haven’t said their last word. Finally, hypothesis 4, I think, has
more potential. First, it smoothly applies to both cases: In the case of self-decep-
tion, the subject’s belief is influenced by the costs of believing p (regardless of
whether p is true or not) rather than by the costs of falsely believing p. In the
high-stakes case, on the contrary, Hannah’s and Molly’s thresholds for belief
aren’t influenced by the costs of believing but by the costs of falsely believing
p. But this doesn’t seem to be the full story.
Further support for this idea can be found in found in Kunda’s (1990) and
Kruglanski’s (Kruglanski, 1980; Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski and
Klar, 1987) works on motivated reasoning. In her famous paper, Kunda also
distinguishes between two types of motivations: the motivation to arrive at an
accurate conclusion (whatever the conclusion may be) versus the motivation to
arrive at a particular, directional, conclusion.17 While the first “enhances use of
those beliefs and strategies that are considered most appropriate,” the second
“enhances use of those that are considered most likely to yield the desired
conclusion” (Kunda, 1990). If Kunda is correct in this, then the type of motiva-
tion also influences the type of reasoning, not exactly in the sense described
under hypothesis 2, but in the following way: directionally motivated subjects
will tend to rely on ways of reasoning that allow them to “construct seemingly
reasonable justifications for these conclusions” (Kunda, 1990). Subjects whose
reasoning is directionally motivated do not only tend to rely on biased reason-
ing, but they also seem to “pick and choose” reasoning strategies likely to lead
them to form the desired belief.
This points to another interesting difference between self-deceptive subjects and
high-stakes subjects. In cases of self-deception, subjects do not recognize their
motivations as being part of the reason why they come to believe p. On the
contrary, they often seem unaware of this causal connection. Self-deceived
people typically take the evidence to support their false belief, whereas it seems
part of high-stakes subjects’ position to be aware of the fact that they are
suspending belief for practical reasons.
Finally, and given what I have just said, although I did argue that there were
irrational cases of suspension of belief, it might well be the case that practical
reasons bear a rational influence on beliefs only in cases of suspension.18 In other
words, this would mean that, although it could be warranted to suspend one’s
belief about whether p for practical reasons, one could never rationally believe
p for practical reasons (no matter what type of reasoning one is using). In fact,
this is compatible with what Schroeder (2012) suggests when he writes that
reasons to withhold can only be nonevidential. The final question would thus
be the following: Would we deem it rational for a subject to suspend belief for
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truth-independent reasons? I suspect not. In the light of the points presented
above, we could thus add the following: it might be rational to whithhold belief
for practical reasons, if these reasons are truth-dependent in the sense specified
by Jordan (1996).19
These comments might, of course, merely constitute the sketch of an answer.
They might even, as a matter of fact, raise more questions than they dare to
answer. All the same, I hope to have shown that the suggested dilemma doesn’t
really hold, that, despite these similarities, self-deception and high-stakes cases
differ in significant ways.
That being said, let us finally make note of a few implications for theories of self-
deception and pragmatic encroachment. First, we need to recognize that,
although Mele might be correct in recognizing the FTL model as a mechanism
by which we can explain self-deception, it seems misleading to think that any
type of motivation might play this role. Indeed, the motivation at play in cases
of self-deception seems more likely to be a motivation to avoid forming beliefs
tout court, rather than a motivation to avoid forming costly false beliefs. This
might be a reason to prefer a motivationist account, such as Nelkin’s (2002),
that argues that self-deception should be defined as a desire to believe p rather
than a desire that p, as most motivationists put it, or an account such as the one
suggested by Lauria et al. (2016), according to which self-deception is best
understood as a type of affective coping. These accounts, as well as the argument
laid out above, seem to suggest that the motivation inherent to self-deception is
a motivation linked to the costs of believing rather than related to the truth of p,
something that isn’t obvious in Mele’s account.
Second, this should also have implications for our conception of what makes
self-deceptive beliefs irrational. Indeed, as we have seen, the FTLmodel in itself
isn’t sufficient for explaining why we deem self-deceptive beliefs to be irra-
tional since the same mechanism also leads to rational cases. As I suggested, it
is important to distinguish between the costs of believing and the costs of believ-
ing falsely, and thereby acting as if p. Although I here suggested that this differ-
ence can explain why self-deception is irrational, whereas cases of pragmatic
encroachment are not, there is more to say about how and why, precisely, these
two types of influences ground rationality.
Third, on the pragmatic encroachment side of the discussion, this proves that the
cases used to support the thesis lack detail. Although we do seem to have the intu-
ition that these subjects aren’t self-deceived, the lack of precision about what type
of practical considerations and reasoning might be compatible with this rationality
allows us to question the belief processes involved. In the absence of detail, one
might just as well use this as an argument against pragmatic encroachment in order
to show why these cases are perfectly analogous to self-deception.
Last but not least, I think this discussion has established that speaking in terms
of the influence of practical factors alone isn’t sufficient for explaining why a
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belief might be irrational. Without heading towards the pragmatists’ camp and
saying that it is rational to believe whatever maximizes utility, for example (see
Rinard, 2015; 2017 for a discussion and defence of pragmatism), I claim that it
seems insufficient, even within a more evidentialist framework, to simply posit
that only evidential considerations play a role in determining the rationality of
one’s beliefs.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment
can be explained by reference to the same mechanism—namely, the FTLmodel
for belief formation and lay hypothesis testing. This mechanism shows that a
subject’s motivation for avoiding costly false beliefs not only explains the way
in which the belief is formed, but also seems to explain why this belief is irra-
tional—insofar as the motivation to avoid costly false beliefs thereby leads the
subject to mistreat the evidence at hand. On this basis, I argued that by accept-
ing this we are forced into a dilemma about the rationality of beliefs according
to which either self-deception is rational or cases of pragmatic encroachment
are irrational. Finally, I presented several hypotheses about how to solve this
dilemma and argued that the type of motivation at play holds a central role in
distinguishing the two types of cases.
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NOTES
1 To my knowledge, Gao (n.d.) is the only author who points out and discusses this similarity.
2 By “high-stakes cases” I mean to say cases described and used in the literature on pragmatic
encroachment. The cases are often used as a motivation for rejecting purism, the idea that
knowledge or other epistemic states are purely truth related (see section II for more detail).
3 This second condition helps mainly to distinguish self-deception from wishful thinking, often
defined as cases in which the subject is only unwarranted in believing p (Szabados, 1973; Van
Leeuwen, 2007).
4 In one of his footnotes (2006, p. 115), Mele writes “the requirement that p be false is purely
semantic. By definition, one is deceived in believing that p only if p is false, the same is true
of being self-deceived in believing that p. The requirement does not imply that p’s being false
has special importance for the dynamics of self-deception. Biased treatment of data may some-
times result in someone’s believing an improbable proposition, p, that happens to be true”
(see also Mele, 1987, p. 127-128).
5 Van Leeuwen (2007) describes “not-p” as the “doxastic alternative”. Attitudes towards the
doxastic alternative vary from one theory of self-deception to another. On Mele’s view, it is
not necessary that the subject believes the doxastic alternative to be self-deceived. However,
condition (b) seems to describe the self-deceived subject as somehow possessing evidence
supporting the doxastic alternative.
6 Most of versions of pragmatic encroachment primarily focus on “stakes.” Nonetheless, some
philosophers (see Anderson, 2015; and Gerken, 2011) argue that other types of factors such
as urgency, the availability of alternative evidence, social rules, and conventions can play a
similar role.
7 Pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, for example, must be understood as a thesis about the
metaphysics of knowledge rather than as a thesis about the pragmatics of the verb “to know.”
8 For similar cases, see Cohen, 1999; Fantl and McGrath, 2002; and McGrath, 2018.
9 The traditional position is usually referred to as purism. Purism can be spelled out as follows:
“For any two possible subjects S and S’, if S and S’ are alike with respect to the strength of
their epistemic position regarding a true proposition p, then S and S’ are alike with respect to
being in a position to know that p” (Fantl and McGrath, 2007).
10 One could, of course, reject the assumption I am establishing: that is, that there are no such
cases of subjects suspending belief in high-stakes situations because believing p in these
circumstances would be irrational. If this were the case, there would be no dilemma concern-
ing the rationality of beliefs, for the rationality of the high-stakes subjects wouldn’t concern
their beliefs, but their action. Against this objection, one could invoke the tight link between
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action and belief, or between action and knowledge. For example, functionalists about beliefs
may argue that to believe p is to be disposed to act as if p (see Ganson, 2007) for a discussion
of the double function of beliefs in relation to this issue. Defenders of pragmatic encroachment
often invoke something they call the “knowledge-action principle.” Roughly put, this princi-
ple states that if S knows p then S is in a position to act as if p (see Fantl and McGrath, 2002;
Williamson, 2005; Stanley and Hawthorne, 2008, for different formulations of this idea). This
principle is used to reinforce the idea that if S isn’t in a position to act when the stakes are high,
then S doesn’t know that p.
11 A similar idea can be found in James’s (1897) work, in which he mentions “two duties in
inquiry”: (i) avoiding false beliefs and (ii) forming true beliefs. Depending on which of these
two duties the subject takes to be his or her primary concern, the subject will alter his or her
inquiry and treatment of the evidence relative to whether p. If the subject is primarily
concerned with (i) avoiding falsehood, the amount of evidence required for believing p will
be greater, whereas if the subject’s primary concern is (ii) forming true beliefs—and reliev-
ing himself or herself from a state of agnosticism—that subject will then form a belief on
weaker grounds. More recently, Nagel introduced two psychological elements that influence
belief formation and epistemic inquiry: epistemic anxiety (2010) and need for closure (2008).
These two “forces” vary in function of the practical interests of the subject in a given situa-
tion (Nagel, 2008). Epistemic anxiety is the emotive response resulting from the perceived
costs in being mistaken about a particular matter; the response consists in the subjects regu-
lating their cognitive effort and adapting their cognitive strategy by relying on more deliber-
ate and controlled cognition (Nagel, 2008; cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). One’s level of
“need for closure” on the other hand (cf. Kruglanski and Webster, 1996) refers to the thresh-
old of belief (or desired “levels of confidence”; Nagel, 2010) at which a subject settles and
forms a given belief.
12 There might be costs other than the ones mentioned here. These costs could range from further
subjective, psychological costs to more objective costs. For example, one could consider the
costs of causing distress to Steve by misinterpreting his behaviour. I think the issue of deter-
mining how to narrow down the relevant costs hasn’t yet been completely clarified: do these
costs depend only on the subject’s interests and primary concerns? For purposes of simplic-
ity, let’s here assume that the relevant costs are the ones described above.
13 This mechanism described as the FTL model in Mele’s words is in fact very close to the
general functioning of adaptive cognition. Roughly speaking, adaptive cognition is the idea
that our cognition, the way in which we treat information, test hypothesis, and form beliefs is
cognitively adaptive in the following sense: “agents adapt their cognitive efforts” (and
resources) “to how they represent the practical factors relevant to the task at hand” (Gerken,
2017). This means that the ways in which agents perceive their practical situation influence
their cognition in a significant way. Although there is significant disagreement, as Gerken
(2017) notices, “there is a wide agreement that our metacognitive procedures adapt the cogni-
tive resources that we deploy for a given task to how they represent the practical factors asso-
ciated with it.” The two central aspects of adaptive cognition are the following: (i) how much
cognitive effort one is willing to allocate to a given cognitive task as well as (ii) how much
evidence one needs in order to form or reject a given belief, both very according to one’s prac-
tical stuation.
14 I thank the reviewers for noting that twisted self-deception may present a challenge to any
account heavily relying on this type of mechanism. However, many accounts of self-decep-
tion face this challenge, and it might be the case that Mele takes FTL to sometimes, but not
necessarily, play a role in the formation of self-deceptive beliefs. And it is sufficient for our
argument that FTL sometimes produces irrational beliefs.
15 Although Mele does rely on the FTLmodel to explain how self-deceptive beliefs come about,
it might be the case that neither Trope nor Friedrich nor Liberman would agree with the idea
that, according to the FTLmodel (which, I recall, is a generalization provided by Mele, 1997;
1999; 2001), the motivation to avoid costly false beliefs may result in irrational beliefs. This
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might be true, for example, for anyone working with a slightly different notion of rationality
(i.e., an evolutionary notion, for example) than the one assumed throughout this discussion.
16 I am grateful to Alfred Mele for suggesting this third hypothesis.
17 For more work on this distinction see Kruglanski, 1980; Kruglanski andAjzen, 1983; Kruglan-
ski and Klar, 1987; see also Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly, 1989; Pyszczynski and Greenberg,
1987.
18 I here set aside the pragmatist (or nonevidentialist) idea that it can be rational to believe for
nonevidential reasons because accepting the truth of pragmatism is incompatible with my
beginning assumption that self-deception is irrational. Indeed, if we accept that it can be
rational to believe p because believing p leads to positive consequences, for example (cf.
Rinard, 2015; 2017), it then becomes unclear why we would still consider most cases of self-
deception irrational.
19 It could be interesting to think about Pascal’s Wager here. Pascal’s wagerer decides to believe
in God because he or she thinks believing in God will lead to positive consequences whatever
the truth is, whereas disbelieving (whether this means believing that God doesn’t exist or
suspending belief) will either lead to no consequences or lead to negative ones. Overall, this
could be understood as an FTL belief. However, I do not think this would qualify as a self-
deceptive belief for the following reasons: First, being the product of FTL isn’t sufficient for
qualifying as a self-deceptive belief (cf. conditions given in section 1). It isn’t obvious—at least
not to me—that Pascal’s wagerer should in fact believe not-p (that God doesn’t exist) in the
sense that he or she has been presented with sufficient evidence for being warranted in believ-
ing not-p. Second, these final considerations about the difference between self-deception and
high-stakes cases also shed light upon the kind of reasoning underlying self-deception, and it
does not seem to me that Pascal’s wagerer is similar in this respect. One might still want to
argue that forming a belief for pragmatic reasons of this sort—regardless of whether one has
evidence supporting this belief—is irrational, even though it might not be self-deceptive.
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR SELF-DECEPTION
MARIE VAN LOON
PHD STUDENT, UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH
ABSTRACT:
In this paper, I argue that AlfredMele’s conception of self-deception is such that it always
fulfils the reasons-responsiveness condition for doxastic responsibility. This is because
self-deceptivemechanisms of belief formation are such that the kind of beliefs they bring
about are the kind of beliefs that fulfil the criteria for doxastic responsibility from epis-
temic reasons responsiveness. I explain why in this paper. Mele describes the relation of
the subject to the evidence as a biased relation.The subject does not simply believe on the
basis of evidence,but on the basis ofmanipulated evidence.Mele puts forward fourways
in which the subject does this. The subject could misinterpret positively or negatively,
selectively focus, or gather evidence. Through these ways of manipulation, the evidence
is framed such that the final product constitutes evidence on the basis of which the
subject may believe a proposition that fits that subject’s desire that P.Whichever form of
manipulation the subject uses, the evidence against Pmust be neutralized in one way or
another. Successful neutralization of the evidence requires the ability to recognize what
the evidence supports and the ability to react to it.These abilities consist precisely in the
two parts of the reasons-responsiveness condition, reasons receptivity and reasons reac-
tivity. In that sense, self-deceptive beliefs always fulfil the reasons-responsiveness condi-
tion for doxastic responsibility. However, given that reasons responsiveness is only a
necessary condition for doxastic responsibility, this does not mean that self-deceived
subjects are always responsible for their belief.
RÉSUMÉ :
Dans cet article, je soutiens que la conception d’auto-illusion chez Alfred Mele remplit
toujours l’une des conditions de la responsabilité doxastique, à savoir la « sensibilité aux
raisons » (reasons-responsiveness). Il en est ainsi car lesmécanismes d’auto-illusion dans
la formation de croyances produisent des types de croyances qui remplissent les critères
pour la responsabilité doxastique quant à la sensibilité aux raisons épistémiques. J’ex-
plique pourquoi dans cet article.Mele décrit la relation du sujet à la preuve comme biai-
sée. Le sujet ne croit pas seulement sur la base de preuves,mais de preuves manipulées.
Mele avance quatre façons qu’a le sujet de faire ceci. Le sujet peut mal interpréter positi-
vement ou négativement, focaliser de façon sélective, ou accumuler des preuves. Par ces
formes demanipulations, la preuve est formulée de sorte qu’elle produise un fondement
pour la croyance en une proposition qui s’accorde avec le désir du sujet que P. Peu importe
la forme demanipulation qu’emploie le sujet, la preuve contre P doit être neutralisée d’une
façon ou d’une autre.Une neutralisation réussie de la preuve requiert la capacité de recon-
naître ce que soutient la preuve et la capacité d’y réagir. Ces capacités consistent précisé-
ment en ces deux parties de la condition de la sensibilité aux raisons, soit la réceptivité et
la réactivité aux raisons. En ce sens, les croyances d’auto-illusion remplissent toujours la
condition de la sensibilité aux raisons pour la responsabilité doxastique. Toutefois, étant
donné que la sensibilité aux raisons n’est une condition nécessaire que pour la responsa-
bilité doxastique, cela ne veut pas dire que les sujets souffrant d’auto-illusion sont
toujours responsables de leurs croyances.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the same way that we reproach the ignorant subject, “You should have
known,” we reproach the self-deceiver, “You shouldn’t be self-deceived.” Both
the ignorant subject and the self-deceived subject make an epistemic1 mistake,
for which they are to blame at least epistemically and sometimes morally. Since
blame requires responsibility, holding self-deceivers responsible for their self-
deceptive belief must be appropriate. If these assumptions are correct, then there
should be a way of explaining why self-deceptive beliefs are beliefs for which
we are responsible.
According to Alfred Mele, self-deception need not be conceived on the model
of interpersonal deception but may simply be understood as a motivationally
biased belief (Mele, 1997; 1999; 2001; 2006). Because, according to such a
conception, self-deception consists in, among other things, holding a belief, a
theory of doxastic responsibility should be able to explain how we can be respon-
sible for self-deceptive beliefs.Among the various competing theories of doxas-
tic responsibility, reasons responsiveness (McHugh, 2013; 2014; 2015) offers a
necessary condition for doxastic responsibility.
In this paper, I argue that Mele’s conception of self-deception is such that it
always fulfils the reasons-responsiveness condition for doxastic responsibility.
This is because self-deceptive mechanisms of belief formation are such that the
kind of beliefs they bring about are the kind of beliefs that fulfil the criteria for
doxastic responsibility and more particularly the criteria for doxastic responsi-
bility from epistemic reasons responsiveness. I explain why in this paper. Mele
describes the relation of the subject to the evidence as a biased relation. The
subject does not simply believe on the basis of evidence, but on the basis of
manipulated evidence. Mele puts forward four ways in which the subject does
this. The subject could misinterpret positively or negatively, selectively focus,
or gather evidence. What matters is that the evidence is framed such that the
final product constitutes evidence on the basis of which the subject may believe
a certain proposition. This strategy requires avoiding coming into contact with
data that would disprove P. If the subject does not manage to avoid it, then that
subject might instead misinterpret such information as counting in favour of P
or at least as not counting against P. Whichever form of manipulation the subject
uses, the evidence against Pmust be neutralized in one way or another. Success-
ful neutralization of the evidence requires the ability to recognize what the
evidence supports and the ability to react to it.
Reasons responsiveness requires that subjects would recognize evidence against
P if they were presented with it and that they would react to this evidence if they
were presented with it. These conditions that require the subject to recognize
and react to evidence in counterfactual scenarios express an ability that is
expected from the subject, and it is the possession of this ability that makes a
belief reasons responsive.
12
0
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
I argue that, in order to successfully self-deceive, an epistemic subject must
possess this ability. Possessing this ability makes a belief reasons responsive. In
that sense, self-deceptive beliefs always fulfil the reasons-responsiveness condi-
tion for doxastic responsibility. However, given that reasons responsiveness is
only a necessary condition for doxastic responsibility, this does not mean that
self-deceived subjects are always responsible for their belief.
In order to show this, I proceed in the following way. In section II, I summarize
the reasons-responsiveness account of doxastic responsibility. In section III,
I offer a reminder of Mele’s theory of self-deception. In sections IV, V, and VI,
I apply reasons responsiveness to self-deception.
II. EPISTEMIC REASONS RESPONSIVENESS
According to the reasons-responsiveness account of doxastic responsibility
defended by Conor McHugh (2013; 2014; 2017), subjects are responsible for
their beliefs and other attitudes in virtue of a feature they must possess: reasons
responsiveness.
I speak of doxastic responsibility here because I take it that the object under
consideration is a belief and that we cannot assess the responsibility for self-
deception without using an adequate theory that pertains to its particular object.
Most authors take on assessing responsibility for self-deception by asking
whether subjects are morally responsible for it. I differ in that I first want to
ground moral responsibility in doxastic responsibility.
One dominant account of doxastic responsibility is McHugh’s application of
Fischer and Ravizza’s reasons-responsiveness account (Fischer and Ravizza,
1998) to the epistemic case, epistemic reasons responsiveness. Whereas Fischer
and Ravizza’s reasons responsiveness provides necessary conditions for respon-
sibility for actions, McHugh provides us with necessary conditions for beliefs.
The crucial difference is that, in the epistemic version of reasons responsive-
ness, we are not after any reasons that agents would recognize for holding their
belief and that constitute the basis on which they form, maintain, or revise their
belief, but we are specifically after epistemic reasons—that is, the evidence that
agents would recognize for holding their belief and that constitute the basis on
which they form, maintain, or revise their belief. The difference is important
because practical reasons and epistemic reasons do not function in the same way
with regard to belief. It is indeed frequently admitted that we cannot believe a
proposition for practical reasons. Thus, the only reasons that are pertinent to the
responsiveness of belief are epistemic reasons. Therefore, there is an important
difference in applying epistemic reasons responsiveness to self-deception rather
than simple reasons responsiveness to it—not only because these theories are
different but also because of the reason why there is an epistemic reasons respon-
siveness in the first place: we cannot ask agents to be responsive to nonepis-
temic reasons in order for them to be responsible for their belief.
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Levy (2004) and DeWeese-Boyd (2007) and Nelkin (2013), who discuss the
application of reasons-responsiveness accounts of moral responsibility to self-
deception, seem rather concerned with the actions and omissions (mental and
nonmental) that lead to or maintain a state of self-deception.2 In this vein, they
are concerned with responsibility for self-deception in virtue of the indirect
control we have over these beliefs. Such indirect control operates through actions
(and omissions). Given that these authors are asking whether we can be held
responsible for self-deception in virtue of these actions and omissions that
surround self-deception, it makes perfect sense to turn to the Fischer and Ravizza
version of reasons responsiveness, since they, too are interested in responsibil-
ity for actions. I am concerned not with questions of responsibility for the actions
that lead to and follow from being in a state of self-deception, but with the state
itself—that is, the self-deceptive belief. For this reason, McHugh’s reasons
responsiveness, since it concerns doxastic responsibility directly, is better fitted
for the task of asking whether and why subjects may be held responsible for
their self-deceptive belief.
Theories of doxastic responsibility try to explain why there can be responsibil-
ity for beliefs despite doxastic involuntarism. Doxastic involuntarism is the
thesis that beliefs are not under our direct control (Williams, 1973;Alston, 1988).
We may work to abandon them or form new ones by means of other actions or
attitudes, but not in the same way that we are able to raise an arm at will. Because
we lack direct control over beliefs, it may seem as if we can never be held
responsible for our beliefs. Several solutions to this problem have been offered
in the literature. Most3 theories of doxastic responsibility aim at grounding
responsibility for beliefs on a basis that does not involve direct control. Some
argue that what is needed is a form of indirect control (Meylan, 2013; 2017;
Peels, 2013; 2017), others argue that we are responsible for beliefs if they are
intentional (Steup, 2012), and others explain that we are responsible for beliefs
in virtue of the fact that beliefs are the kind of attitude that reflect our take on
the world (Hieronymi, 2008).
Reasons responsiveness remains the most agnostic of these theories with regard
to the exact nature of control over beliefs; it endorses neither direct nor indirect
control. In this sense, the type of control reasons responsiveness requires for one
to be responsible for one’s beliefs is minimal. Mele’s conception of self-decep-
tion as motivationally biased belief intuitively doesn’t seem to require any kind
of doxastic control that is not minimal, whether direct or indirect. Given that
reasons responsiveness requires only a minimal form of control, this makes it
perfectly well suited to accommodate Mele’s model of self-deception.
McHugh proposes a form of control that is distinct from direct control and indirect
control and which applies specifically to beliefs and other attitudes: attitudinal
control (McHugh, 2017). Nevertheless, this particular notion of control is a very
minimal one, more akin to a kind of sensitivity to evidence. S has attitudinal control
over S’s belief that P only if4 S’s belief is responsive to reasons. S’s belief that P is
responsive to reasons only if both of the following conditions hold.
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Reasons Receptivity
S would recognize epistemic reasons5 to believe P if presented with
such reasons to believe P.
Reasons Reactivity
S would react to epistemic reasons S has to believe P.
Reasons receptivity and reasons reactivity together form epistemic reasons
responsiveness (McHugh, 2013; 2014; 2015). Reasons responsiveness is a
necessary condition for doxastic responsibility.
A belief fulfils the reasons-receptivity condition if in a sufficiently wide range
of counterfactual scenarios relevant to the actual scenario the subject recognizes
evidence counting in favour of or against P. Being reasons receptive amounts to
being able to recognize that some evidence would count in favour of or against
P if one were presented with such evidence. For example, suppose I believe that
the teapot on my desk contains Earl Grey. My belief is reasons receptive if, were
there Lapsang Souchong in the teapot, I would recognize the smoky scent
emanating from the teapot as evidence counting against the belief that the teapot
is full of Earl Grey.
A belief fulfils the reasons-reactivity condition if the subject, when faced with
evidence to the contrary, reacts to that evidence by revising the belief, and would
do so in a sufficiently wide range of counterfactual scenarios relevant to the
actual scenario. For example, take again my belief that the teapot on my desk
contains Earl Grey. Given that the smoky scent emanating from the teapot would
be evidence supporting the belief that the teapot contains Lapsang Souchong
and not Earl Grey, I am reactive to evidence if I abandon the belief that the teapot
contains Earl Grey in reaction to this new piece of evidence.
Beliefs that are not reasons responsive are beliefs for which we are not respon-
sible—beliefs involved in paranoia, for example (McHugh, 2014). In these cases,
the belief fails to be reasons receptive. The subject would not recognize evidence
supporting not-P if he or she were presented with such evidence in a wide range
of counterfactual scenarios relevant to the actual scenario. For example, take the
true belief that there is someone sitting behind me in the café. If in a wide range
of relevant counterfactual scenarios I turn around, see no one at the table behind
me, and yet do not recognize this as evidence that there is no one sitting behind
me, I am not receptive to evidence. This is one way to fail to be reasons respon-
sive. Another way to fail to be reasons responsive is to fail to be reactive to
reasons. For McHugh, what he calls a “repressed belief” typically fails to react
to recognized evidence. By “repressed beliefs,” McHugh means implicit preju-
diced beliefs, for example (McHugh, 2017; p. 2752). In spite of having the abil-
ity to recognize reasons against their belief, subjects are not able to revise it.
Here the subjects are not reasons reactive, and thus not reasons responsive. Thus,
on the reasons-responsiveness account of doxastic responsibility, the paranoid
subjects and subjects with repressed beliefs are not responsible for their beliefs.
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In the next section, I turn my attention to self-deception itself and more precisely
to Alfred Mele’s account, of which I provide an overview.
III. MELEAN SELF-DECEPTION
The following description of self-deception is generally agreed upon in the liter-
ature. A subject is self-deceived in believing a certain proposition when that
subject seems to persist in believing this proposition in spite of the evidence he
or she has against this proposition. In the majority of cases present in the liter-
ature, self-deceptive beliefs are emotionally significant for the subject: beliefs
about the faithfulness of partners, beliefs about the morality of your loved ones,
beliefs about our own value or emotional states, and the like. Mele proposes the
following set of jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception (Mele, 1997;
1999; 2001; 2006):
1) The belief that p which S acquires is false.
2) S treats data relevant, or at least seemingly relevant, to the truth value
of p in a motivationally biased way.
3) This biased treatment is a non-deviant cause of S’s acquiring the belief
that p.
4) The body of data possessed by S at the time provides greater warrant for
¬p than for p.
As will become apparent, if reasons responsiveness is to be found in self-decep-
tion, its locus must be situated in the way the self-deceived subject treats data or
evidence: indeed, in explaining doxastic responsibility, reasons responsiveness
focuses on the way in which the subject recognizes and reacts to evidence. For
this reason, I focus on Mele’s second condition for self-deception and the way
in which one treats the evidence.
Note that Mele mentions no desire in his conditions. The subject’s desire that P,
however, seems to be implicit in the second condition, which states that the
subject treats the evidence in a motivationally biased way. For the present
purpose, I will take the subject’s motivation to be a desire. “Biased” picks out
the manipulative strategies at work in the formation or sustaining of the subject’s
beliefs. Take the following example.
Annie and Alvy
Annie wishes she were still in love with Alvy. Because of her desire,
she interprets the frequent knots in her stomach in his proximity as
evidence that she is still in love—whilst in reality these knots are
evidence of a growing anxiety in his presence—and forms the belief
that she is still in love with Alvy. She also ignores the fact that she has
lost interest in what Alvy does and frequently avoids physical contact.
Annie is self-deceived in believing that she is still in love with Alvy.
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HereAnnie (1) forms the false belief that she is still in love withAlvy; (2) treats
the evidence relevant to whether she is still being in love with Alvy in a moti-
vationally biased way, by interpreting, because of her desire to still be in love
with him, the knots in her stomach as evidence of her still being in love with him;
(3) treats the evidence in such a way that it nondeviantly causes her to form the
belief that she is still in love withAlvy; and (4) possesses a body of evidence that
provides greater warrant for believing that she is not in love withAlvy anymore
than for believing that she is still in love with Alvy.
Condition (2) requires that the self-deceived subject treat evidence in a motiva-
tionally biased way. This means that the subject acquires a belief that has been
formed thanks to some biasing strategies. The biasing strategies in play may
result in, but are not restricted to, the following effects: negative misinterpreta-
tion of the evidence, positive misinterpretation of the evidence, selective focus-
ing on the evidence, and selective evidence gathering (Mele, 2001). In what
follows, I provide the details of these ways of manipulating the evidence and
see how these might play out in “Annie and Alvy.”
In cases of negative misinterpretation, the subject does not count as supporting
not-P (where P stands for “Annie is still in love withAlvy”) evidence that would
be recognized as supporting not-P in the absence of her desire that P (Mele,
2007). In “Annie and Alvy,” there must be evidence that Annie would usually
count as supporting not-P but that she does not count, in this scenario, as
supporting not-P—e.g., that her heart does not race when Alvy is nearby.
In cases of positive misinterpretation, the subject counts as supporting P
evidence that would be recognized as supporting not-P in the absence of his or
her desire that P (Mele, 2007). Again, in “Annie and Alvy,” there could also be
evidence thatAnnie would usually count as supporting not-P but that she counts,
in this scenario, as supporting P—e.g., the knots in her stomach.
In cases of selective focusing, the subject fails to focus on evidence that that
subject would usually count as supporting not-P in the absence of his or her
desire and focuses on evidence that seems to support P (Mele, 2007). Recurring
panic attacks in the presence of Alvy would be an example of evidence that
Annie would usually count as supporting not-P in normal circumstances but that
she ignores in the actual scenario, where she is self-deceived. Instead she focuses
on evidence that seems to support P—e.g., that she enjoyedAlvy’s last steamed
lobster.
In cases of selective evidence gathering, the subject overlooks evidence support-
ing not-P that would have been easy to obtain in the absence of his or her desire
that P and finds evidence seemingly supporting P that would have been hard to
find in the absence of his or her desire that P. For example, Annie might avoid
opening her journal and instead spend time looking at pictures of their last holi-
day together. The crucial difference with selective focusing on evidence is that,
whereas the latter consists in cognitive operations (e.g., remembering, forgetting,
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ignoring, etc.), the former seems to consist in concrete actions (e.g., searching,
collecting, looking, reading or not reading one’s journal, etc.).
Negative misinterpretation, positive misinterpretation, selective focusing, and
selective evidence gathering all consist in successfully manipulating the
evidence in such a way that it fits the subject’s desire that P.
Mele’s account captures perfectly well a feature of the phenomenon I have
described at the beginning of this section. This is the feature of self-deception
that consists in the subject’s being in touch with the evidence in one way or
another. The subject seems indeed to entertain a paradoxical relation with what
that subject believes to be the facts. As I have shown in my presentation of
reasons responsiveness, the subject’s relation to the evidence is the locus of
doxastic responsibility. Indeed, for a subject to be considered responsible for his
or her belief, that belief must be reasons responsive. Another way of saying this
is that subjects may be held responsible for their belief only if they follow the
norms that govern belief formation, maintenance, and revision. According to
these norms, subjects should be able to recognize (the right kind of) reasons for
their belief if presented with them and should be able to react to these same
reasons. This norm concerns the subject’s relation to evidence. Thus, if we are
to assess the reasons responsiveness of self-deception—to assess whether
subjects fulfil a necessary condition for being held responsible for their self-
deceptive beliefs—we will have to take a closer look at the feature of self-decep-
tion that pertains to the subjects’ relation to the evidence. This is what I do in the
next section. If it turns out that in cases of self-deception a subject would indeed
recognize and react to epistemic reasons in a wide and relevant range of coun-
terfactual scenarios, then the subject’s belief is reasons responsive and more-
over fulfils a necessary condition for doxastic responsibility.
IV. ACTUAL-SEQUENCE MECHANISM
Before I go on to ask whether self-deceptive beliefs fulfil both reasons recep-
tivity and reasons reactivity, it is important to clarify the range of counterfactual
scenarios that must be examined in order to determine whether self-deceptive
beliefs meet the reasons-responsiveness condition. Delimiting the relevant range
of counterfactual scenarios depends on the mechanism of belief formation in the
actual sequence, also known as the actual-sequence mechanism. In this section,
I identify this mechanism as the manipulation of the evidence that takes place in
self-deception and that enables self-deceived subjects to form a belief that fits
their desire.
What determines the relevance of the counterfactual scenario is the mechanism
of belief formation used in the actual scenario, the actual-sequence mechanism.
The mechanism must be the same across a wide range of counterfactual scenar-
ios. It is however unclear what the conditions for the individuation of the actual-
sequence mechanism are (Ginet, 2006; McKenna, 2013), and defining them
remains to be done. This is a problem not only for McHugh’s epistemic reasons
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responsiveness, but for Fischer and Ravizza’s original reasons-responsiveness
account, too, from which he borrows.
Fischer and Ravizza themselves provide the following explanation:
We must confess that we do not have any general way of specifying
when two kinds of mechanisms are the same. This is a potential prob-
lem for our approach; it will have to be considered carefully by the
reader. But rather than attempting to say much by way of giving an
account of mechanism individuation, we shall simply rely on the fact
that people have intuitions about fairly clear cases of “same kind of
mechanism” and “different kind of mechanism”. For example, we rely
on the intuitive judgement that the normal mechanism of practical
reasoning is different from deliberations that are induced by signifi-
cant direct electronic manipulation of the brain, hypnosis, subliminal
advertising, and so forth. (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998, p. 40)
The individuation of the actual-sequence mechanism is a general difficulty for
reasons responsiveness, and my concern is not to solve it here. Instead I will
rely on McHugh’s own indication regarding the epistemic case, that “the actual
sequence mechanism must be owned by the agent” and “might be things like
perception, memory and reasoning” (McHugh, 2013, p. 143).
One option is to narrow the mechanism down to these simple mechanisms—
i.e., perception, memory, reasoning, etc.—by excluding the subject’s desire and
biases from the mechanism. The problem with this option is that, if the relevant
counterfactual scenarios are those in which the subject is not motivationally
biased, then the relevant counterfactual scenarios are scenarios where the subject
is not self-deceived in the Melean sense. This is rather odd and gives the impres-
sion that we wouldn’t be assessing the reasons responsiveness of self-deceptive
beliefs only, but those of non-self-deceptive beliefs as well.
It might also be that the actual sequence mechanism consists in the interpreta-
tion of evidence in a motivationally biased way—in short, that it consists in the
manipulation of the evidence (i.e., negative misinterpretation, positive misin-
terpretation, selective focusing, and selective gathering). This claim entails that
the manipulation of the evidence is a mechanism in its own right, akin to mech-
anisms such as perception, memory, and reasoning. One might object that, even
though manipulation might count as a type of mechanism, there seems to be an
important difference between manipulation, on the one hand, and perception,
memory, and reasoning on the other: contrarily to perception, memory, and
reasoning, manipulation is a composite of simpler mechanisms. It might be,
indeed, that manipulation of the evidence requires perceiving the evidence in
the first place. However, the same holds for memory. Therefore, if McHugh
identifies memory as a legitimate mechanism of belief formation, then confer-
ring the same status onto manipulation should not be an issue. That manipula-
tion constitutes a mechanism in its own right does not seem too unreasonable;
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it is after all the way in which a subject acquires a self-deceptive belief. In the
same way that a subject comes to believe by means of perceiving, the self-
deceived subject comes to believe by means of manipulating the evidence.When
we ask which mechanism of belief formation led the subject to believe deceit-
fully, it is more likely that we point at the manipulation of the evidence rather
than at a noncomposite form of mechanism.
I have identified the actual-sequence mechanism in the case of self-deception
with the manipulation of the evidence.What has not been determined is whether
the manipulation of the evidence should remain of the very same kind (that is,
fixed) throughout the counterfactual scenarios (e.g., positive misinterpreta-
tion)—this is manipulation narrowly conceived.Alternatively, the manipulation
of the evidence could be allowed to adjust to different ways of becoming moti-
vationally biased (e.g., positive misinterpretation at w1, negative misinterpreta-
tion at w2, selective focusing at w3, …, wn, where w1, w2, and w3, …, wn, are
relevant counterfactual scenarios)—this is manipulation broadly conceived. I
presuppose that allowing the kind of manipulation to vary across the counter-
factual scenarios is analogous to allowing the way one visually perceives to vary
(e.g., wears glasses at w1, squints at w2, etc.), hence the general advice for the
individuation of the actual-sequence mechanism is not violated. It would make
little sense not to allow the kind of manipulation to vary. After all, if the kind of
manipulation does not vary depending on the epistemic reasons or on the
evidence with which the subject would be confronted, the relevant range of
counterfactual scenarios would be overly restricted. That is, the range would be
restricted to counterfactual scenarios in which, for example, the subjects posi-
tively misinterpret their evidence in order to believe what they desire. Because
it only makes sense that the evidence counting against what the subject desires
would be positively misinterpreted by the subject, the range of counterfactual
scenarios would also be restricted to counterfactual scenarios in which the
subject is confronted with evidence counting against the subject’s desire (if we’re
looking at belief formation) or belief (if we’re looking at belief maintenance).
A range of counterfactual scenarios thus restricted is in fact not relevant, in the
sense that the very point of thinking about reasons responsiveness in counter-
factual terms is to look at what would happen if the subject were confronted
with evidence that is different than in the actual scenario. Let us add here as well
that what matters when it comes to individuation of the actual-sequence mech-
anism is that it would clearly be the agent’s or the subject’s own—that acting or
believing due to a certain mechanism would be distinct from acting or believing
due to a mechanism that is not the agent’s or subject’s own, having been
implanted in his or her brain by an external person, for example. For these
reasons, I will assume that the ways in which the subject manipulates the
evidence should be allowed to vary.
V. REASONS RECEPTIVITY
In this section, I assess the reasons receptivity of self-deceptive beliefs.For any
S, where S is a self-deceived subject, to fulfil the reasons-receptivity require-
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ment, the following proposition must be true: S is self-deceived and S would
recognize evidence against P across a wide range of relevant counterfactual
scenarios. In other words, it must be the case that “S is self-deceived” and “S
would recognize evidence against P across a wide range of relevant counterfac-
tual scenarios” can be true at the same time.
Let’s start with the actual scenario. In the actual scenario, S becomes self-
deceived, let’s suppose, by means of positive misinterpretation. S’s desire that
P leads S to count as supporting P evidence that supports not-P. For example,
Annie’s desire to still be in love with Alvy leads her to interpret her stomach
knots as support for the belief that she’s still in love, though the evidence in fact
supports the belief that she’s not in love anymore (let’s say the knots are caused
by her anxiety). For Annie to be receptive to reasons, there must a wide range
of relevant counterfactual scenarios in which she would recognize evidence
supporting not-P (that she’s not in love with Alvy anymore). The basic idea is
that Annie must be sensitive to alternative evidence across these scenarios.
If the actual-sequence mechanism is the manipulation of the evidence, then the
relevant range of counterfactual scenarios are the ones where Annie comes to
believe a proposition by manipulating the evidence. In these counterfactual
scenarios, evidence, whether it supports P in some or not-P in others, is manip-
ulated and interpreted as supporting P. BecauseAnnie comes to believe P in all
the relevant counterfactual scenarios, it might look as though, at first sight, her
belief is not receptive to reasons. That she does might result inAnnie’s belief not
being reactive to reasons, but for now let us simply look at the receptivity of her
belief.
If we identify the mechanism of belief formation as the manipulation of the
evidence itself, the relevant range of counterfactual scenarios are the ones where
S comes to believe that P by manipulating the evidence in various ways. Thus,
for each variation in the evidence, during which the desire that P remains
constant, the way of manipulating the evidence is adjusted to the evidence at
hand. In these counterfactual scenarios, S recognizes evidence supporting P, or
evidence supporting not-P in order to be further taken as supporting P. In
“Annie andAlvy,” the evidence across the counterfactual scenarios might vary:
at w1, Annie has knots in her stomach, at w2 she does not, at w3 she has a panic
attack, etc. In each counterfactual scenario, the way of interpreting the evidence
changes so as to adjust to what is required in order to satisfy Annie’s desire to
still be in love with Alvy. At w2, for example, Annie might resort to negative
misinterpretation by not taking the absence of knots in her stomach as evidence
supporting that she is not in love. Evidence at w3 might call for selective focu-
sing. The point is that such adaptation requires the ability to recognize evidence.
Thus, according to a conception of the manipulation of the evidence broadly
conceived, self-deceptive beliefs fulfil reasons receptivity. If they fulfil reasons
reactivity as well, then self-deceptive beliefs are responsive to reasons.
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VI. REASONS REACTIVITY
I now turn to reasons reactivity. For S, where S is a self-deceived subject, to
fulfil the reasons-reactivity requirement, the following proposition must be true:
S would react to evidence against P across a wide range of relevant counterfac-
tual scenarios. In other words, it must be the case that “Swould react to evidence
against P across a wide range of relevant counterfactual scenarios” must be true
at the same time. I hinted at the fact, in the previous section, that, because the
self-deceived subject forms the belief that P no matter the evidence he or she
recognizes, it might look as if self-deceptive beliefs fail to meet the reasons-
reactivity part of reasons responsiveness.
In the actual scenario, S becomes self-deceived, let us suppose again, by means
of positive misinterpretation. S’s desire that P leads S to count as supporting P
evidence that supports not-P and further to form the belief that P. Annie’s desire
to still be in love with Alvy would lead her to count her stomach knots as
supporting the belief that she is still in love, though the evidence in fact supports
the belief that she is not in love anymore (suppose the knots are caused by her
anxiety), and, on this basis, she would form the belief that she is still in love. For
Annie to be reactive to evidence, there must a wide range of relevant counter-
factual scenarios in which she reacts to evidence she recognizes as supporting
not-P by forming a belief accordingly. In fact,Annie would react to evidence she
recognizes as supporting not-P by forming a belief contrary to what she recog-
nizes as evidence. This way of failing to meet reasons reactivity, if it is indeed
the case, has little to do with the way in which subjects are typically said to fail
to meet this condition. Indeed, as we’ve seen earlier, what McHugh has in mind
are rather cases of what he calls “repressed beliefs,” beliefs whose content the
subject rejects while maintaining his or her belief. But this is not what is happen-
ing in the case of self-deceptive beliefs. It is not that the subject would not react
to evidence going against what that subject desires. Successful self-deception
in fact requires that the subjects react to what they recognize to be evidence
against P, except that they would react contrarily to this evidence. For McHugh,
in order to fulfil reasons reactivity, the subject’s belief should be such that in a
wide range of counterfactual scenarios, the subject would react to evidence “by
forming the doxastic attitude she takes them to call for” (McHugh, 2017,
p. 2751). In the case of self-deception, evidence recognized as counting against
P calls for forming or maintaining the belief that P. Although this way of react-
ing to evidence is epistemically vicious, it does not show that the subject lacks
the capacity to react to evidence and, in this sense, it does not infringe on the
subject’s responsibility for his or her belief.
The proposition “Swould react to evidence he or she recognizes against P across
a wide range of relevant counterfactual scenarios” is true. Therefore, self-decep-
tion satisfies reasons reactivity.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Self-deceptive beliefs fulfil both reasons receptivity and reasons reactivity.
Consequently, self-deceptive beliefs fulfil reasons responsiveness and thus meet
a necessary condition for doxastic responsibility. If self-deceptive beliefs are
reasons responsive, depending on whether or not one is willing to accept reasons
responsiveness as a sufficient as well as necessary condition for doxastic respon-
sibility, then we may be held responsible for our self-deceptive beliefs. However,
reasons responsiveness is only a necessary condition for doxastic responsibility.
This leaves room for sometimes not being held responsible for self-deceptive
beliefs, since reasons responsiveness is not sufficient.
I will not take on the task of supplementing McHugh’s account by showing that
the reasons-responsiveness condition is also sufficient for responsibility. I do
think the latter idea is plausible, however. Before concluding, I would like to at
least provide some support for this idea. The following rough picture of respon-
sibility is generally agreed upon: an epistemic condition and a control condition
are required and, if fulfilled, add up to responsibility. Each theory then works out
these conditions in further detail. We have seen that the case of belief poses a
challenge to this picture of responsibility as it is not under our direct voluntary
control. Instead McHugh offers a condition for responsibility that depends on an
ability the subject should possess. This ability, as we’ve seen, consists in recog-
nizing alternative evidence to one’s belief and reacting accordingly if presented
with it. This ability, reasons responsiveness, includes an epistemic component—
in requiring a certain awareness on the part of the subject vis-à-vis their reasons
for believing—and, for lack of a control component, a component that draws
on the proper functioning of the subject’s mechanism of belief formation. Once
we concede that there can responsibility without direct voluntary control, these
two components of reasons responsiveness together seem to exhaust what can
be required of a responsible belief.
To conclude, I have argued that, at least on Mele’s account of self-deception,
self-deceptive beliefs always fulfil the reasons-responsiveness condition for
doxastic responsibility. This is because the self-deceived subject’s relation to
evidence is such that the subject would recognize and react to evidence against
P if that subject were presented with it. I believe not only that this feature of
self-deception is present in Mele’s account of self-deception, but that we find it
in any account of self-deception that posits a similar relation to the evidence on
the part of the subject. In this sense, self-deceived subjects always fulfil a neces-
sary condition for doxastic responsibility.
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NOTES
1 Epistemic at least. I remain agnostic on whether self-deception further consists in a moral
mistake. In this sense, I follow Neil Levy, who argues that we shouldn’t be presumed culpa-
ble for self-deception (Levy, 2004). However, I make a step towards disagreeing with him on
whether we shouldn’t necessarily hold subjects responsible for their self-deception, since I
argue that self-deceptive beliefs always fulfil a necessary condition for responsibility. What
is being reproached of the subjects is that they should have believed better at least according
to epistemic norms. Plausibly, self-deception also constitutes a moral mistake: we might
reproach the subjects for believing something they shouldn’t according to moral norms as
well.
2 Nelkin rightly points out that, in order to ultimately gain a proper understanding what respon-
sibility for self-deception is, we should “get clear about exactly what the self-deceiver is
supposed to be responsible for. We should distinguish between the process of self-deception,
the immediate product of self-deception, and its more indirect consequences” (Nelkin, 2013,
p. 129). She herself proposes several ways in which one might deal with the questions, one of
them being to understand self-deception as a case of culpable negligence. Note also that, as
she underlines, her approach to reasons responsiveness is agent based rather than mechanism
based (Nelkin, 2013, p. 126).
3 Some argue that it is in fact possible to believe at will (Peels, 2015) or intentionally (Steup,
2017).
4 It is not clear whether McHugh takes reasons responsiveness to be both necessary and suffi-
cient for responsibility. In McHugh, 2013, McHugh mentions that reasons responsiveness
might also be sufficient.
5 In McHugh, 2014, McHugh specifies the kind of reasons in play here. They are what he calls
“object-directed reasons”—that is, reasons “for being in some doxastic state that are such
because they pertain to whether its content is true or false” (McHugh, 2014, p. 16) or reasons
that consist in “considerations that pertain to the world’s being as it is represented in the state’s
content” (ibid., p. 16-17). In other words, when S is epistemically reasons responsive, the
reasons to which S responds are of the sort that make it epistemically warranted for S to believe
that P.
13
2
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
REFERENCES
Alston, William, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification,” Philosophical
Perspectives, vol. 2, 1988, p. 257-299.
DeWeese-Boyd, Ian, “Taking Care: Self-Deception, Culpability and Control,” Teorema, vol. 23,
no. 3, 2007, p. 161-176.
Fischer, John M., and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsi-
bility, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Ginet, Carl, “Working with Fischer and Ravizza’sAccount of Moral Responsibility,” Journal of
Ethics, vol. 10, no. 3, 2005, p. 229-253.
Hieronymi, Pamela, “Responsibility for Believing,” Synthese, vol. 161, no. 3, 2008, p. 357-373.
Levy, Neil, “Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility,” Ratio, vol. 17, no. 3, 2004, p. 294-311.
McHugh, Conor, “Epistemic Responsibility and DoxasticAgency,” Philosophical Issues, vol. 23,
no. 1, 2013, p. 132-157.
———, “Exercising Doxastic Freedom,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 88,
no. 1, 2014, p. 1-37.
———, “Attitudinal Control,” Synthese, vol. 194, no. 8, 2017, p. 2745-2762.
McKenna, Michael, “Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents and Mechanisms,” in Oxford Studies in
Agency and Responsibility, vol. 1, 2013, p. 151 -183.
Mele,Alfred, “Real Self-Deception,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 20, no. 1, 1997, p. 91-
102.
———, “Twisted Self-Deception,” Philosophical Psychology, vol. 12, no. 2, 1999, p. 117-137.
———, Self-Deception Unmasked, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001.
———, “Self-Deception and Delusions,” European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 2, no.
1, 2006, p. 109-124.
Meylan, Anne, “The Legitimacy of Intellectual Praise and Blame,” Journal of Philosophical
Research, vol. 40, 2015, p. 189-203.
———, “The Consequential Control of Doxastic Responsibility,” Theoria, vol. 83, no. 1, 2017,
p. 4-28.
Nelkin, Dana, “Responsibility and Self-Deception,” Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical
Studies, vol. 5, no. 20, 2012, p. 117-139.
Peels, Rik, “Does Doxastic Responsibility Entail the Ability To Believe Otherwise?” Synthese,
vol. 190, no. 17, 2013, p. 3651-3669.
———, “Believing at Will Is Possible,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 93, no. 3,
2015, p. 1018.
13
3
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
———, Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2017.
Steup, Matthias, “Belief Control and Intentionality,” Synthese, vol. 188, no. 2, 2012,
p. 145-163.
———, “Believing Intentionally,” Synthese, vol. 194, no. 8, 2017, p. 2673-2694.
Williams, Bernard, “Deciding To Believe,” in Problems of the Self, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1973, p. 136-151.
13
4
V
O
L
U
M
E
1
3
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
É
T
É
/
S
U
M
M
E
R
2
0
1
8
